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
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A Special Volume on Prague School Structuralism
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THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO

Frantisek William Galan

Frantisek Galan (1946-1991): In Memoriam

MICHAEL HOLQUIST

Make hue among the dark comedians,
Halloo them in the topmost distances
For answer from their icy Elysee. Wallace Stevens

On Monday, October 21, 1991, Frantisek Galan, Professor of Comparative and Slavic Literature at Vanderbilt University, died after a six month encounter with Leukemia.

Professor Galan was born in Slovakia in the dark years following the German occupation. Except for brief meetings, his father (a distinguished lawyer) and mother were separated by the war, and then by events leading up to, and following the Communist accession to power. Professor Galan was raised largely by an uncle, a Supreme court judge, in Bratislava. His father was arrested and imprisoned during the Slansky trials, and although later released, died a broken man. Professor Galan nevertheless remembered his youth with fondness, and he never forgot the friends he made in those years, many of them now occupying high posts in the new Czechoslovakia. A great lover of all the arts, Professor Galan early fell in love with classical American Jazz, and served as the impresario for several local groups of musicians. It was only natural, then, on entering the Comenius University of Bratislava in 1966, that he should devote himself to a Major in English and American Studies, with a minor in Slavic Philology.

After the Soviet invasion of 1968, Professor Galan left Czechoslovakia for Canada, where he received his B.A. (with a Major in Slavic Studies, and a Minor in English) from the university of Toronto in 1970. He began graduate work in Comparative Literature at Princeton the same year, receiving his M.A. in 1974. He returned to Canada for his doctoral work at the University of Montreal. He completed his dissertation, "Toward a Structural and Semiotic theory of Literary History: the Prague School Project, 1928-1944," and received his doctorate from Toronto in 1980.

In 1977 Professor Galan began what was to be a distinguished (if all too short) teaching career as an Assistant Professor at the University of Pittsburgh; from 1978 to 1985 he taught in the Slavic and Comparative Literature departments at the University of Texas, Austin (with a stint as Adjunct Assistant Professor of Semiotics at Brown University's Center for Semiotic Studies).

Having done pioneering work in establishing the importance of Russian Formalist film theory for a generation of Western experts, Professor Galan was appointed Associate Professor of English and Film at Georgia Institute of Technology, where he served from 1985 to 1988 (when he spent a one semester appointment in the English Department of Emory University). In 1988 he took up his final appointment as Professor of Comparative and Slavic Literatures at Vanderbilt University.

During his short life Professor Galan won several distinguished Fellowships including those from the National Humanities Center in Triangle Park, N. C. , the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C. His 1981 monograph, *Prague School Pragmatics* and, above all, his magisterial *Historic Structures : The Prague School Project, 1928-1946* (Austin : University of Texas Press, 1984), established Professor Galan as one of the leading authorities in the area of East European literary theory. *Historic Structures* was immediately recognized as a work whose rigor was matched only by its lucidity; it has now appeared in new editions, as well as in Spanish and Japanese translation. At his death he had completed editing a special issue of the *Indian Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics* devoted to the work of the Prague School, and had all but finished *Poetics of Cinema*, an anthology of Formalist writings on film theory (which will be completed by his friends). Professor Galan's central project of his last years, a large volume on "Prague Between the Wars: an attempt at a Semiotic Study of Culture," will now not see the light of day.

The world of learning will not soon forget Frantisek Galan as an erudite and innovative scholar. But there is always a portion of even the greatest scholar's life that "is not writ in any book." Of this portion of Frantisek Galan's existence it may truly be said that his intelligence did not flag in the teeth of certain death. Those who enjoyed the gift of his friendship will cherish all their lives the memory of his precise wit, the elegance of his personal style, and his consummate love of all things beautiful and well made.

Go Not Thou about to Square the Circle : The Prague School in a Nutshell

In memoriam Frantisek W. Galan

PETER STEINER

The Prague School (henceforth PS) is the established name for the international group of scholars in linguistics, literature, theatre, folklore, and general aesthetics organized as the Prague Linguistic Circle (1926 - 1948). In its origins, the PS was in part indebted to Russian formalism, especially the Moscow branch (the Moscow Linguistic Circle whose institutional name it echoed), and some of its members (Petr Bogatyrev, Roman Jakobson). At the same time, the PS had roots in both the Czech tradition of 19th-century Herbartian Formalism (Josef Durdik, Otakar Hostinsky) which conceived of the artistic work as a set of formal relations, and in some post-Herbartian developments in poetics and theatre (Otokar Zich). Among other schools of thought the PS was influenced by Saussurian linguistics, Husserl's Phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology. Such intellectual affinities were welcomed by the members of the PS, since they perceived their enterprise as the crystallization of the new scholarly paradigm for the humanities and social sciences which Jakobson christened *Structuralism* (Jakobson, 1929 : 11).

The history of the PS can be conveniently divided into three periods. The first begins with the establishment of the Circle in 1926 and continues until 1934. During this time, the research of the Structuralists was oriented toward the internal organization of poetic works, especially their sound stratum. Roman Jakobson's and Jan Mukarovsky's histories of old and modern Czech metrics are the most representative works of this phase.

The subsequent period (1934 to 1938) opens with Mukarovsky's study of a little-known Czech poet of the early 19th century, Milota Zdirad Polak, and ends with the Circle's collective volume devoted to the leading Czech Romantic, Karel Hynek Macha. In this period, the PS transcended its immanent orientation toward literary history : the semiotic concept of a literary work rendered it a social fact (i.e., a sign understood by the members of a given collectivity) and enabled the Structuralists to relate the developmental changes in literary history to all other aspects of human culture. Simultaneously, PS scholars extended poetics into aesthetics, shifting from a concern with verbal art alone to a concern with all the arts and with extra-artistic aesthetics as well.

The last period, roughly from 1938 to 1948, is delimited by external interventions. The German invasion forced some members of the PS to leave Czechoslovakia (Bogatyrev, Jakobson, Rene Wellek) and severed the international contacts of the Circle; the Communist takeover ten years later effectively banned the Structuralist study of art and eventually led to the disbanding of the Circle. However, the first blow was mitigated by an influx of junior members into the Circle : the literary historian Felix Vodicka, the student of dramatic art Jiri Veltrusky, and the musicologist Antonin Sychra, among others. During this final stage the research of the PS shifted toward the subjects involved in artistic process (the author and the perceiver). Vodicka's systematic attempt to elaborate the history of literary reception is among the most promising developments of this period.

In the post-War years, the intellectual heritage of the PS was disseminated throughout the world by those members who left Prague. The Structuralist revolution of the 1960s in France and the United States was to a considerable degree stimulated by Roman Jakobson, who in the 1940s helped to establish the Linguistic Circle of New York, of which the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss was a member. Petr Bogatyrev, who returned to the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the war, performed a similar role there. A group of young literary scholars (Miroslav Cervenka, Lubomir Dolezel, Mojmir Grygar, Milan Jankovic) attempted a resurrection of the PS in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, but the Soviet invasion of 1968 dealt it a final blow.

For the PS, Structuralism was a dialectic synthesis of the two global paradigms dominating European thought in the 19th century : Romanticism and Positivism. "European Romantic scholarship", Jakobson observed in 1935, "was an attempt at a general, *global* conception of the universe. The antithesis of Romantic scholarship was the sacrifice of unity for the opportunity to collect the richest factual material, to gain the most varied partial *truth* " (Jakobson, 1935 : 110). Structuralism, the Prague scholars argued, would avoid the one-sidedness of its predecessors by being neither a totalizing philosophical system nor a narrow concrete science. " Structuralism", as Mukarovsky put it, "is a scholarly attitude that proceeds from the knowledge of the unceasing interaction of science and philosophy. I say 'attitude' in order to avoid terms such as 'theory' or 'method.' 'Theory' suggests a fixed body of knowledge, 'method' an equally homogenized and unchangeable set of working rules. Structuralism is neither—it is an epistemological stance from which particular working rules and knowledge follow, to be sure, but which exists independently of them and is, therefore, capable of development in both these aspects" (Mukarovsky, 1941 :13-14). What characterizes the Prague version of Structuralism from other trends claiming that label is its conceptual frame formed by the interplay of three complementary notions—structure, function and sign.

Structure

The concept of structure, which gave the paradigm its name, requires special attention. In the parlance of the PS, it referred to what might be seen as two distinct entities. On the one hand, it denoted the holistic organization of a single work as a hierarchical system of dominant and subordinated elements. But in the same way as Ferdinand de Saussure recognized that every concrete utterance (*parole*) is meaningful only against the background of the collectively shared linguistic code (*langue*), the Prague saw every individual work as an implementation of a particular aesthetic code—a set of artistic norms. These they also termed a structure.

In contrast to Saussure, however, the PS did not believe that any code (whether linguistic or aesthetic) is exclusively synchronic and existing in and of itself. Concerned with literary change, the Structuralists advanced three different models for its description. The earliest emulated to a considerable degree the immanent orientation of Russian Formalism according to which the literary series develops because of its intrinsic need for de-automatization (*aktualisace*). But the limitations of this approach soon became apparent. Poetry does not exist in a social vacuum, Mukarovsky recognized in 1934, "The developmental series of individual structures changing in time (e.g., political, economic, ideological, literary) do not run parallel to each other without contact. On the contrary, they are elements of a structure of a higher order and this structure of structures has its hierarchy and its dominant element (the prevailing series)" (Mukarovsky, 1934 ; 60). The immanent study of literary change was thus augmented by consideration of its external context. The historical trajectory of literature was seen as determined simultaneously by the purely literary needs and the external impulses stemming from social developments.

Despite their differences, the immanent and extrinsic models of literary change describe history from the same vantage point : that of its production. But this perspective is clearly insufficient to explain the becoming of a text solely as a function of the context that generated it, as Vodicka observed in the early 1940s, "Only if read does the work achieve its aesthetic realization [and] become an aesthetic object in the reader's consciousness" (Vodicka, 1942 ; 371). The history of literary reception proposed by Vodicka relativizes considerably the bond between the text and the underlying literary code which provides it with identity. Any work can potentially be reconstituted according to reading conventions that did not exist during its inception and, in this way, assume new and unpredictable appearances.

Function

The second key concept and the trademark of Prague Structuralism was function. Rooted in a purposive view of human behavior, it designated "the active relation

between an object and the goal for which this object is used" (Mukarovsky, 1971 : 17). The PS stressed the social dimension of functionality, the necessary consensus among the members of a collectivity concerning the purpose that an object serves and its utility for such a purpose. From the functional perspective, every individual structure mentioned above (political, economic, etc.) appeared as a set of social norms regulating the attainment of values in these cultural spheres.

Within the functional typology proposed by the Structuralists, the aesthetic function played a special *role*. It might be said that this function was the dialectical negation of functionality in general. Whereas in "practical" functions the *telos* lies outside the object used, in the aesthetic function the *telos* is this object. That is to say, in extra-artistic activities functional objects are instruments whose value stems from their suitability for particular purposes. Works of art, on the other hand, as objects of the aesthetic function, do not serve any practical goal directly and thus constitute ultimate values in and of themselves.

However, the Structuralists did not believe that an artistic work is completely severed from its social context. The PS conceived of an object's functionality in terms of hierarchy rather than mutual exclusivity : the dominance of the aesthetic function does not preclude the presence of other functions. Though unrealized, practical functions do not vanish from the work; they remain there in all their potentiality, merely shifting their corresponding values to a different level. The transformation that extra-aesthetic values undergo in art depends on another component of the Structuralist frame of reference—the sign.

Sign

" *The problem of the sign*, " the members of the Circle declared in their joint manifesto of 1935, " is one of the most urgent philosophical problems of the cultural re-birth of our time" because " all of reality, from sensory perception to the most abstract mental constructions, appears to modern man as a vast and complex realm of signs" (Havranek, 1935 :5). As mentioned above, the PS classified all artifacts according to the functions they serve. However, man-made objects do not merely carry out their functions (i.e., a house protecting us from the weather) but also signify them (a house as a sign of civilization). A conjunction of material vehicle and immaterial meaning, the sign reinscribes in different terms the dual nature of structure—its physical embodiment in individual artifacts and its mental, socially shared existence as a normative code. From a semiotic perspective, then, culture appears as a complex interaction of signs mediating among the members of a particular collectivity.

At this point we might return to extra-aesthetic functions in art whose appurtenant values are not realized because of a dominant aesthetic function. But since an artistic work is also a sign, these unrealized values are transferred from an empirical to a semantic plane, they become partial meanings which contribute to the total semantic structure of the work. Thus, "from the most abstract point of view," Mukarovsky wrote in 1936, "the work of art is nothing but a particular set of extra-aesthetic values. The material components of the artistic artifact and the way they are exploited as formal devices are mere conductors of energy represented by extra-aesthetic values. If at this point we ask ourselves where aesthetic value lies, we find that it has dissolved into individual extra-aesthetic values and is nothing but a general term for the dynamic totality of their interrelations" (Mukarovsky, 1936 : 69).

Poetic language

Despite the breadth of their research interests, the members of the PS devoted most of their attention to the study of literature. Following the path charmed by the Russian Formalists, they approached verbal art from a linguistic perspective, treating it as a particular functional dialect—poetic language. The Circle's "theses" of 1929 presented such dialects as a series of binary oppositions : internal vs. external, intellectual vs. emotional, poetic vs. communicative (the latter subdivided into practical vs. theoretical), etc. Though in subsequent years the structuralists further elaborated, augmented and terminologically modified this typology, the basic characteristics of poetic dialect remained the same. As a realization of the aesthetic function in linguistic material, it transforms the verbal sign from an instrument for signifying other, extra-linguistic realities to a self-centred composition.

The most obvious manifestation of the aesthetic function in language is the hypertrophy of the signifier—the striking organization of linguistic sound, especially in poetry. The entire range of phonic features, which in messages governed by other functions serve as an automatized vehicle of meaning, are arranged in poetic language so as to call attention to themselves, turning thus from a means toward something else into their own ends. Consequently, the PS investigated closely the problems of sound orchestration, prosody, and intonation in poetic compositions. The distinctive feature of these inquiries was their phonological basis. That is, for the Prague Structuralists only those phonic elements of language capable of differentiating cognitive meanings could be exploited poetically. By the same token, the PS regarded the sound configurations permeating the poetic work (including meter) not as mere formal constructs but as partial semantic structures comprising the overall meaning of the text.

The foregrounding of the *phone* in a poetic composition disrupts the process of linguistic designation the matching of signifiers with signifieds to produce meaning

—and results in the heightened polysemy of verbal art. To explain this point, let me introduce the PS model of linguistic designation formulated in 1929 by Saussure's student, Sergej Karcevskij. According to it, every language use is a struggle between the "psychological" meaning the speaker wishes to express and the "ideological" meanings imposed by the system. Linguistic designation, then, involves two antithetical tendencies. The signifier and the signified can be matched in a way the speaker sees as adequate to the particular context or as adequate to socially shared linguistic conventions. The tension between these two tendencies results in the homonymic /synonymic extension of the word: the asymmetric dualism of sound and meaning. This is to say, every application of a linguistic sign necessarily implies other possible applications of the same sign in different contexts (homonymity) as well as the existence of applicable, but in this case not applied, alternative signs (synonymity). "The signifier (sound) and the signified (function) slide continually on the "Slope of reality". Each overflows the boundaries assigned to it by the other: the signifier tries to have functions other than its own; the signified tries to be expressed by means other than its sign. They are asymmetrical; coupled, they exist in a state of unstable equilibrium" (Karcevskij, 1929: 93)

The aesthetic manipulation of sound in verbal art intensifies the semantic slippage of linguistic signs. The dissolution of the signifier into its constitutive elements and their regrouping according to a particular phonic prescript provides language with a new net work of signifying possibilities; a different ground on which sound and meaning can meet. Yet, by problematizing the process of verbal representation, according to the PS, poetic language performs a signal role in the linguistic system. In contrast to some other functional dialects that stress the total adequacy of signs to what they stand for and strive to obliterate their differences, poetic language underscores the reciprocal inadequacy of the two, their deep-seated non-identity. But "why is it necessary to point out that the sign does not merge with the object [it signifies]?" Jakobson asked in 1934, "Because besides the immediate awareness of the identity between the sign and object (A is A_1) we need the immediate awareness of the lack of this identity (A is not A_1)". "This antinomy is necessary", Jakobson continued, "for without contradictions there is no mobility of concepts, the relation between concept and sign becomes automatized, activity stops, the awareness of reality dies out" (Jakobson, 1934: 234).

The maximal extension of signs in verbal art, however, was still insufficient criterion to distinguish poetic language from other functional dialects. Emotive designations (curses, endearments), Mukarovsky insisted, demonstrate an equal if not higher tendency toward semantic novelty; yet, their purpose is clearly not aesthetic. The specificity of poetic language vis-à-vis its emotive counterpart, therefore, cannot be sought solely in the act of designation but in another fundamental

linguistic operation: the process of combining signs into higher linguistic operation: the process of combining signs into higher linguistic units .

The difference between linguistic designation and combination corresponds to another basic semiotic dichotomy discussed by the PS , between arbitrary and motivated signs. " Language , " Karcevskij paraphrased Saussure in 1927 , " always offers the spectacle of battle between lexicology (the tendency toward the arbitrary and phonological sign) and syntagmatics (the tendency toward the ' motivated ' and morphological sign) " (Karcevskij , 1927 ; 15) . The possibility of homonymic /synonymic slippage is predicated upon the essential arbitrariness of the link between the signifier and signified ; anything can be designated by any word , and vice versa. The conventionality of the linguistic system provides this flux with social limits , but in itself is incapable of stopping it because the individual sign user may always violate these limits in the name of "psychological adequacy . " Given this fact, it is not surprising that emotive language charged with the task of intimating a speaker's mental state strives toward the pole of lexicological arbitrariness.

Though poetic and emotive languages share a propensity for semantic shifts , they differ in regard to arbitrariness. For the PS , verbal art was the prime example of syntagmatically motivated signs . Since the aesthetic function transforms language from an instrument for signifying something else into a self --centered sign , the meaning of poetic designation is not a function of the external context but of the internal contexture of the utterance. This fact results from the complexity and systematic organization of the poetic text at all levels : the series of phonological , morphological, and syntactic parallelisms, and the hierarchical correlations among partial signs create what the Structuralists termed the work's "Semantic gesture " --- the grid of formal possibilities that motivates the overall meaning of the literary sign. It is the relational properties of the signifier, the interactions among its partial signs which create the structure of its signified , the work's semantic universe . Therefore , in transgressing linguistic conventionality, poetic language does not slide toward the pole of arbitrariness .Instead , each work generates from within its own textual conventions, a paradigm of intersubjective expectations which suggest its interpretation .

The essays written for this issue approach the rich intellectual heritage of the PS from a variety of perspectives. Since the Structuralist revolution inaugurated by the Prague Circle marked a decisive turn in the history of the humanities and the social sciences, some of authors investigate the broad cultural setting which facilitated this change. . Jindrich Toman's comprehensive " Notes on the Emergence of the Prague Circle " applies Mukarovsky 's thesis about the intrinsic interdependence among different branches of human endeavors within a cultural context to the PS

itself. Structuralist thought, Toman illustrates convincingly, was not informed solely by professional, academic pursuits but also by the socio-political factors of the milieu in which it originated. To prove his point, he appends to this volume Jakobson's polemical essay from 1925 that, from a Structuralist position, rallies against the arid and reductionist poetics of so-called "proletarian literature" promulgated at that time by the Czech communists.

Milan Palec next reiterates the imperative to study the PS in the 19th-century war Czech culture. Theory, without a corresponding artistic praxis, is empty; and praxis without such a theory is blind. Drawing on a complex symbiosis between Structuralist aesthetics and the Czech avantgarde theatre, Palec demonstrates the mutual benefits both parties derived from their complementarity.

The three contributions which follow treat the history of the PS in a more restricted manner, within the boundaries of traditional disciplinary matrices. My own piece posits a robust theoretical affinity between the tenets of Structural linguistics and the phenomenology of language outlined by the Russian pupil of Husserl, Gustav Shpet. Without glossing over their differences, I see their two stances as fellows-in-arms in the common struggle against the atomism, psychologism, and individualism of the positivistic paradigm. The PS and the Russian philosopher shared the conviction that language must be analyzed in structural, semiotic, and teleological terms.

But not all encounters between the PS and philosophy, Kei Yamanaka's study cautions, were so harmonious. It casts sharp light on a curious intellectual cross-pollination which occurred after the War when Roman Jakobson incorporated into Structuralist semiotics Charles S. Peirce's typology of signs. After exploring Jakobson's motivations for intertwining these disparate traditions, Yamanaka finds them deeply incompatible and deems Jakobson's valiant efforts an ultimate failure.

Finally, the leading Czech prosodist Miroslav Cervenka retraces the tortuous path along which phonology entered the Structuralist literary studies. By discovering an intrinsic bond between linguistic sound and meaning, phonology furnished metrics with a firm basis for separating essential prosodic features from rhythmic epiphenomena. But—and this is the gist of Cervenka's essay—the students of verbal art are yet to fully explore the heuristic potential of phonology, especially in regard to the vexing issue of syntactic intonation.

The PS, however, need not be tackled as a mere historical event, interesting only to those who, as the proverb goes, do not wish to repeat the mistakes of the past. The next four essays attempt to insert Structuralist ideas into current theoretical discussions. Hana Arie Gaifman tells us that the concept of dominant, which in PS parlance referred to the hierarchical organization of the artistic whole, has a very

specific meaning in the study of music. By applying it metaphorically to the field of literature, she offers an original inter--- artistic model for describing the dynamics of literary change .

" Belated Meetings " by Wendy Holmes painstakingly maps all the recent encounters between the PS and Anglo ---American /French art history. The stumbling block which prevents these engagements from being fruitful is , according to Holmes, the different developmental trajectories of the Czech and West --- intellectual traditions. The made ---in ---Prague version of Structuralism with a social and historical awareness fits ill the discourse of contemporary art historians whose universe is circumscribed by all too abstract polemics between the French Structuralists and post---Structuralists.

If spurned by the Western scholars who have reappropriated the label of Structuralism for their own ends , the PS might as well look for friends elsewhere. And this is where Michael Sprinker's tightly argued paper comes in: it is precisely the socio--- historical ramifications of its literary theory which align the PS with the Marxist critique of ideology exemplified by the writings of Louis Althusser .

Finally , David Herman's dense and complex contribution positions the PS functionalism within the ongoing debates about the pragmatic dimension of semiosis. He takes issue with the claim made by Mary Pratt ---a prominent practitioner of speech act theory in literary studies --- that the Structuralist notion of poetic language separates literature from its social setting . Pratt's critique , Herman shows, focuses narrowly on the typology of functions without taking into account the metapragmatic rules for its use advanced by the members of the Circle . Not only did the PS conceive of all linguistic structures (poetic included) as a relative hierarchy of many functions but , more importantly , they always maintained that any such hierarchy is valid solely in a concrete cultural situation. It is not the PS, Herman charges, but Pratt herself who fails to stipulate the metapragmatic rules of discourse and turns a blind eye to the enormous versatility of utterances in space and time.

To familiarize readers with some important commentaries on the PS, Miroslav Cervenka and Michael Holquist reviewed two books related to the topic. A collective volume by thirty ---four scholars from many countries --- *Roman Jakobson : Echoes of His Scholarship* is a telling homage to the man who was a friend of the Russian Futurists, Khlebnikov and Mayakovsky , in the teens ; a founding member and the vice ---chairman of the Prague Circle in the twenties and the thirties; a mentor to Levi-Strauss in the forties; and the dean of American Slavistics from the fifties until his death in 1982 . " Only with difficulty" , Cervenka concludes his report, "can one imagine the magnitude of the problems with which a future 'biographer

'of Jakobson will have grapple," But , as this collection attests, it will be an exciting venture.

Holquist's review article of Striedter's recent account of Russian Formalism and Prague Structuralism deals with a morestreamlined narrative. Striedter's admirable goal was not merely to provide a history of Slavic literary theory but to show its relevancy for contemporary American criticism. In a friendly manner, Holquist points out the difficulties which such a project entails. But given the changing nature of literary studies in the USA and the collapse of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe which for decades hindered the free flow of ideas , Striedter's initiative , Holquist concedes , could not come at a more opportune moment.

My brief , all too brief, rendition of the contributions to this issue of the *Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics* devoted to the PS does not do justice to the breadth of knowledge and sophistication of their authors nor to their oft polemical ardor. Nevertheless, it is my strong hope that the essays gathered here will attract a distant audience to a significant strain of the continental theorizing which, I believe, merits serious consideration.

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Linguists in Society: Notes on the Emergence of the Prague Circle *

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In May 1911, Albert Einstein, after arriving in Prague, where he received appointment to the Physics department of the Prague German University, wrote to Zurich to his friend Besso : "Prague is wonderful, so beautiful, that it alone would be worth a journey" (Speziali 1972:20). Indeed he was in good company in Prague, teaching at an venerable institution and welcomed by the German speaking intellectuals. Historians have noted with interest that he was a frequent guest in a circle at the Fantas, owners of the Unicorn pharmacy in Old Town Square, where Christian von Ehrenfels, Felix Weltsch, Max Brod and occasionally, Franz Kafka used to meet. Max Brod even made a literary character of him : the astronomer Johannes Kepler in Brod's *Redemption of Tycho de Brahe*, a novel set in Prague around 1600, is generally believed to be inspired by Einstein's personality. But beautiful as the ambience was, Einstein also described Prague as "Gedankenode ohne Glauben" (An intellectual desert beyond belief). He left the city with its quaint Unicorn after three academic terms.

Had such linguists as Ferdinand de Saussure, Antoine Meillet or Baudouin de Courtenay come to Prague in the same years as Einstein, they might also have left quickly- the provincialism of the city was too obvious. But when another foreign scholar, Roman Jakobson was fleeing Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Second World War, he said to his friend Jaroslav Seifert, the Czech avant-garde poet and future Nobel Prize laureate : " I was glad to be in this country and I was happy here too"(Seifert 1981:323). And shortly after this an emigre in New York, he returned to his traumatic farewell with Seifert. Addressing an audience of New York Czechs worried about the fate of their occupied country, he said in an unpublished lecture on the Czech author Egon Hostovsky : " I do not think that there is any doubt about the nature of the intellectual legacy with which the Czechoslovak resistance has to identify itself today and tomorrow. Above all, it is the legacy of the avant-garde more precisely the revolutionary, cultural development of the first twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. Saying farewell to me in the Prague of April 1939, a great Czech poet put it very well: 'There is only one thing you must not forget-These twenty years were immensely beautiful. Remind everyone of how much work we managed to do'".

This radical change in judgement the shift from Einstein's "Gedankenode ohne Glauben" to Jakobson's "revolutionary cultural development," owes much to a diamet-

that Vilem Mathesius a far-sighted Czech linguist, gave on March 13, 1925. Reminiscing about this evening he wrote :

The lack of lively scholarly contact with the Prague philological community which used to depress me, was now felt very intensely by Jakobson who came to Prague from quite different circumstances. We often used to talk about the need for a debate and study center for young linguists and it was quite natural that we looked for a remedy among ourselves. I have noted that on March 13, 1925, I invited Jakobson and Trnka and also Karcevskylateralecturer in Russian at the University of Geneva but then a master of the Russian gymnasium in Prague. (Mathesius 1936 : 138)

It is hard to imagine a company more diverse than these four persons: Vilem Mathesius (1882-1945), a professor of English and a dry, somewhat moralistically inclined protestant; Bohumil Trnka (1895-1984), his desciple and devoted assistant; Sergei Karcevsky (1884-1955), formerly a student of Saussure and Bally, now an emigre activist who first escaped the Czar after the Revolution of 1905 and then the Bolsheviks after yet anotherrevolution; and finally Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), between 1914-1920 an active participant in the interlocking circles of the Russian avant-garde and the Russian Formalists, now an employee of the Soviet Red Cross mission in Prague-hence somewhat suspicious. Nor is it easy to visualize their conversations: Matheisus' Russian was rudimentary, Trnka's probably non-existent; Jakobson knew some Czech, Karcevsky probably less. Mathesius was seriously handicapped by poor vision (Trnka was assigned to read for him). Jakobson was a close friend of modernist Russian and Czech poets and artists, far from an academic in appearance. Nonétheless, all these men had one radical commitment in common: modern linguistics andliterary theory. The evening was the first recorded meeting of a group which later became known worldwide as the Prague Linguistic Circle.

The two main protagonists, Mathesius and Jakobson, had met in 1920, shortly after Jakobson came to Prague. In a sense the encounter was not accidental, given their common interests. Yet at the same time their encounter was a pure coincidence. Mathesius could certainly not foresee that the Russian intellecutals who were flocking to Prague as a result of the events of 1917 would eventually help solve his great social and scholarly problem, i.e., creating in Prague a vibrant academic community. Mathesius' determination to raise Prague from its provincial state was beginning to take shape long before the First World War, although under conditions which might not inspire much optimism. Mathesius himslef was a linguist who was educated in an era in which historicism was losing its appeal as anexplanatorymodel. German scholarship ceased to be the point of orientation for many Czechs : English and French writings began to exercise more influence. But for all his determination, he

was restricted by a climate of provincialism. He taught in a city which despite its splendid political and cultural history had considerably deteriorated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Paradoxically, changes which were hailed as great emancipatory achievements often only sustained provincialism. Thus the division of the Prague Charles University into a German and Czech section in 1882 petrified the rift between the intellectual community of this bi-nationality: the Czechs would now only rarely study with German professors, and German students would not even think of the Czech half of the university as an intellectual center.

In 1918, old Austria broke apart and an array of new states arose within its former borders. Czechoslovakia was among the winners. The new state was able to assert its borders easily, suffered no major economical problems, and, most importantly, was sustained by an atmosphere of enthusiasm and optimism. An organizer of Czech scholarship might-it was hoped-quickly transform the momentum into splendid results. Mathesius was one such organizer, and he was the great opportunity which had now arisen. Ironically he could not at first achieve much. The mechanism of intellectual provincialization repeated itself. The Czechs now had their independence, yet political independence and intellectual productivity often do not run on the same fuel.

Other segments of the Czech intelligentsia were facing the same problem after 1918, but were more successful in dealing with it. An instructive solution was provided by the young artists and poets of the Czech avant-garde. They fully accepted the ideology of modernism and quickly jumped on the "international bandwagon." In 1922 a collection entitled *Life (Život)* was edited by Jaromir Krejcar, an avant-garde architect who later belonged to Roman Jakobson's circle of friends. *Life* opened with a poem by Jaroslav Seifert and included texts by other Czech poets and intellectuals. At the same time, a number of European artists contributed to it, including Le Corbusier, Ilya Erenburg, Adolf Behne, and many others, their articles were interspersed with pictures of ocean-liners, airplanes and also of Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton, Harold Lloyd, Mary Pickford and other heroes of the Golden Twenties. The international orientation extended beyond finetypographs; Krejcar and other Czech avant-garde architects succeeded in sprucing up Prague's suburbs with constructivist villas in the early 1920s, well before the new government managed to erect its banks, libraries and theaters. The avant-garde thus did not discuss the status of the province and the fatherland very much but acted in consonance with its own cosmopolitan ideology. There were no borders between Prague, Paris, Holland...

Czech scholars, by contrast, seemed at first to be preoccupied with odd questions. In *New Athenaeum* a journal coedited by Mathesius, many pages were devoted to

discussion of whether they should publish in Czech or in German. Mathesius was soon forced to conclude that the circumstances in the new state were even more provincial than in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Moreover, there was no simple formula which would enable scholars to transcend these provincial limits. The Czechs differed in this respect from the German Prague intelligentsia which had the option of leaving Prague and which had in fact cultivated this option to the point of a mania. Prague seemed like a nice provincial theater, capable of accommodating a whole array of personalities ranging from Gustav Mahler to Albert Einstein, but the idea of leaving was always implied. Thus while for German speaking scholars and artists Prague cultural institutions were transient places in a career whose ideal culmination points were Vienna or Berlin, the Czechs were in a different situation since they generally did not look at the place in terms of leaving it behind. But what was to be done to make the capital of the new republic a center of scholarship, how was Mathesius' problem to be solved?

Undoubtedly, Mathesius himself had some of the trumps. He believed in rationally organized work; in the possibility of a universal education proceeding not only by means of a more effective and truly democratic school system, but also through the involvement of intellectuals in public affairs. In his view intellectuals had a strong moral obligation to society. This was what he called "constructive work," a notion which for him stood in opposition to romanticism. His collection of essays *Cultural Activism* (Mathesius 1925) is the most explicit source of his personal philosophy, but his ideas can also be conveniently illustrated by small journalistic pieces such as his brief reflection on the 28th October (the Czechoslovak Independence Day), which he published in the cultural weekly *Přítomnost* (Present Times) in early November, 1926. He noted that the anniversary celebrations were ultimately wasted on petty political campaigning. In this way, "a major psychological mistake" was being committed: "We are not using this exceptional occasion to educate our citizens and to reinforce all their creative efforts. For Mathesius, a clear alternative was available, namely, to "convert (Independence Day) to Constructin Day, a day on which a working program for the coming year would be announced and explicated in detail" (Mathesius 1926;673). The program in question was not to consist of bombastic enterprises. Instead concrete projects were to be pursued leading to results which could be seen and evaluated. Improvements in the organization of public transport would be one such task for instance; another might be the improvement of tourist facilities; and soon this new conception of Independence Day would have immense consequences for the self-education and selfawareness of the new Czech society:

We shall learn to think in concrete and practical terms and gain confidence in our initiative. Moreover, we shall learn not to leave things half done simply because the new Independence Day will be back in just a year bringing the need to check what has been accomplished, what remains to be done and who is guilty that not everything has been done. Such an Independence Day will teach us to work constructively, and work constructively we must, unless we want to decay. (ibid.)

Yet despite all these calls for restructuring the new Czech society, the progress in scholarship was slow. In short in the early 1920s Prague was a city of artists and poets, but was still far from being a center of academic innovation. As often happens however a coincidence in development was not long in coming the years after the First World War introduced a new social and ethnic element to Czechoslovakia, the emigres from the Soviet Union. For the first time in its history Prague (and Czechoslovakia) turned into a major concentration of East European emigres. This development had very specific characteristics. Berlin was briefly (in the early twenties) the capital of Russian culture abroad; Paris was to become a huge center for Russians and Ukrainians in the twenties and thirties, but neither city offered the infrastructure of government-sponsored institutions and grants for individual academic and literary figures. The newly created Republic of Czechoslovakia quickly declared it a matter of principle to make the existence of free Russian and Ukrainian culture and scholarship outside the Soviet Union possible. While the personal initiative the first Czechoslovak President, Tomas G. Masaryk, was strong and conspicuous, it must be noted that the "eastern" emigres received sympathy and support from politicians of varying persuasions.

Little is known today in detail about the coexistence of all these groups in multinational Prague. Leaving aside such good-will actions as folkloristic "cultural days" appealing to the wide public, scholarly societies alone seemed to provide grounds for genuine intellectual encounter between the emigres and the locals. Among them the Prague Linguistic Circle, the solution to Mathesius' problem, clearly stands out for the degree of integration achieved in it was without precedence.. This was the meeting ground of Czechs, Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans of traditional scholars as much as of the leftist intelligentsia. It even served as a point of encounter within the Russo-Ukrainian community itself which provided a very important source for the Circle. The presence of several excellent Russian and Ukrainian linguists with existence experience in analytical work proved crucial in making Prague a leading place of scholarship.

But how did such unusual integration proceed in detail? Among the ingredients in the emerging circle were Mathesius' determination and the liberal atmosphere of

Masaryk's Prague, in which a multinational pool of interested scholars could be transformed into an enthusiastic group. Yet despite all these prerequisites, the emergence of the circle was by no means a simple consequence of all these components. Mathesius' dinner did not immediately bear fruits. Determined as Mathesius was and devoted as the members were, the overall impression is that no strikingly new quality was achieved when the circle began to function publicly in 1926. Years were passing and the circle was still like any other traditional scholarly society. Thus the process of amalgamation required yet another ingredient. It was dispatched by the ubiquitous actor the *Zeitgeist* and its name was collectivism. The First World War radically changed attitudes towards the usefulness and desirability of liberal individualism. Mathesius, too was close to this new thinking since he believed that the Czechs rather than being original individualists were actually better at collective work. In his "Czech Science," one of the essays in *Cultural Activism* he deplored the fact that research in the last decades had tended towards narrow-minded specialization and that bold attempts at synthesis were not appreciated. He was furthermore disappointed about the isolationism of Czech scholars manifested in their unwillingness to participate in the international circulation of ideas and he was upset about the general lack of communication among scholars. He thought, however, that collective actions were a promising key to the solution:

This is not a situation which could not be changed. It is true that we are not distinguished by individual courage. Our courage is of a more corporate character.... but given the fact that we were not endowed with individual courage or perhaps that its tradition has not evolved here one cannot say that it is impossible to create conditions for fostering it in research for instance by creating a favourable atmosphere or by supplementing it with our corporate courage. (Mathesius 1925:89)

Indeed the epoch was not enamored of what was termed "excessive individualism" and placed much confidence in the collective. A desire for ideologies transcending the liberal "free interplay of interests" was growing. A society with meaningful goals one in which the individual would renounce his personal whims in favour of higher interests was widely discussed. Curiously this sentiment cut across political persuasions and so the idea of collective constructivism was not only in the air among the admirers of the new Soviet state, but also in the liberal circles to which Mathesius belonged. when the First Congress of Slavic Philologists met in Prague in 1929, the Prague circle presented its famous *Theses*, a comprehensive program of research as a manifesto worked out collectively by its members not signed by individual members. A year later the Statutes of the circle defined the activities for the Circle as the collective work of a group of scholars united by a common *Welt anschauung*. All the major protagonists of the circle in particular Mathesius and Jakobson were imbued

with the spirit of collective action. It was at the very moment when the *Theses* were being worked out that Mathesius' problem was finally solved and a new quality began to emerge. Important testimony to this change is the following passage from a letter by Jakobson to Trubetzkoy dated April 16, 1929:

The active core of the circle has concluded that in its function as a parliament of opinions as a platform for free discussion, the Circle is a relic and has to be transformed into a group which is tightly interlocked as far as scientific ideology is concerned. This process is taking place at present with much success. An initiative committee of sorts has established itself in the circle including Mathesius the very able linguist, Havranek, Mukarovsky, Trnka and myself. This transformation of the Circle literally inspired its members ; in fact, I have never seen such a degree of enthusiasm in Czechs at all. (Jakobson 1975: 122,fn.4)

As to the role of the group leader, a crucial ingredient in this situation Jakobson and Mathesius seem to have shared it without really being competitors. Mathesius seems to have occupied a senior position because he was academically well established and enjoyed general public recognition (see his public activity alluded to above). Jakobson on the other hand was the cementing force within the circle. Milada Souckova a *femme de letters* and a contemporary observer later recalled:

He knew everyone and he knew how to make everyone interested in the activities of the circle. When by chance he was not present because he was detained by his University duties in Brno the usual zest of the meeting was missing. It seems to me that the audience was waiting for him especially for his part in the discussion which followed every lecture. (Souckova 1976:2)

Thus the Circle asserted itself through collective texts and through a distinct type of collective behaviour. In deliberately tressing the idea of the collective it soon turned into more than merely a school of linguistics. The feeling that the circle was a unique phenomenon is well documented not only in reminiscences but also in contemporary reflections and reports. Witness the following lengthy passage which contains among other things such relevant phrases as "intimacy of atmosphere," "mutual attraction," "identity of intellectual interests":

With the Prague Linguistic Circle an institution has come into existence which in a number of respects represents something new in our scholarly life.

First of all, one must stress that the heart which drives and regulates the entire activity of the circle is scholarly discussion. (In our country) neither learned societies nor scholarly bodies are able to create an atmosphere in which discussion can flourish... The Prague Linguistic Circle is an exception to this. In its meetings, which take place twice a month, and are alternately located in the English Department of Charles University and in members' apartments, more than half of the time is reserved for discussion; and it is usually quite difficult to make the participants go home, notwithstanding the late hour. In my opinion there are two reasons for this: first the intimacy of the atmosphere which is a result of the fact that the circle is a closed society whose members have grown together through frequent contact; secondly, there is an identity of intellectual interests which exercises mutual attraction.

Of the Circle's *Theses* Mathesius wrote:..

This program (of modern linguistic research), presented to the Prague Congress of Slavists in the form of theses, later printed in French on the first twenty-nine pages of the first volume of the *Travaux*, is a result of genuine collective scholarly work. The participants in the Congress may, of course, say that one chapter is worked out according to suggestions of a certain member of the circle and the other according to those of another, yet the final formulation is the result of joint work in which individual authorship gave way to collective effort. (Mathesius 1929 : 1131)

And another member of the circle, the Czech literary scholar Otakar Fischer, observed in the 1930s: "What characterizes the method of the members of the Prague Linguistic circle is their collective way of acting, the collective character of their tactics of their fight" (O. Fischer 1932:269). Milada Souckova's observation too is of special value in view of this group-dynamic process:

The language of the meetings was another characteristic of the circle. Seldom was a Czech without an accent heard. Even those who hardly knew how to speak any other language but their native Czech acquired a kind of queer pronunciation after some time. (Souckova 1976:2)

A group is of course, not sufficiently defined merely by the facts that group-fusion has taken place and that the identification with the group has grown strong. It is also important to establish the manner in which such fusion is achieved. The evidence

available indicates that the Circle was rather radical in this respect. Consider the following statement by Jakobson:

already in 1929, during the Congress of Slavists in Prague, (the Circle) presented itself as a militant and disciplined organization, with precise programmatic theses. The novelty of the structure of this circle, in contrast to the traditional type of scholarly society, appears in the fact that the circle renounces carrying out the task of a parliament containing diverse currents and proclaims openly in its by-laws that it aims collaborating in the progress of linguistic research on the basis of the structural functional method and that the activity of any member of the circle which shows itself in opposition to this program will result in his exclusion. (Jakobson 1933:636/4)

This quotation explicitly introduces a new and significant point: dissident members could be formally excluded. While in a non-radical group it is likely that members would voluntarily leave or fall into oblivion due to lack of enthusiasm or interest, a radical group reserves the right to punish by explicit expulsion.

Thus the Prague Circle achieved a new quality and status—not only because of its radicalism and explicit formulation of such mechanisms as a formal expulsion but also because it consciously emphasized collective work. While (some degree of) loyalty to the group as witnessed in other schools, is an automatic component of the group process collective work was a value per se in the Prague circle.

The lengthy process sketched above raises issues requiring detailed analysis. Many fall within the domain of group sociology, thus qualifying as questions about the external history of scholarship. But the enterprise of the circle was scholarly, its primary challenge was intellectual. The circle formed around a set of intellectual problems which arose both within and outside the field of language inquiry. This intellectual dimension was reflected among other things in subtle relationships between the development of scholarly concepts and the guiding socio-cultural images of the time. Technically, the circle was engaged in three major projects: linguistics, aesthetics and language culture. The impact of contemporary cultural ideology on linguistics, and phonology in particular—is not decisive. On the whole the development of the Prague phonology was predetermined by developments internal to the discipline prior to the formation of the circle. Nonetheless even in phonology important links between *Weltanschauung* and theory-formation can be attested in the work of Nikolai S. Trubetzkoyl, who, together with Jakobson was the chief phonologist of the circle. I will not address this particular issue (cf. Gasparov 1987), but instead I wish to concentrate on another area in which *Weltanschauung* and scholarship influenced one another.

A prominent field in which the spirit of time profoundly affected the contents of scholarship was the theory of "language culture," that is, approximately the maintenance of standard literary language and language planning. The idea of language culture was rooted in the assertion that language is a social phenomenon. This concept continued the tradition of French linguistics and remained a hall mark of the Circle although some late work undertaken within the Prague framework such as Jakobson's *Kindersprache, Aphasie and allgemeine Lautgesetze* (1941) are not entirely consistent with it. More importantly, however, at that time this conception of language also invited the idea that language is a domain of intentional social action, a field open to intervention of scholars. Thus, the Prague theory of language culture provides a paramount example of a merger of cultural ideology and scholarship; the Circle cultivated an activist attitude par excellence towards language. In other words, if language is a malleable entity, linguistic activists do not have to remain mere onlookers. In characterizing contemporary society as striving towards rationality and a scientific approach, Jan Mukarovsky clearly implied that linguists should be involved in the organization of culture and in the "control of signs" :

all contemporary cultural life is characterized by a more and more intensive intervention of science in organization of diverse social values. Independently of political persuasion and in a broad variety of social fields, an increasingly strong tendency towards a transition from economic anarchy to a more rationalized and planned production is being encountered. The necessity to organize language culture is becoming increasingly necessary.... Yes, we want linguistic regulation just as we want the overdue architectural regulation, of cities but a regulation which is determined by the goals of today not by archaic or "archaizing" considerations (Mukarovsky 1933:2)

The language of the Circle was remarkably consistent in this respect:

In the same way as social reconstruction assumes an ever more planned and goal-directed character and as an ever greater number of system of social values enters into the circle of planned economy, the production anarchy in the life of a language system is also condemned to retreat step by step in the face of planning and regulation. (Jakobson 1934: 325/4)

This was wholly in line with the image cultivated among the progressive intelligentsia who also expected linguists to pursue meaningful, organized, constructive work and not to remain mere onlookers.

It is quite remarkable and future study must address this issue in greater depth how ideas of social interventionism converged in the circle despite the members'

clear generational and national differences, so that, particularly in the 1930s the individual scholars virtually assimilated to one another in this respect. Thus, the old liberal Mathesius also spoke of "order", a somewhat unusual expression for him in view of his earlier opinions. and wrote essays with unpleasantly Germanic titles such as "The will to Culture". (The essay actually reads quite unmythically.) Jakobson did not avoid a somewhat dark excursion, either, when, in quest for intellectual synthesis, he came to see Ottmar Spann among the spiritual allies of the new wholistic concepts in scholarship. Spann, an Austrian social philosopher, was not only a foremost advocate of a conservative organic society, but also of political visions of law and order that soon brought him close to the philosophy of National Socialism. (No more references to Spann occur in Jakobson's writings in the 1930s.)

Although by far not complete, the above sketch has explicated the embedding of the Prague Linguistic circle into the cultural milieu of the Prague of the inter-war period. In addition, it has identified one of the most characteristic (and most neglected) features of the Circle, its collective nature. Also this feature rather transparently relates to guiding images of contemporary social thought. Of course, a study that emphasizes a great deal of cultural and social aspects of scholarship faces the danger of relativism and uninspiring sociologism. Thus a remainder is appropriate not to let go under the fact that the enterprise of the circle was a scholarly one and that intellectual challenge lay at its bottom. The circle was not a conspiracy of professors seeking permanent positions-- as vulgar interpreters often believe school formations are about-- but a response to specific problems which arose both within and outside the field of language inquiry. And while each of the scholars found guidance by the *Zeitgeist's* invisible hand and support in the group of his peers each piece of invention had to go through an individual mind. In this sense this essay was not about inventions. It only provided the background that was nourishing them.

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Prague Structuralism and the Czech Theatre of the 1930s

MILAN PALEC

Although the Prague Linguistic Circle established in 1926, and the Czech theatrical avant garde of the 1930s seem on the surface to have little in common the two belonged undoubtedly together. They were connected not only by geography and date of origin, indeed, both were the result of particular historical and philosophical circumstances. These two groups also shared the same goal, namely the search for new and radical avenues of thought. Finally, the Prague Linguistic Circle and the Czech theatrical avant-garde shared a similar destiny.

In the history of science and art, we rarely see so nearly perfect a model of interaction and cross influences between the two domains, as seen between Prague structuralism and the Czech Theatre of the 1930s. This unusual symbiosis between "art-loving" scholars and "theory-appreciative" artists grew from a common feeling of responsibility for the establishment of a new order in art, science and society. The rush of the "white" intelligentsia from the East in the 1920s and the Left intelligentsia from the West during the 1930s contributed to the extraordinary production of the Prague Linguistic Circle as well as to the Czech theatrical avant-garde.

The beginning of World War Two, with the Nazi occupation of Prague, disrupted the work of the Czech theatrical avant-garde. It suffered a further setback soon after the end of the war, when a communist government took power in Czechoslovakia. This take over also spelled the end of the Prague Linguistic Circle's activity. Several structuralists emigrated, mostly to the United States, where they and their followers continued cultivating the soil for structuralism in the late 1950s and for semiotics in the 1960s.

The Czech theatrical avant-garde was revived in the 1960s during the era of the Prague Spring only to be crushed again in 1968 by Soviet tanks. This time its followers emigrated primarily to West European countries.

When communism collapsed in 1989, students at Charles University, where former members of the Prague Linguistic Circle had taught sixty years earlier, and Prague theatre artists together started the "velvet revolution". Consequently, the Czech and Slovak nations elected a playwright as their president.

This short historical summary should provide the necessary background for an analysis of a process of reciprocity that developed between the two movements in question.

All artistic endeavors have their theories. The practical and theoretical aspects work in symbiosis and are, as a rule, complementary. Theory requires practice in the same way that practice requires theory; each is equally dependent upon the other and necessary in order for a given discipline to evolve as a whole. From the end of the last century onwards, the stage was dominated by "realistic" theatre. This particular style managed to endure well into the twentieth century in communist countries in the guise of "socialist realism" (and also in certain western countries where theatre has been primarily a commercial undertaking). This "realistic" theatre was philosophically based on positivism. Positivism is interested, above all, in objective reality as something that can be measured, illustrated, or located geographically or temporally. It seeks a complete negation of subjective elements and follows the precepts of classical aesthetics. These attributes of positivistic thought are still alive and well in so-called "utility" theatres.

The avant-garde movement likewise looked for some kind of legitimization of its artistic principles. The structural method was implemented in an effort to devise an escape from the chaos that modern art resembled in the eyes of the uninitiated.

Structuralism does not present a philosophy as most philosophical doctrines do. Structuralism is a method, a way of thinking about the world, it is essentially a model in which each part plays its individual role following the law of relationships. If we understand that the stage can serve as the model of the world and an actor as the model of mankind, we can begin to see why the work of the Prague Linguistic Circle was so highly appreciated by the Czech theatrical avant-garde. The individual relationships within the model are more important than the model itself. As Roman Jakobson stated: "I do not believe in things, I believe only in their relationships." (1929)

The outstanding forerunner of structuralism Otakar Zich with his doctrine of formative aesthetics and early semantics, provided a solid base for several generations of Czech structuralists who were interested in theatre theory. The appearance of Zich's *Aesthetics of Dramatic Art* (1931) attracted members of the Czech theatrical avant-garde to the work of the Prague Linguistic Circle, which offered a continuous elaboration of Zich's ideas.

The Structuralists introduced the concept of structure as not merely the sum of its parts, but as the dynamic relationship among individual parts. Consequently the cardinal question concerns the order within the structural system. Applied to the theatre, this notion meant a revolution in the understandings of the performing arts.

The structure of a piece of theatre expresses the relationship and interaction of its components: the acting, directing, choreography, the literary text, music, dramaturgy, stage design, architecture and, if you will, the spectator. Every component of this structure can be understood as a subsystem which has an internal structure of its own. Consider stage design for example. If perceived as a subsystem, components of its structure are inevitably participating in the following systems: the fine arts, architecture, cinema, audiovisual systems, applied arts, and so on.

The Prague structuralists adopted Jurij Tynjanov's concept of a "dialectic whole" as a model for the artwork. "The unity of a work is not a closed symmetrical whole," maintained Tynjanov, "but an unfolding dynamic integrity; among its elements stands, not the static sign of equation or addition, but always the dynamic sign of correlation and integration. Structure is a process rather than a closed whole" (1924:9-12). Tynjanov's idea was enhanced by Mukarovsky's concept of structure understood as dialectic thought. Here Mukarovsky focused on the dynamic tension of thesis and antithesis within the structure as the key to its evolution.

The theatre served as an excellent laboratory for studies and analysis of the relationships between subsystems and components. Mukarovsky pointed out that the development of an artistic structure must be stimulated by other artistic and, ultimately, social structures, and also that all structures are equally valuable. This is what he called "the interconnection of all art". (1978:201-20)

Function was another concept developed by the Prague linguistic circle. Each system has its particular goal, and we assume that it will develop out of the function of the individual components. The integrated activity of all participating components comprised the functional goal of the theatrical structure which is to create a theatrical production. Accordingly, the concept of function is closely related to the third concept of the Prague Linguistic Circle, namely, that of the sign.

The function of a theatrical system as a sign system- a system capable of reflecting and changing reality always depends upon some component that dominates the system in a vertical direction. Consequently, the dominant component of the structure limits the other components to their particular position and assigns them their meaning in the functioning of the whole system. Jindrich Honzl spelled out these ideas in the following statement:

"We do not maintain that the playwright and the word, the actor and the director are in some way outside factors that fail to determine the balance of theatrical structure. We only wish to show that every historical period foregrounds different components of theatrical expression and that the creative force of one factor can substitute or suppress the rest

of the components of theatrical expression without minimizing the power or the theatrical activity as a whole ". (1976:74-94).

The intentional organization of the functions of a theatrical system as a system of signs, born of the connections between individual components and their functions, relies on integration within this system, which is the only guarantee that all its components will be directed to one final goal. The components of a theatrical system do not function only on the horizontal axis; the vertical organization as well assumes a certain cohesion in the creative process and in the final result, which is built into the sign system itself. Therefore the coordination of a particular structure produces equivalent possibilities of communication. It allows each sign the same capability to provoke meaning whatever character the sign might have.

Prague structuralists succeeded in giving new meaning to classical theatrical terminology. They found that a method can be expressed by the vertical harmonization functions. This method is implemented by mediating the complex phenomenon known as "style". Style in theatre arises as a functional horizontal connection between the individual components of the theatrical system based on principle coordinating verbal and non verbal elements that produce unique yet generally understandable codes of communication for the spectator. Style is not a condition for creating an artistic point of view, and is definitely not identical with it. With regard to the theatre, style is multilateral: a style is born in revolt against a preceding dominant style. Such a revolt occurs when negative signs from the previous style are accentuated, therefore encouraging the program of a new style to arise. Hence the development of art, from the standpoint of style, has a revolutionary character.

With the onset of the theatrical avant-garde, the arts did not have any unified style. Hence style was replaced by form. In theatre it was replaced by "small forms" like "stage-on-the-stage" (or theatre-within-a-theatre), "theatricalization", "oratorio," "ritual," and so on. Post-modern artistic tendencies, in turn are perceived as a result of the reaction of theatre against its avant-garde period; these reactions can be called "style" if this amalgam of historic styles will prove its ability to develop a unifying philosophical frame.

The third crucial concept for the Prague structuralists was that of sign. Jan Mukarovsky distinguished the "Linguistic sign" a term describing its normal usage, and the "artistic/aesthetic sign," which communicates the fact that it is not a mere instrument. (1976:3-11) As Frantisek Deak pointed out, "in theatre, the communicative and artistic signs coexist." (1978:91) In general, communicative and aesthetic signs in theatre presuppose a set of values and functions in their own right, and are endlessly changeable and complex. Moreover, since theatrical convention also changes, and the theatre of a given time and place will highlight certain components and rank

them higher than others, the mutability of the theatrical sign implies that the sign can shift both in its own right as well as in the way in which it is perceived.

In the theatre, signs also have a multiplicity of meanings. As Petr Bogatyrev pointed out "an ermine cape is a sign of royalty in the theatre, regardless of the material of which the cape is actually made. The sign in the theatre is not a sign of an object, but the sign of a sign of an object" (1976:33-50). As a specific example, oakum was used in E.F.Burian's production of K.H.Macha's "May" (1935). At first oakum on the stage was just oakum, a material filling a space. Later, the oakum turned out to have several hidden meanings, even fulfilling a communicative purpose. Both functions of the oakum were alternately accentuated: thus in a particular light setting, the oakum reminded the audience of a tree crown, and did not call attention to its material structure. In a different light, however, it was simply oakum and each of its fibers was clear and lucid. In both cases the oakum was a sign. In the first case it functioned principally as a sign; in the second case it represented itself alone. Both functions were finally integrated to such an extent that in the spectator's mind the existence of the oakum on the first significative plane gave substance to its function on the second significative plane. And what happened to the oakum happens to all objects on the stage- as well as to the actor.

Predecessors of Prague structuralists already recognized the fact that theatrical sign fall into two categories. The first is the "characterizational," actively distinguishing characters and place of action. The second is the "functional," participating in the dramatisation. Moreover the things on the stage that constitute theatrical signs acquire special features, qualities, and symptoms during a play which they do not have in real life.

Prague structuralists active in the 1930s such as Jan Mukarovsky, claimed that: "The work of art has a sign character". Mukarovsky (1976:3-11); or as Jindrich Honzl put it, "Everything on the stage is a sign," (1976:74-94). Forty years later, the Polish semiotician Tadeusz Kowzan had reached a similar conclusion: "Everything is a sign in the theatrical presentation" (1968:52-81). Kowzan distinguished two kinds of signs: 1) the natural phenomena unprovoked by man and 2) the artificial signs created in order to signify or communicate something. Kowzan argued that the theatre is made up entirely of artificial signs.

Theatre uses verbal as well as non-verbal systems of signification. The signs a particular performance displays can be drawn from anywhere: there is no system of signification that cannot be integrated into the production. In the theatre, according to Kowzan, signs seldom appear in their pure state. A richness and variety of signs adds complexity to a performance. Therefore, it is quite daunting to analyze where exactly signs belong in the given system, since most sign combinations are situated in the complex nexus of time and space.

In a work of art, there is a certain configuration of the elements which brings them together and creates a unified artistic sign. The very organization of a work of art as a complex sign has within it a predetermined range of meaning which is built intentionally into the work's structure.

The increasing interest in semiotics in the 1960s resulted in the rediscovery of the work of the Prague Linguistic Circle. The terms like index, signal, symbol, icon, information, message, symptom or badge became part of the vocabulary in the 1970s of not only theatre theoreticians but also theatre practitioners. The increasing interest in the doctrine of sign led in the West to extremes like the "structural" theatre: which attempted to apply the semiotic doctrine directly to the artistic creative process. In Czechoslovakia, however, the theatrical mainstream remains firmly tied to the theatrical heritage of the interwar avant-garde. Both the legacy of the Czech directorial triumvirate E. F. Burian, Frejka, Jindrich Honzl, with designers Jindrich Styrsky and Troster, from the 1930s, and another directorial triumvirate Otomar Krejca, Radok, Jan Grossman, along with designer Jan Svoboda from the 1960s influence young generations of theatre artists today the same way in which the work of the Prague Linguistic Circle continues to preoccupy present day theatre theoreticians.

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Gustav Shpet and the Prague School: Conceptual Frames for the Study of Language

PETER STEINER

In 1922 two members of the Moscow Linguistic Circle who had just resettled in Czechoslovakia, Petr Bogatyrev and Roman Jakobson, published a survey of Slavic philology in Russia during the tumultuous period of 1914-1921. In it the authors note that "G.Shpet's work, 'The Tasks of Ethnic Psychology,' ... demonstrates clearly the perils of the illegitimate crossbreeding of linguistics and psychology that characterizes the work of such psychologists as Steinthal or Wundt." ¹ This statement is, I believe, the first mention of Shpet's name in any Czech periodical dedicated to the study of language and literature. Given the rapid development of these two fields in Czechoslovakia during the twenties and thirties and the signal role of the Russian intellectual tradition in Structuralist linguistics and poetics one would expect to find many subsequent references to Shpet's work by the members of the Prague Linguistic Circle. However, such references are extremely rare. The Structuralists seldom invoked Shpet's ideas and then only in a general way.

In fact, I have been able to locate only three other instances when the Structuralists either quoted from or referred to Shpet's texts. The introductory survey of contemporary linguistics in Bohuslav Havranek's *Genera verbi* (1928) cites a passage from volume 2 of Shpet's *Esthetic Fragments* in which the inner form of language is characterized as a logical form. Jan Mukarovsky quotes Shpet's definition of structure, also from *Esthetic Fragments* in a lecture on poetics presented during the winter semester of 1930/1931. And finally, Jakobson's long 1931 essay on Tomas Masryk's contributions to linguistics observes that Masryk's critique of *Volkerpsychologie* anticipated the position of some modern philosophers of language, in particular "G.Shpet's exemplary work, *Introduction to Ethnic Psychology*, Moscow 1927." ²

A more sustained scrutiny of Structuralist writings might unearth more references to Shpet's work. But my examples are sufficient to illustrate the general attitude of the Prague linguists to the Russian philosopher. They perceived him as a useful ally in their attack against the epistemological underpinnings of nineteenth-century positivism—its psychologism, individualism, and atomism. At the same time, they were aware of the considerable differences between their respective scholarly methods, theoretical horizons, and intellectual emphases. Shpet was a philosopher, and tackled language from a somewhat abstract perspective. The members of the Circle were linguists, and though not entirely deaf to philosophical speculations, occupied

themselves with the detailed analysis of concrete linguistic phenomena. Hence, the paucity of quotations from Shpet in their studies.

What connects Shpet and the Prague School is not the particulars of their research but their general conceptual frameworks. Moscow and Prague were in agreement that the positivists paradigm of knowledge had outlived its usefulness and that linguistics required a new theoretical grounding. Describing this paradigm switch in 1929, Jakobson wrote: "contemporary scholarship studies every complex of phenomena not as a mechanical aggregate but a structural whole, a system, in order to discover, first of all, its internal laws, static and developmental. Today, it is not the external impulse that is at the center of scholarly interests but the internal developmental preconditions, not genesis mechanically, conceived but function." ³ The key notions of structure, sign, and function lie at the heart of both Shpet's and the Structuralists' discussion of language and the rest of this paper will be concerned with these three ideas- how their treatments coincide and differ in the work of Shpet and the Prague School.

In the Slavic intellectual traditions, Shpet was the first to define the term "structure" and apply it to linguistics and esthetics. "Spiritual and cultural formations," he observed in 1923, "are in essence structural." ⁴ They differ from other types of wholes in their relational nature. A structure is not merely the sum total of its constitutive parts but a particular mode of their inward organization. Thus, "a structure differs from an aggregate whose complex mass permits the destruction or elimination of any of its components without a change in the qualitative essence of the whole. Structure can be analyzed only into new, self-enclosed structures which when re-assembled restore the original structure" (EF, 12).

Language for Shpet is the structural whole *Par excellence*, the proto-image of all other cultural phenomena. "By the structure of words," he writes, "I do not mean a morphological, syntactic, or stylistic construction, not a 'surface' but an organic, deep ordering: from the sensorily perceptible to the formally-ideal (eidetic) object, with all the levels of relations between these two terms" (EF, 11-12). What seems to characterize structure, according to this statement, is that it comprises two modes of being a worldly empirical one and a non-worldly, eidetic one. As Shpet insists, "When dealing with both a structure *in toto* and its separate members we must not forget either what is actually given or what is potential." (EF, 13).

Shpet insists on this co-presence because the two aspects of structure need not coincide in reality. The potential aspect exists merely as a relational grid, a scheme of possibilities- formally complete but materially void which can be actualized in a number of quite different ways. "Structure," according to Shpet, "is a concrete formation whose individual parts may change in 'dimension' and even in quality

but cannot be eliminated from the whole *in potentia* without its destruction. *In actu*, some 'members' may be only, inchoate in an embryonic or degenerate, atrophied state. But the *scheme* of the structure would not suffer from this " (EF, 11-12).

Despite their actual incompleteness, parts are recognized as structural elements because of their intrinsic link to the whole to which they belong. This structural 'belonging' is based on what Edmund Husserl called the relation of foundedness or, in Shpet's terms, that of implication. Thus, a logically incomplete judgment can be perceived as correct if the implied rules are grasped. "An enthymeme, "for example, makes sense because it "implicitly contains a syllogism with all its structural members" (EF, 13). But obviously, implication is not limited to patently deformed wholes. Since every actual structure is merely a material variant of its potential scheme the implication of the *eidosis* is what provides it with its categorical identity. "A mathematical formula," Shpet argued, "not only contains the potential relations revealed in actual numerical measurements, but also implies the algorithm that produced it; a proposition is *implicite* a system of inferences and *in potentia* the conclusion of a syllogism, a concept (word-term) is *in potentia* and also *implicite* a proposition; a metaphor or a symbol is *implicite* a system of tropes and *in potentia* a poem, etc ." (EF 14). ⁵

Not surprisingly, the Prague School understanding of "structure" was in many respects close to Shpet's. "A structure," Bohuslav Havranek stated in 1940, "is composed of individual phenomena as a higher unit (whole) acquiring holistic properties which are alien to the parts; in short, it is not simply the sum total of its parts. Individual phenomena are not separable parts of a divisible whole but are interconnected, they are what they are only and always with regard to hierarchically organized wholes." ⁶ Since the Structuralists read Shpet's *Esthetic Fragments* where the term "structure" is discussed in detail, one could even speculate that they borrowed the word directly from the Russian phenomenologist. In any case, what made structures different from the other wholes in the eyes of the Prague linguists was their relational character.

Havranek's definition of structure is sufficiently broad to cover its usages in a variety of disciplines : biology, psychology, philosophy. But in its application to language some additional specifications are necessary. As we have seen, for Shpet the essential feature of the structure is its dual nature: its extension between the pole of the potential (*eidetic*) and the actual (*empirical*). The Prague linguists operated with a similar premise. They did not couch the opposition in phenomenological terms, however, but proceeded along the lines suggested by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. According to him, traditional linguistics suffered from a naturalistic misconception of its subject matter. Instead of asking the essential question, "what is language?" scholars stopped at the empirical level and concentrated

on its physical, psychological, or cultural manifestation. To rectify this situation, Saussure distinguished between what is transient and accidental in language -actual speech (*parole*) and what is permanent and rule governed- the potential linguistic system (*langue*) .

In pointing out that language consists of empirical and formal aspects, Saussure was not far from Shpet's position. However, while the Russian philosopher maintained that the two must always be treated together, the Swiss linguist emphasized only one. In his tirades against naturalism he insisted over and over that the system, not its material manifestations, is what is crucial for language. The linguistic identity of speech phenomena is their liability to the abstract norms that *langue* furnishes *a priori*. Language, Saussure explained, is like a game of chess in which a missing piece can be replaced by virtually any other object. Despite the physical difference between the two markers, within the game they have the same value. Similarly, given the infinite heterogeneity of the physical substance that speech can utilize and the restricted nature of the underlying formal system, Saussure separated *langue* from *parole* and declared the system to be the sole object of linguistic study.⁷

The Prague School's view of this issue was definitely closer to Shpet than to Saussure. This fact explains the Structuralists' aloofness from their Danish counterparts, the Glossematians, who carried Saussure's dictum that " language is a form and not a substance" to its algebraic extreme. For the Prague scholars, abstract *langue*, devoid of its material implementation was a heuristic device, and not a linguistic reality.⁸ This view was to a considerable degree conditioned by the functionalism of the Czech group.

Conceived of as a means-end structure, language inevitably finds some substances more usable than other for the goals it pursues and; therefore, cannot be fully independent of them. To recycle Saussure's chess metaphor, it is not likely that a missing piece will be replaced by an ice cube, an egg yolk, or a living spider rather than by something more suitable for the purpose. Extended to the study of language, this attitude led the Structuralists to insist that linguistic sound be studied not only as an abstract phonological system but also as an actual phone whose physical properties condition verbal communication in a particular way.⁹ Similarly, the Prague scholars investigated written language, refusing to treat it as a treacherous disguise of living discourse (Saussure's position). They saw it instead as an autonomous structure employed, according to Josef Vachek, for needs which the phonic substance cannot satisfy.¹⁰ I shall be returning to the notion of function later on.

Shpet's definition of structure, we recall, involves not only its dual nature but also the relation of implication endowing the individual elements of a structure with their categorial identity. Shpet's treatment of this topic was heavy on explanation

but light on examples. However, what the *Esthetic Fragments* merely suggested, Roman Jakobson's phonological studies exploited to the full. As Elmar Holenstein has pointed out these inquiries "are to be regarded as a pattern and model for eidetic phenomenology."¹¹ In contrast to Saussure, who considered the phoneme the ultimate unit of the signifier, Jakobson argued from the 1930s on that the phoneme can be dissolved into smaller constitutive elements which he labeled distinctive features. As a "bundle of such features"¹² a phoneme implies, in Shpet's terms, the universal system of correlated distinctive features which in one way or another are realized in every linguistic sound belonging to this class. To push the parallel between Shpet and Structural linguistics yet further, a phoneme is not only implicitly an inventory of distinctive features but also, *in potentia*, a morpheme. Here we are broaching another field of inquiry advanced by the members of the Circle-morphonology-a discipline that "studies the phonological structure of the various morphological parts of the word."¹³

Until now I have dwelt on the points of similarity between Shpet's and the Prague School's notions of structure. The affinities revealed so far should not, however, blind us to their differences. Among these the most important is the way the two traditions accounted for the dynamism of language. For the Russian philosopher the essential antinomy fuelling structural transformations was that of potentiality versus actuality. A formally complete eidetic scheme is incessantly permuted in the variety of its realizations because of the physical heterogeneity of the implementing matter. For the Prague School, on the other hand, the engine of linguistic dynamism was the historical incompatibility of the elements comprising the structure. In their view, language is in no way a harmonious, symmetrical system but an on-going struggle between revolutionary tendencies aiming to alter the status quo and conservative tendencies set on preserving it. At any moment the structure is both balanced and unbalanced; it is simultaneously a stage and a mutation. The ruptures in previous equilibria coexist with the equilibria that mended these ruptures, and all of them point to subsequent changes that will redress the situation in the future.¹⁴ This conscious attempt of the Prague linguist to merge system with diachrony differs significantly from Shpet's approach to linguistic structure, which, despite all of its historical awareness, remains primarily synchronic.

The second major concept shared by Shpet and the Structuralists is the semiotic nature of the word, the fact that it is a sign. Both Shpet and the Prague linguists concurred on this point. As Shpet put it, "The word is a sign *Sui generis*" (EF, 8). This insistence on the uniqueness of the word vis-a-vis all other signs, for example, symptoms or signals, can be attributed to the influence of Edmund Husserl's semiotic typology elaborated in the *Logical Investigations*. The introductory paragraphs of "Investigation I" divide the domain of signs into two uneven categories: 1)

expressions, i.e. signs capable of remaining self-same regardless of the actual context in which they signify : and 2) indications, i.e., signs lacking such identity and merely representing fluctuating states of affairs. Expressions are generally linguistic signs and are resistant to displacement because of one particular facet of their structure that indications lack." In the case of a name," Husserl explains, "we distinguish between what it 'shows forth' (i.e., a mental state) and what it means. And again between what it means (the sense of 'content' of its naming presentation) and what it names (the object of that presentation)."¹⁵ Both the "showing forth" and the "naming" are contingent upon empirical reality and, therefore, cannot retain their sameness in repetition. Only the "content of an expression's naming presentation", the "meaning" (*Bedeutung*) of the linguistic sign, is independent of a phenomenal context. It is this lexical meaning inherent in the word prior to its representing other entities that endows the expression with its identity and distinguishes it from all other signs.

In general, Shpet accepted Husserl's conclusions about the make up of the verbal parcel. "The word," he wrote, "is a sensory complex which fulfils specific functions in human intercourse: the primary ones- semantic and synsemantic ; the secondary ones- expressive and deictic " (EF, 7). Shpet's secondary functions correspond to what Husserl called "showing forth" and "naming," whereas the primary semantic function carries out the "meaning" of the word. And this is so because for Shpet (as for Husserl) the specificity of the word *qua* sign lies in "its link to meaning (*smysl*) " (EF,8).

Nevertheless, despite this affinity, Shpet departed from Husserl's semiotic doctrine in one important respect, namely in his emphasis on the communicative nature of language. According to Husserl, meaning in its purity exists only ideally (like numbers or geometrical figures) and is fully realized only within the confines of a single consciousness, i.e., in the mental soliloquy. Once the expression enters the world in the process of communication, it degenerates into a meaningless indication. In contrast to this, Shpet insisted that " the word is *Prima facie* communication (*soobshchenie*), and consequently a means of *intercourse* (*obshchenie*)" (EF, 7). And as he reiterates subsequently, " the communicative function of the word is not only the most important one, but also the one, upon which all the others are founded " (EF, 29). As these quotations suggest, for Shpet the semiotic nature of the word (its link to meaning) is closely related to the function it serves (communication). This fact leads us back to the notion of function.

As early as 1914, Shpet drew a sharp line between two types of phenomena: natural and social. Whereas social phenomena possess inner meanings (*smysl*), natural ones do not. "Let us take a concrete object; let us recall Aristotle's example of an

axe and, true, we will find its 'inner meaning' in its 'cutting.' " ¹⁶ This inner meaning has its source in the fact that the axe was made by somebody with a particular purpose in mind. Harking back to Aristotle, Shpet calls this inner meaning of social phenomena their entelechy. "Language, art, every social object," he writes, "always presents itself as a sign with internal, intimate meaning. We do not see, hear, or feel it yet we always "Know" it. We know that *der Fisch* means table, the table means an instrument for a particular end whence its meaning, its entelechy" (JS, 205).

What is significant about such knowledge, however, is its origin. It is not constituted in our consciousness in the intentional act of perceiving the social object but only through the process of interacting with others. Social phenomena, Shpet argues, "are facts which we perceive in no other way than in the transmission from somebody else" (JS, 207). And it is in this transmission of collective experience that the entelechy of language lies. As a structure of intersubjective signs it is the primary vehicle of communication among the members of a group. "Meaning," Shpet wrote, "is the dialectical accumulator of thought always ready to transmit its intelligible [*myslitel' noe*] charged to the proper receiver" (EF, 88). From this perspective, the meaning of a word cannot dissipate in communication but, on the contrary, only in this process does it find its genuine realization.

Shpet's purposive explanation of social phenomena was very near to the hearts of the Prague Structuralists. As I argued earlier, they conceived of language as a means-end structure and, hence, categorically rejected Saussure's "fundamental idea" that " *the true and unique object of linguistics is language studied in and for itself.*" ¹⁷ In 1925, Jakobson succinctly summed up his objection: "Language," he wrote, "according to the correct definition of contemporary French linguists, is a system of conventional values very much like a pack of cards. But because of this, it would be wrong to analyze it without taking into account the multiplicity of possible tasks without which the system does not exist. Just as we have rules for a universal card game valid equally for rummy, poker and building card houses, linguistic rules can be determined only for a system defined by its goal." ¹⁸ What is under attack here is not *Langue per se* but Saussure's conceptualization of it as a homogeneous system uniformly governing all speech activity. From the teleological standpoint of the Structuralists, language is a set of functional dialects each with its own set of rules structured in a way best suited to a specific purpose.

To analyze these means-end linguistic structures requires that we specify all the functions verbal intercourse carries out. And given the heterogeneous roles that language plays in our life, this could be a formidable task. Here the Prague Structuralists turned to Husserl's analysis of the expression, which I mentioned in connection with Shpet earlier. For Husserl the uttered word intimates the mental state of the speaker,

names some objectivity, and presents its meaning. From this beginning, Jakobson developed a typology of linguistic functions which became the cornerstone of the structuralist theory of language. To each of the three aspects of expression corresponds a specific goal-oriented functional dialect- the emotive, the practical, and the poetic¹⁹. The individual *langues* of these dialects organize linguistic devices in such a manner that one component of the speech act - the speaker, the referent, or the sign itself, becomes foregrounded.

Given their common phenomenological origin it is not surprising that Jakobson's typology so resembles Shpet's outline of verbal function. Yet, there are also important differences between them, of which I shall mention one. Shpet, faithful to Husserl, considers the semantic (meaning-presenting) function of language to be primary and relegates the expressive and deictic ones to a merely ancillary position. The apriori hierarchy reflects a logocentric view of language according to which the word is, above all, "an embodiment of reason [*razum*]" (EF,7), and the process of understanding (*urazumenie*) is the actualization of the thought (*mysl'*) contained in a word's meaning (*smysl*) in a particular mind (*um*).

The structuralist position on verbal meaning was more flexible. They would agree with the Russian philosopher that words are by definition signs and hence endowed with meaning. However, they treated the presence of meaning in an utterance in terms of a relative rather than absolute hierarchy. Language, from the functional point of view, serves a number of purposes not all of them inevitably rational and the structure of a linguistic sign in each instance reflects this fact. In some speech acts (e.g., scholarly discourse) the semantic plane clearly predominates. In others (e.g., expressive interjections) meaning might be reduced to a bare minimum- the superimposition of a phonological grid on an otherwise inarticulate scream. But it is precisely because of its capacity for such a radical realignment, the Structuralists would insist, that language is "the most important semiotic system, the sign *kat' exochen....* the cement of human coexistence [which] regulates man's attitude toward both reality and society."²⁰

I have now come to the end of this short comparison of Shpet's and the Prague School's approaches to language. I hope that the many affinities and also divergences between their frames of reference are apparent. The most important fact, I believe is that the two intellectual traditions rejected the nineteenth-century paradigm of knowledge and conceived of language in structural, semiotic, and teleological terms. Elmar Holenstein, who has studied the connections between Husserl and the Prague Circle, has proposed including the circle in Phenomenology as its structuralist branch.²¹ Given the numerous links between Shpet and the Prague

School, we might follow Holenstein's lead and call Shpet's philosophy of language a phenomenological branch of Structuralism.

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4. *Esteticheskie fragmenty*, vol. 2 (Petersburg, 1923), p. 12. Further references to this text will be given within the body of the essay with the abbreviation "EF" followed by page number.
5. In this quotation I have corrected what seems to me a mistake. The Russian text reads: "a proposition is in *potentia* the system of inferences and *implicit* the conclusion of a syllogism."
6. "Strukturalismus," *Ottuv slovník naucny nove doby*, vol. 6 (Prague 1940), p. 452.
7. See F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, tr. W. Baskin (New York, 1959), esp. pp. 7-23 and 101-122.
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15. *Logical Investigations*, vol.1, tr. J. N. Findley (New York, 1970), p. 276.

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17. *Course*, p. 232.

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Jakobson on Peirce

KEI I. YAMANAKA

"Any concept is a sign, of course. But we may take a sign in so broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not a thought, but an action or experience, or we may even so enlarge the meaning of sign that its interpretant is a mere quality of feeling".

C.S. Peirce

It was in the early fifties that the name of Charles Sanders Peirce began to appear in the writings of Roman Jakobson. First the reference was to Peirce's pioneering draft of semiotics and marginally to his notion of "interpretant" (Jakobson 1953:1.555;1.565-66), but gradually it extended to such diversified notions as the triadic classification of signs into icons, indices and symbols, translational theory of linguistic meaning, universe of discourse, inner dialogue, and temporal interpretation of sign classes. By that time, however, Jakobson's theorizing had reached its final phase: he had already accomplished most of his major contributions to general linguistics, substantially shifting the main pillars of the Saussurean paradigm; his renowned means-ends models of language was also in the process of completion, a model that was to account for the facts and findings he had accumulated over half a century (cf. Jakobson 1953;2.557;1956).

It is tempting to ask, therefore, what could have prompted Jakobson to cite Peirce so often. If it was not simple to embellish his erudite prose, what was the ultimate purpose of Jakobson's repeated recommendations? Was he just intent on acquainting the linguistic world with the semiotic thought of this creative and sometimes unfathomable precursor, or was he trying to reinforce some aspect of his own theoretical standpoint, as in the case of his inordinate emphasis on the contributions of Mikolaj Kruszewski or on Gerard Manley Hopkins?

Some of Jakobson's motives are attested by his own words. For years Jakobson had been chafing under the deplorable situation that he was "among linguists perhaps the sole student of Peirce's views" when "many things could have been understood earlier and more clearly if one had really known Peirce's landmarks" (Jakobson 1980:34). If it had been Jakobson's intention to make these landmarks known, no one can now doubt that Jakobson proved to be marvelously successful in this respect. Peirce, an unhappy and obscure philosopher known only among the interested few, has now come to be the most frequently discussed and the most often cited writer in semiotic literature. But the question still remains what theoretical conjunction it was that induced Jakobson to think so highly of Peirce.

It is instantly noticeable that the adduced observations center around the nature of signs in general and of signification in particular. This is quite understandable because, before anything, Peirce was the father of present-day semiotics and semiotics in its proper sense was the domain that preoccupied Jakobson in his later years. Perhaps the following list will exhaust the assertions in Peirce's semiotics that Jakobson thought worthwhile to bring to our renewed attention:

- 1) The Stoic tradition in Peirce which conceives of the signum as a referral from the signans to the signatum.
- 2) The inclusiveness of his semiotic program, especially the trichotomy of signs that includes various modes of significative phenomena.
- 3) Relative hierarchy among the modes of signification that enables us to speak of various hybrid forms in signs, or in Peirce's terminology "degenerate signs".
- 4) The elucidation of the generic character of both signans and signatum in the code of language.
- 5) His concept of "interpretant" which regards meaning as the translation of a sign into a more developed sign or into another system of signs.
- 6) His observations on the modes of being of the three basic types of signs.
- 7) General affinities of thought as exemplified in such concepts as dyad and invariance.
- 8) His emphasis on the importance of blanks and inner dialogue for the study of language.

This is an itemized list of Peircean themes that recur in Jakobson's writings. Even this brief enumeration will enable us to say something cogent about the tilt that Jakobson gave to Peirce's phenomenology. But let us first address the hub of the whole cluster of ideas, namely, the three-modal classification of signs. Doubtless this is one of the most popular and the most important facts of Peirce's semiotic theory. But the deeper reason for Jakobson's expounding this trichotomous program must be sought elsewhere, presumably in his general attitude towards the Saussurean paradigm. Jakobson always used to gauge his accomplishments in relation to Saussure's basic assumptions-- or, speaking more bluntly, his tactics used to be to challenge Saussurean tenets one by one. Characteristically, however, the first principle of

Saussurean linguistics-- the arbitrary nature of the [linguistic] signs-- remained uncontested.

For Jakobson, who started as a translational poet, the motivated, or even significative, nature of "the alphabet" was something that required no theoretical corroboration. It was sufficient for him simply to quote "a telling criticism" of the principle by one of his revered colleagues that only for a detached onlooker is the "bond between the signans and signatum a mere contingency, whereas for the native user of the same language this relation is a necessity" (Jakobson 1965:2.348; cf also 1962:1.653). According to textual and other evidence, however, Saussure's query into the arbitrariness of linguistic signs was quite thoroughgoing, spanning both the relation between signans and signatum and the relation between signum (that is, the unity of signans and signatum) and designatum, turning in consequence the whole argument into a devastating critique of human language (Engler 1962; Maruyama 1983: 184ff.). Even when Saussure envisaged the possibility of a general science of signs embracing such diversified systems as writing military and maritime signals, gestures, the language of deaf-mutes, costumes and ceremonies, he conceived of it as basically concerning arbitrarily fixable values. But this aspect of Saussurean linguistics had no appeal whatsoever to Jakobson. He was much more interested in tracking down, in the Genevan master's epistles and old notes, fragmentary observations relating to a category of signs which is "not always completely arbitrary" (Jakobson 1980a), and in his turn continued to amass wide-ranging evidence of the necessary or natural nexus between the signans and signatum. Yet it is easily imaginable that Jakobson felt a compelling need to elaborate a more inclusive theory that adequately accounted for every aspect of verbal signs in their varying degrees of motivation-- a need which should have become all the more strongly felt, or even a theoretically prerequisite, when confronted with the actual task of mapping out plans for general semiotics. Quite understandably, he saw that the two intertwined principles in Saussure of the arbitrariness of the signs and the static conception of the system "blocked the development of the *semiologie generale* that the master had foreseen and hoped for" (Ibid.).

In this context, the doctrine of signs that Peirce had outlined saved perfectly both of Jakobson's his needs: it provided Jakobson with a cogent and well-developed framework for semiotics as well as with a more flexible approach to language. The first and direct application of Peirce's trichotomy to linguistic signs is attempted in Jakobson's "Quest for the Essence of Language" (1965), in which he addresses himself to the "far from unanimous" principle of arbitrariness from the angle of how verbal code and messages are motivated. From the outset, Jakobson does not regard Peirce's semiotic classification as something fixed and closed, and repeatedly praises "his shrewd recognition that the difference between the three basic classes

of signs is merely a difference in relative hierarchy " and further comments that " it is not the presence of absence of similarity or contiguity between the signans and signatum, not the purely factual or purely imputed, habitual connection between the two constituents, which underlies the division of signs into icons, indices and symbols, but merely the predominance of one of these factors over the others." (1965:2.349)

Here we find the three important motifs that shape Jakobson's later model of semiotic theory - the bonding between signans and signatum, a pair of binary features, namely, similarity/contiguity and factual/ imputed, and the relative hierarchy in the modes of possible motivation which, incidentally, is one of the characteristic traits of his functional approach. Although the final theory- formation is yet to come, and although it appears so paradoxical, there is good reason to believe that, well before Jakobson came up with all these theoretical premisses, he had already in view the conclusion that derives from the theory . Two years earlier, in a treatise on visual and auditory signs, Jakobson writes:

Using C.S Peirce's division of signs into indexes, icons, and symbols, one may say that for the interpreter an index is associated with its objects by a factual existential contiguity and an icon by a factual similarity, whereas there is no existential connection between symbols and the objects they refer to. A symbol acts by virtue of law.' (Jakobson 1963:2.335)

At this stage, the binary opposition factual/imputed is still unformulated except for the disconnected references to factual contiguity and to the conventional nature of arbitrary symbols. But we cannot overlook the fact that here for the first time Jakobson enumerates the three categories in an inverted order (instead of Peirce's original "icons, indexes and symbols" or their exact reversal) (cf.1957:2.132). The deviation becomes all the more striking in "Quest for the Essence of Language" (1965) because the two versions appear side by side between the quoting and the quoted passages:

Peirce's concern with the different ranks of coassistance of the three functions in all three types of signs, and in particular his scrupulous attentions to the indexical and iconic components of verbal symbols, is intimately linked with his thesis that the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible (2.349 [Apparent misprints corrected by KIY])

Although the above -cited passages do not entirely preclude alternative interpretations, there is at least a surface indication that somehow index comes foremost in Jakobson's mind. And we can surmise that his emphasis on the modal varieties of signs, their relative hierarchy, and on the underlying pairs of binary oppositions all reflect a decade of his theorizing endeavours which culminated in a *revision* of Peircean trichotomy. But before pursuing this development of Jakobson's thought, we must take a brief look at Peirce's phenomenological edifice that enclosed and defines his taxonomy on each level.

Peirce conceived of his phenomenology as a catalogue of universal categories for the being in general. What underlies all his intricate system of taxonomy are the three classes of the model of being which he termed firstness, secondness and thirdness-- or, in a more transparent terminology, possibility, existent and law, respectively. According to one of his most straightforward statements, firstness is defined as "something which is what it is without reference to anything else within it or without it, regardless of all force and of all reason." (Peirce 2.85) It is a quality of unanalyzed feeling, or a mere appearance with "an utter absence of binarity." Secondness, on the other hand, is "the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.... The type of an idea of secondness is the experience of effort, prescinded from the idea of purpose" (Hardwick ed., 1977:24-25). Thirdness is "the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other" (Ibid). If these three are exhaustive modes of being that our conscious mind registers, it is quite easy to see that signs are typically triadic relations in which "something stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (2.228). The following passage brings forth almost all the facets of Peirce's semiotic thought and methodology:

A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad infinitum. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect significant character. It is not necessary that the Interpretant should actually exist. A being in futuro will suffice. Signs have two degrees of Degeneracy. A Sign degenerate in the lesser degree, is an ... Index, which is a Sign whose significance of its Object is due to its having a genuine Relation to that Object, irrespective of the Interpretant. Such, for example, is the exclamation "Hi !" as indicative of present danger, or a rap at the door as indicative of a visitor. A Sign degenerate in the greater degree is an... Icon, which is a Sign whose significant

virtue is due simply to its Quality. Such for example, are imaginations of how I would act under certain circumstances, as showing me how another man would be likely to act. We say that the portrait of a person we have not seen is convincing. So far as, on the ground merely of what I see in it, I am led to form an idea of the person it represents, it is an Icon. But, in fact, it is not a pure Icon, because I am greatly influenced by knowing that it is an effect, through the artist, caused by the original's appearance, and is thus in a genuine Obsistent relation to that original. Besides, I know that portraits have but the slightest resemblance to their originals, except in certain conventional respects, and after a conventional scale of values, etc. A genuine Sign is a... Symbol, which is a sign which owes its significant virtue to a character which can only be realized by the aid of its Interpretant. An utterance of Speech is an example. If the sounds were originally in part iconic, in part indexical, those characters have long since lost their importance. The words only stands for the objects they do, and signify the qualities they do, because they will determine, in the mind of the auditor, corresponding signs. (2.92)

Here a sign is conceived of as a relation that is infinitely regressive because the mediating factor, the interpretant, is also a sign to itself. The ultimate semiotic correlate, however, is necessarily triadic, irreducible neither to a dyad nor to an unembodied quality. Thus thirdness is an inherent and defining character of semiosis. Still, we must not overlook an important and very abstruse aspect of Peirce's, theory, namely, that the three model classes do not constitute a cut and dried scheme of labels but are so stipulated as to be recursively applicable and the second and the third cycles of the same classificatory principle produce the well-known threefold trichotomies of signs. They can be first classified according to the mode of being of the sign itself, according to the relation between the sign and its object, and according to the sign in its relation with the interpretant.

	Firstness	Secondness	Thirdness
First	Qualisign	Icon	Rheme
Second	Sinsign	Index	Dicisign
Third	Legisign	Symbol	Argument

In order to grasp the whole nature of these trichotomies, we must first clarify why only disjointed parts of this taxonomy could have been the major concern of semiotic students, including Jakobson himself: above all, sinsign and legisign in their more transparent and popularized version of "token " and "type" (cf. Hardwick ed. 1977:83) and the tripartite classification of semiosis according to its secondness. Apparently the answer lies in the inclusiveness of the scheme itself. Qualisign, for instance, is characterized by Peirce as a quality which " cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied" and the embodiment of which " has nothing to do with its character as a sign" (2.244). In other words, it is simply a qualitative possibility unrealized and therefore uncoded, something whose mode of being could be inferred "only by a proper way of abstraction" (Yonemori 1981:140).

The third column, on the other hand, concerns the nature of interpretant construed as modes of statement: emotional, dynamical and logical, respectively. We notice a general parallelism with " the traditional model of language... confined to the three functions; emotional, conative, and referential (Jakobson 1960: 3.24) , yet Jakobson's attitude towards this trichotomy is quite obscure, as he makes little mention of it anywhere. The point is that these categories represent three different aspects of "that which is essentially intelligible" (2.309) rather than the difference in functional motivation in verbal manifestations. Rheme is a possible assertion, a blank form of proposition yet to be implemented with significative forms. Dicisign is an indexical proposition which is "either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for being so" (2.310) and, in consequence, the argument is, " a sign whose interpretant represents its object as being an ulterior sign through a law, namely the law that the passage from all such premises to such conclusions tends to the truth". (2.263)

Taken as a whole, Peirce's semiotic program encompasses ontology, grammar and logic in their broadest forms, and it is quite understandable that the more practically minded semioticians, especially those with a linguistic background, should focus only on those aspects of this program which show affinities and near correlatives with their own concepts and terminology. But Peirce's formidable exercise in classification does not end here. Actually, the three trichotomies do not even constitute a classification of signs at all but offer merely a preliminary identification of semiotic invariants of three categories that "together define ten classes of signs " (2.254) which in turn further subdivide into sixty -six subclasses. It will be futile to go into all the details here. Nevertheless, the logic of classification cannot be dismissed so easily since it comprised the very essence of Peirce's whole project.

As Jakobson has repeatedly pointed out, Peirce "did not at all shut signs up in one of these classes" (1980:38) but thought rather that every actual sign has all the three categories blended together. Consequently, classification of signs for Peirce

amounts to identifying possible combinations of classes between thirdness, secondness and firstness. Mathematical enumeration produces twenty-seven combinations, but Peirce places two strong theoretical restrictions on them:

(1) No sign must be combined with other sign(s) on the same column.

(2) No sign can combine with the next lower sign on its right column.
(2.236n; Feibleman 1946:88; Yonemori 1981:128)

The necessity of these restrictions is again based on the fundamental character of the three categories: any combination within the same category nullifies the meaning of categorization itself and allowing the lower category to determine the higher one runs counter to the initial premise that the thirdness of "genuine mediation is the character of a sign" (2.92). It would not be entirely superfluous to point out that the "symbolic icon," or the symbol with "an icon and/or an index incorporated into it," to which Jakobson used to refer (cf. 1968:1.702; 1980: 38, etc), is theoretically precluded in Peirce's later formulation. In consequence, the triadic relations that make up signs are (rhematic, iconic) Qualisign, (rhematic) Iconic Legisign, Rhematic Symbol (legisign), Argument (symbolic, legisign), (rhematic) Iconic Sinsign, Rhematic Indexical Legisign, Dicent Symbol (legisign), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, Dicent Indexical Legisign, and Dicent (indexical) Sinsign. Peirce further enumerates degenerate varieties for these ten classes, which mainly relate to the manners of reference (direct or indirect) and in case where the third correlate is a legisign to the manners of inference (deductive, inductive, or abductive). But this brief sketch would suffice for our present purpose of examining Jakobson's reaction to Peirce's program.

These, then, are the basic lines of semiotics that Peirce drafted around the turn of this century (circa 1906, according to the editor of his collected papers). But as we have indicated, Jakobson did not just draw attention to this pioneering legacy. Even though it is true that, owing to the fragmentary and confused editorship of the available texts of Peirce's writings, "the reader is obliged to rework assiduously for himself the whole plan of these volumes in order to get a perspective" (Jakobson 1980:33), Jakobson's interpretation from the first gravitates towards those aspects of Peircean theory that corroborate or tie in with the basic lines of his own theoretical stance: the allegedly structuralist method in Piercean phenomenology, the non-Saussurean or motivationist vista that his semiotics opened up, his emphasis on dyads, and the like. In a word, Jakobson was "a selective reader," as Bruss (1978) aptly put it.

And finally, after a decade since his first acquaintance with the American thinker, comes the following summing-up. In 1968 Jakobson writes:

The division of signs into indexes, icons, and symbols, which was first advanced by Peirce in his famous paper of 1897 and elaborated throughout his life, is actually based on two substantial dichotomies. One of them is the difference between contiguity and similarity. The indexical relation between signans and signatum consists in their factual, existential contiguity. The forefinger pointing at a certain object is a typical index. The iconic relation between the signans and signatum is, in Peirce terms, "a mere community in some quality," a relative likeness sensed as such by the interpreter, e.g. a picture recognized as a landscape by the spectator. We preserve the name symbol used by Peirce for the third class of signs.... In contradistinction to the factual contiguity between the car pointed at and the direction of the forefinger's pointing gesture, and to the factual resemblance between this car and an etching or diagram of it, no factual proximity is required between the noun car and the vehicle so named. In this sign the signans is tied to its signatum "regardless of any factual connection". The contiguity between the two constituent sides of the symbol "may be termed an imputed quality, "according to Peirce's felicitous expression.....

The classification of relations between signans and signatum posited three basic types: factual contiguity, imputed contiguity, and factual similarity. However, the interplay of the two dichotomies- contiguity/similarity and factual/imputed admits a fourth variety, namely, imputed similarity. Precisely this combination becomes apparent in musical semiosis. The introversive semiosis is a message which signifies itself, is indissolubly linked with the esthetic function of sign systems and dominates not only music but also glossolalic poetry and non-representational painting and sculpture. (Jakobson 1968:2.700;2.704)

While the terminology is mostly Peirce's, it is completely deprived of its original theoretical framework. Jakobson disregards the three fundamental categories by adhering to Peirce's earlier, possibly the earliest, formulation, rejects the second trichotomy itself in favour of an entirely new tetrad, and resorts to functional cross-classification rather than to the triadic componential definition. Bruss (1978) enumerates Jakobson's deviation from Peirce's original formulation regarding all the major theoretical constituents such as sign situation, object, the three subclasses themselves. Evidently this is no longer an advertisement for Peirce, not even a garbled version of Peircean semiotics, but- an -out and out statement of Jakobson's own standpoint, which must, therefore, be approached as such and evaluated in its own right.

There are at least three points of general theoretical interest:


- (1) Why does indexicality come foremost in the Jakobsonian classification of sign?
- (2) Does his reformulation have the same theoretical scope as Peirce's?
- (3) What will be the justification for Jakobson's alternative outline of semiotics?

Apparently, Peirce's semiotic program as can be glimpsed in his *Collected Papers*, covers several developmental stages, and Jakobson was free to put together a highly personal version of his own distillation. Regrettably, Jakobson's program, in its turn, is not mapped out in all its details. His 1978 survey of language in relation to other communication systems comes closest to being complete, but other sources have to be also taken into consideration if we are to assess the significance and the possible consequences of the Jakobsonian modification.

To begin with, we can note a confrontation between the two scholars' different scientific backgrounds-- naturally fraught with numerous faux amis-- which led, in Jakobson's hands, to a serious distortion of meaning with regard to several important terms. Jakobson had evidently more of a practical mind and approached the problem of signs with several concrete semiotic systems in view. This is presumably one of the reasons why he chose to disregard the first trichotomy of Qualisign, Sinsign, and Legisign. If Peirce classifies signs according to whether "the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law" (Peirce 2.243), Jakobson's classification of actual, embodied signs can dispense with these ontological categories of signs.

In talking about the verbal code, Jakobson used to take "the verbalizable" into account, but somehow made no attempt in his semiotics to reconcile the Peircean notion of possible signs with his own. Instead, the first trichotomy is replaced with much a more detailed cross classification according to (1) the modes of perception (visual/auditory), (2) the ways of production (organic/instrumental), (3) the modes of presentation (representative/ostensive), (4) the modes of existence of the addresser (communicational/informational), and, finally, (5) the modes of use (autonomous/applied) (Jakobson 2.702-703). Compared to Peirce's schema, this offhand enumeration is evidently much more realistic. Yet this reshuffling commits Jakobson to a tacit understanding that signs are all existents to be perceived either visually or auditorily and that they span both communication and information. This classification is, by today's standards, much too anthropomorphic. In fact, it marks the first step in Jakobson's departure from the phenomenological framework of Peirce's semiotics.

In Peirce's second trichotomy, signs as such stand for something else in three different capacities depending on their relation with designate, or in Peirce's terminology, with their objects. And this scheme also undergoes a drastic modification that takes us back to our initial question why index comes first in Jakobson's classification. In short, Jakobson seems to assert that all the (human) signs can be adequately placed within the following diagram:



If the signs are a function of the two polarities, there would be no special reason to favour any particular order in enumerating these four subtypes. As we have seen, however, Jakobson chooses to give priority to factual contiguity, that is, to index rather than to icon or symbol. It is understandable why factuality (*Sachlichkeit*, in his earliest formulation) comes first, as it is clearly meant to identify the least "developed" mode of representation. Nonetheless, we are hard put to understand why contiguity precedes similarity in that the latter apparently implies less motivation between the sign and its object.

The only possible answer seems to be to suppose that Jakobson's classification is ineluctably logocentric. In language, shifters, and in particular demonstrative pronouns with a gestural prop, moor the conventional edifice of language-- in effect, a complex system of superordination and predication --to the real world. Iconic elements in language, on the other hand, are either phonic qualities subservient to meaning or else present a facultative homology between events and propositions, which can occur in language, as Peirce put it, only in degenerate form.

Beside producing a forcible transmutation of trichotomy into binarism, possibly with a logocentric orientation, this classification has several other important implications. Most notably, it characterizes sign - types by gradience rather than

by pigeon-holing and thus induces, by means of cross-classification, an entirely new type of signification termed "introversive semiosis". George Steiner was probably the first commentator to call attention to this type of signs that "seek to establish reference only to themselves, only inwards" (Steiner 1961), yet Jakobson goes a step further by giving this typology a theoretical framework. Taken literally, the defining terms, such as "imputed similarity," for instance, appear almost vacuous when applied to musical semiosis and glossolalic poetry (what does it mean to say they have imputed similarity with their objects when the objects themselves are nonexistent?), but make sense if we posit that they simply identify the extreme cases of autotelic or reflexive function in music and non representational arts.

If this is the end product of the theoretical encounter in question, we have to say that although Jakobson has done a great deal to stimulate a new interest in Peircean semiotics, advocating the later's pioneering accomplishment was not Jakobson's sole, or even main, objective. It is true that some of Peirce's penetrating observations won Jakobson's deep admiration, but more important was evidently the fact that the temporary symbiosis made it possible for Jakobson to organize his own ideas and insights in such a way as to set up a new paradigm entirely free from the Saussurean anathema. Jakobson's formulation of introversive semiosis may not be quite successful, yet anyone familiar with his theory or arts, especially with the acclaimed definition of the aesthetic or poetic function, will feel that Jakobson's theoretical and interpretive endeavors have been a long preparation for it. In other words, the above schema is so conceived as to both summarize and encompass, on the semiotic level, all of Jakobson's diversified probings into the structure of language and other adjacent sign systems.

It is undoubtedly to Jakobson's credit that semiotics extended its scope over economical, psychological and biological messages and assumed a more explicitly heuristic bent. Still, as we have seen, the project resulted in pulverizing the foundation of Peirce's phenomenological architecture. The same fate, however, seems to have awaited Jakobson's own program: although he tried to set a boundary between semiotics and communication sciences and considered "the totality of communication disciplines" ethnological and zoological, to be the outermost concentric circle circumscribing the semiotic science at large (2.662; Holenstein 1975:190), this program already bears today, when semiotics is broaching ever new subjects in accordance with the expanding intellectual universe of contemporary science, the marks of its own time.

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Poetics and Phonology : Points of Disharmony *

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1. After nearly seven decades, there is no need, I believe, to expound on the revolutionary importance that introduction of the principles of phonology had for poetics and, especially, for theory or verse. While there is no doubt about the scientific nature of several branches of literary study, poetics evolves beyond its pre-scientific stage only when it comes to grips with the existence of a system which furnishes a criterion by which to separate all (and only) relevant components of the sound level of a poetic work. The issue is not merely a matter of methodology; above all, it concerns a deeper understanding of the ontological status of the basic material of poetry. It is of decisive importance for poetics that the continuum of speech is approached by its users with a system of discrete categories— their relationships and internal differentiation— set up in advance. The system not only imparts meaning to the relevant motor acts and acoustic percepts but predetermines what will actually be regarded as articulated and perceived. For the first time, the sound layer of the work appears to be a matter of a comprehensive communicative relationship between speaker and perceiver, which creates the precondition for overcoming the elements of one-sidedness in the articulatory and acoustic approaches. "The essential symptoms of speech are only those of its aspects that are present both in pronunciation and perception,"— this is Boris Tomashevsky's formulation put forth as early as 1922, and Roman Jakobson systematically spelled out the same view in a discussion with Saran and Verrier the same year.

Gradually discovered by phonological analysis of particular languages, hierarchical relationships between sound elements of speech— namely, between those capable and incapable of differentiating meaning— are becoming the basis for poetics on which operate the specific principles of poetic organization.

2. Historically, adequate application of all these theoretical stimuli was not, however, an automatic process. In Russian, and subsequently Czech poetics, this development had been protracted until the 1930's . In the meantime, structuralist poetics had to distance itself not only from half-baked solutions, but also from straightforward applications common at a time of the changing scholarly paradigm. The shared feature of such applications was that the relevance of some acoustic element in a verse line appeared to be directly dependent on the relevance of the

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same element in the phonological system. It is also apparent that the different principles of phonology have come to the force in different areas of poetics and in different scholarly traditions.

In prosody, as far as the carriers of rhythm in particular language are concerned, prominence came to be viewed as the decisive category. In a seminal work on Czech verse (published in Russian in 1923 and in Czech in 1926), Jakobson managed to specify, in an outstanding way, the position of Czech versification among other accentual syllabic metre systems. His point of departure was the difference between the phonological nature of Russian accent and the non-phonological nature of Czech accent. For traditional prosody-- for example, Josef Kral's-- such a distinction was quite inaccessible, as it posited no difference whatever between accents. Jakobson's analysis suggested the closeness of the classical Czech accentual syllabic verse to the syllabic system, which stems from the functional and acoustic weakness of Czech accent. The latest scholar to draw attention, in a convincing manner, to the wealth of original discoveries and stimuli contained in Jakobson's work, is Stephen Rudy. Yet it has not been said clearly enough that Jakobson himself fell short of his main goal. The linguistic foundation of Czech verse, as Jakobson defined it, has never been accepted in its entirety. According to Jakobson, this foundation is provided by word boundary (distributively defined); and although stress as a nonphonological element, mechanically dependant on diaeresis, fits Jakobson's thesis, it does not "stand out" in linguistic consciousness. The trouble is that while stress in Czech is unthinkable without a previous word boundary, there are plenty of word boundaries preceding most, though not all, monosyllabic words which are not followed by any stress. In relation to strong and weak positions within a verse line, these monosyllabic words behave in much the same way as any other syllables which are not preceded by a word boundary. On the other hand, the relation of each accented and unaccented syllables to the weak position of meter (though not to ictuses) is fairly clear-cut, apart from some important exceptions. In any case, Jakobson took this phenomenon into account later on, offering different kinds of justification: it was accents, not word boundaries, that he counted, like all the Czech prosodists in the thirties, when he made the statistical analysis of the incidence of ictus in Erben's and Macha's poetry.

Thus it appeared that the phonological or nonphonological nature of an element has no immediate bearing on its capacity as the carrier of the rhythmic beat. Nonphonological elements, too, can "stand out" in our linguistic consciousness, at least in the way their deformation is clearly felt. The phonological nature of an element does, of course, have a decisive influence on the characteristics of a versification of which it is a part (see the closeness of Czech accentual verse to syllabic meter mentioned earlier).

In a 1926 review of Jakobson's book, Mukarovsky based his arguments against Jakobson's "Fundamentals" on the stability of accent position in Czech linguistic consciousness. Mukarovsky was, at this point, still apart from Jakobson methodologically and he framed his opposition to Jakobson's phonological theory of verse quite sharply. Jakobson, Mukarovsky claimed, "a priori imposed the difference between phonological and extragrammatical elements upon metrics as the basic methodological concept." Five years later, however, in the paper "Phonological and Poetics," Mukarovsky's attitude is altogether different, but his phonological approach is doubtless enriched by the author's former dissent. Experience from the dispute that preceded the turn in Mukarovsky's views in 1927 comes through quite strongly: "It may not be said that the borderline between the acoustic qualities of the work itself and those qualities independent of it could be identified with a line dividing phonological facts from extra-phonological facts." We may assume that Jakobson himself agreed with this somewhat more differentiated approach, for in a slightly modified form the same view is expressed in the collective thesis of the Prague Linguistic Circle produced in 1928.

3. The recurrent thoughts on what is and what is not part of a work are characteristic of a scholarly tradition that Mukarovsky inherited before his encounter with Russian formalism. Although this tradition also played a part in the shaping of modern Russian theory of verse, it held, generally speaking, considerably less urgency for the formalists. A number of Central European scholars, headed by Eduard Sievers, showed the way towards overcoming the schematism of nonformative metrics in the study of the individual acoustic form of verse. Their working hypothesis revolved around those features that are transmitted and obligatorily inscribed into every line of the text under investigation. This meant, of course, that the description of the acoustic perception of the poem now took into account a number of components which had been previously of no interest to metrics. Apart from "melody" (intonation), the Sievers school concerned itself with timbre (the way in which syllables are conjoined), with tempo, and the like, each scholar putting a different element in the foreground. Yet almost no attention was paid to demonstrating the assumed sound configurations by means of the linguistic analysis of the text. Sievers and his school remained contented with highlighting the acoustic impression. Without much difficulty, and quite rightly, its opponents (for instance, Heusler) were able to declare the school's results to be subjective constructs, describing these acoustic elements as recitative qualities, but not necessarily predetermined by the work. Mukarovsky's teacher, Otakar Zich, included even intonation among the components that the work acquires only during the verse reciter's rendition. For Zich, though, a poem was consummated as a work of art only when recited aloud.

As his unpublished series of lectures show, Mukarovsky was perfectly informed about these studies. The question of acoustic shape, uniquely tied up with an inimitable poetic personality, became central to his own scholarly work of the first decade. Aware of the inconclusiveness of Siever's results, Mukarovsky addressed himself to the task of locating, in the text of a poetic work, the basis of those properties of acoustic impression that Sievers merely stated with dogmatic assurance. After his first study, *Príspevek k estetice českého verše* [A contribution to the Aesthetics of Czech Verse, 1923], Mukarovsky's efforts along these lines culminated in the work *O motorickém dění v poezii* (On the Motor Processes in Poetry, 1927). Although flawed when taken as a whole, these efforts are a grand attempt to turn practically all component of a poetic work-- starting from rhythm and euphony, through the semantics of words and tropes, all the way to the theme and the poet's overall approach to reality-- into carriers of individual acoustic shape. (And as Milan Jankovic has shown, precisely this integrative approach to a problem made possible, ten years later, one of Mukarovsky's great theoretical contributions, deriving as it did from such well-prepared foundations: when the summary intention of an *acoustic* configuration was replaced by the *semantic* summary intention, motor gesture became *semantic gesture*, one of the most stimulating and discussed categories to date of the aesthetics of Prague structuralism) As far as the verse theory is concerned, Mukarovsky switched from Siever's acoustic approach to an articulatory- motor analysis, but even this development turned out to be lagging behind, and hence was incompatible with, the principles of modern linguistics. Mukarovsky motivated the relationships between the resultant acoustic configuration and the other components of work by methods borrowed mainly from contemporary psychology. It is easy to imagine the critique that his method must have come under at the meeting of the Prague Linguistic Circle when the author presented his work in 1927. Apparently, this occasion meant a dramatic turning-point in Mukarovsky's development. The study, whose publication had already been announced, never appeared; instead two years later, the first volume of the *Travaux* featured another paper, "Souvislost fonické linie se slovosledem v českých verších" [The Connection between the Phonic Contour and Word Order in Czech Verse], which addressed the same problem from the structuralist position. I have dealt with this paper elsewhere in great detail and have voiced many reservations about its claims; suffice it to say here that Mukarovsky defines the phonic line on the basis of structural relationships between linguistic components of the work: easily demonstrable components, such as word order, make the intonation contour of a verse visible insofar as it is predetermined by these components. Consequently, Mukarovsky's hypothesis about the poet's psychology and motor behavior can be entirely eliminated. (It is interesting to note that the germ of these analyses can be found in Jakobson's *Fundamentals of Czech Verse*: here

the passage on Mayakovsky implies the dependence of accent intensity on the semantic relations between words within a syntagma.

Apparently, Mukarovsky did not give up on his pre-structuralist inquiry but attempted to reach its object by different avenues. He was helped in his pursuit by the emerging phonology of the sentence. Once again, phonology was seen as an instrument for dealing with those acoustic components of the work which are not of phonological nature by themselves.

Here, too, we are at the opposite pole from the applications of phonology which, using the contrast of phonological versus non-phonological acoustic elements, made a clear-cut distinction between those features which as phonological may function as a part of the work and those which represent mere recitative qualities. Such applications leave no scope for the question of the individual acoustic form of the work. This attitude was exemplified in the studies by Sergey Bernstein, whose unjustified radicalism manifested itself in the following three directions: first, Bernstein excluded all nonphonological acoustic element from the work, although one cannot deny their intersubjectivity and, consequently, communicativeness. Secondly, he conceived phonological elements as mere sets of abstract oppositions, independent of the substance in which they are realized: for Bernstein, a poetic work thus became a purely "extramaterial" phenomenon which can be enriched by sensory qualities (as components of aesthetic impression) only and exclusively by recitation. Finally, hampered by the still inchoate stage of the discipline he drew upon, Bernstein excluded some phenomena-- intonation, in particular-- from phonology and the language system, which, however, belong there, whether partially or completely.

If phonology embarked on a new stage of prosodic study by applying the aspect of prominence, the issue of individual acoustic form, as we have seen, centred on the aspect of *intersubjectivity*. Among the Russian formalists, it was Tomashevsky who understood this aspect best (along with Boris Eichenbaum, who based his research on verse melody exclusively on the demonstrable connection between intonation and syntax). Tomashevsky rejected Bernstein's skepticism concerning the analysis of the work's acoustic layer, both in its individuality and as an intersubjective function. In one of his formulations of theory of rhythmic impulse, Tomashevsky placed intonation among the components of the rhythmic impulse. He went so far as to outline a bold project of research on verse intonation as part of rhythm. Unfortunately, Tomashevsky's project, like Mukarovsky's proposals presented in his controversial study on the interconnections of the phonic lines, has not been put into effect to this date.

The Dynamic Aspect of the Dominant

HANA ARIE GAIFMAN

In 1935 Roman Jakobson presented the scholarly public at the Masaryk University of Brno with a comprehensive definition of the concept of dominant: ¹ "It is the focusing component of a work of art; it rules, determines and transforms the remaining components. It is the dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure. The dominant specifies the work." ² He goes on pointing out that verse (or a whole literature in a given period, or the art in a given period) is a system of values possessing its own hierarchy in which there are superior and inferior values and one leading value -the dominant- without which verse in a given poetry (a genre in literature, a particular art form at a given time) cannot be evaluated. The history of a literary style can be conceived as a change in the hierarchy of values including the replacement of a canonized dominant by another innovating one. The concept of dominant as well as the whole hierarchical approach has been an organic part of the structuralist method in general and of the Prague school in particular. ³

The dominant, as defined by Jakobson, is the highest organizing and therefore the chief stabilizing component of a given structure. From the above quoted characterization follows at least implicitly, that it comprises also the chief dynamic constituent of the structure. The examples given by Jakobson reinforce this implication:

Jakobson shows first the importance of the concept of dominant for an adequate description and differentiation of verses in their different forms. He compares the Czech verse of the 14th century with Czech verse of the Realist period and with what at that time was the contemporary verse, the verse of the thirties. In all three the same elements can be observed- rhyme, a syllabic scheme and intonational unity; but there is a different hierarchy of values, each has a different dominant, for the first rhyme was the dominant, for the second it was the syllabic scheme, while for the third the intonational integrity fulfilled this role.

Jakobson goes on to apply the concept of dominant at a higher level of generality; a poetic work is defined by him thus: "It is a verbal message whose dominant is the aesthetic function." ⁴ He stresses the fact that the marks disclosing the implementation of the aesthetic function are changeable. Having established the aesthetic function as the dominant of the poetic work we can also establish the hierarchy of diverse linguistic functions within the poetic work.

Jakobson ascribes to the dominant particular importance for the study of literary evolution. Evolution, says Jakobson, is not so much a question of the disappearance

of certain elements and the emergence of others as it is the question of shifts in the mutual relationship among the diverse components of the system, it is a question of the shifting of dominant which brings along shifts in evaluation. That which from the point of view of the old system was regarded as worthless may be adopted by the new system as a positive value.⁵ As an example he brings the verse of the Russian late-Romantic lyricists Tjucev and Fet whose verse was criticized by the Realist critics for the errors and alleged carelessness. Turgenev, who published these poems, corrected their rhythm and style according to the values prevalent in his time. Only much later were the original texts reinstated and recognized as an initial step toward a new concept of poetic form.

The final point made by Jakobson is that the shift is also a directly experienced synchronic phenomenon: "The reader of a poem or a viewer of a painting has a vivid awareness of the two orders the traditional canon and the artistic novelty as a deviation from the canon."⁶

The nature as well as the function of the dominant will become clearer and more definite when we look at the highest organizing constituent together with its inner dynamic counterpart, while separating at the same time the dynamic aspect from the stabilizing one. For this purpose I shall use the theory of music.

In the theory of music every tonal composition is defined by its tonality, i.e., by the scale in which it is written. The tonality is given by the *tonic* the key tone i.e., the first tone on the scale. The tonality defines the relations of all the tones to the tonic and gives the composition its stable framework.⁷ It is important to note that in order to create the effect of completeness, a composer has to end his (tonal) composition on the tonic. Otherwise the composition gives the impression of something unfinished, something open which demands a further movement for its completion. It is the tonic that determines the relations between the tones on the scale as well as in the composition. It determines the whole hierarchy, the possible variations in these relations and thus the character and the integrity of the work. It gives it its stable basis, its fixed point of orientation. I suggest, therefore to call the fixing, focusing constituent of a work of art *the tonic*.¹

The other most important tone on the scale is the *quinta*, the fifth tone called *the dominant*. On the dominant the scale which follows on the circle of quintas is constructed. It is the dynamic, the productive constituent of the structure. Of course, I use the theory of music metaphorically as Mikhail Bakhtin does when he speaks about the "Polyphonic novel" and "intonating". By calling Dostoevsky's novels "polyphonic" Bakhtin stresses the organized coexistence of several cognitive voices or consciousness, within the framework of the literary text.⁸ In our case the theory

of music enables us to represent in an adequate way the simultaneous existence of the two aspects of the Jakobsonian dominant.

Let us see now how the binary concept of "tonic and dominant" functions when applied in an actual analysis. As we are dealing with the heritage of the Prague school and of Czech literary scholarship let us look also at a Czech literary text-Jaroslav Hasek's "The Good Soldier Svejk and his Fortunes in the World War." It has been the generally accepted view that the figure of the Good Soldier is the highest organizing principle of the novel, that it is Svejk who fixes the text and thus he is the tonic of the novel. According to Jakobson's conception of the dominant Svejk indeed seems to fulfill this role, at least to a certain extent. But we are still left with a very basic question, namely, how can Svejk be the chief organizing principle when he is the chief disorganizing element who disrupts repeatedly the plot by his unpredictable behaviour, who keeps intruding his interminable humorous anecdotes and turns the great game of war into a series of Svejkian games. The binary concept which relates the tonic to the dominant enables us to look at the novel differently: Svejk is indeed the dominant in the musical sense. He is the dynamic aspect, the productive constituent of the novel. We may say that he creates the text. The fixed organizing principle is the game of the war. It is a game played according to generally accepted and rigid rules. It is played in a very definite time and very definite space. Within this universal game Svejk carries out his own games according to his own rules creating enough space for invention and improvisation.⁹

Our next example is concerned with the problems of evaluation. The famous unfinished Svejk-novel had two earlier predecessors, a series of short stories written in 1911¹⁰ and a novella written in Kiev in 1916-1917 during Hasek's Patriotic journalistic activities in the periodical "Czechoslovak". It is called "The Good Soldier Svejk in Captivity"¹¹ and like the stories was never translated into English. The short stories belong to Hasek's masterpieces in this genre. But the novella has caused quite a lot of confusion among Hasek's scholars. They have agreed that from the literary point of view it is significantly inferior to the novel but the reason for this inferiority has never been stated. This is particularly puzzling since most of the novel's ingredients can be found already in the novella: There is the war, there are the officers and the soldiers, there are many of the episodes and there is Svejk. When we apply the "tonic-dominant" concept one reason for this inferiority emerges very clearly. It is found in the very figure of Svejk. In the novella he is a static, passive, mostly non-productive puppet. He is completely subdued to the tonic which is the anti-Austrian propaganda represented by the narrator. This quality becomes particularly striking when we compare the amount of Svejk's direct speech and story-telling in the novel with that in the novella. In the novel Svejk is undoubtedly

the chief speaker, but in the novella it is the narrator who speaks most of the time. There is no dynamic aspect to the novella, the dominant is missing.

In the same way can this binary model be used for clarifying and explicating at least one aspect of the inferiority of such works like the so called "Robinsoniads" or "Quijotias", but I shall not undertake this analysis here.

In the study of literary evolution the original dominant has been applied quite fruitfully both by the Russian formalists and the Czech structuralists¹². As I said earlier the synchronic existence of the fixed (canonized) of the changing (the new) has been recognized and described quite clearly already by Jakobson. But even in Jakobson's presentation of the synchronic experience -the simultaneous "existence of the foregrounded new on the background of the canonized" makes this phenomenon a chain of discrete occurrences. The fact that the canonized art is just about to be passed and the new art is just about to be canonized, the fact that it is a matter of constant movement is missing in this presentation. The use of the theory of music and of the binary concept of tonic and dominant provides us with an adequate description of the graduality, the almost fluidity of the evolutive process which has not been captured by the earlier models.

For the sake of clarity we have to introduce another term from the theory of music: the interval. It is the relation created by the difference of height between two tones. Now, the relation between the tonic and the dominant is constant, that of quinta. Thus the number of vibrations of the dominant is always higher than that of the tonic and the ratio between the smaller and the higher number is constant, namely- 2:3. Looking at the circle of quintas we can observe another interesting feature. The distance between the tonics of any two consecutive scales is quite big-- five tones. At the same time any two consecutive scales on this circle are the most similar in that they share half of the scale. The scales follow each other thus:

C major c d e f g a h c

G major g a h c d e f # g

D major d e f # g a h c # d

A major a h c # d e f # g # a e.t.c


From this part of the circle of quintas we can see already that this model brings out nicely some basic aspects of the movement of literary evolution. We can see quite clearly what might be called "the altered return to the before last style". For example, the passage from the Renaissance style to the Neo-classic style of the 17th century in Italy with the Baroque in between is paralleled to the movement from C major to D major, via G major. Like the return from C major to D major, the

Neo-classicism is on the surface level a come-back to the Renaissance; at the same time it is basically different from it.

Returning to Hasek for the third time we shall examine the validity of the model by applying it to the concrete example of a rising style and its relation to the canonized style of the time. In his life time Hasek's literary style was anything but canonized, in fact, it seemed to be very distant from what at that time was the canonized high literary style. Hasek's short stories were however extremely popular not only among the general reading public but also among the editors of the various journals for which he used to write. His way of writing was part of the light journalistic canon, but not of the high literary one. As late as 1938 Rene Wellek, a prominent member of the Prague Linguistic Circle appraised Hasek's unfinished novel in the following words : "The book is not much of a work of art, as it is full of low humour..."¹³ The second part of Wellek's phrase is true to an extent. Hasek's artistic language comprises the Prague pub jargon, the armyjargon, jargons of various profession, but mainly journalistic jargon, and of course, low language which was not necessarily part of any of the jargons. Behind this low language many literary subtexts and transformations are hidden . Hasek's literary texts are strongly oriented to works of other authors and to foreign literature. At that time the canonized style demanded correct and quite high language. The orientation towards foreign literatures (as a part of poetic language and not as object of imitation) was relatively small. For one of the main objects of that literature was self-affirmation. Hasek's style was gradually recognized and became by 1947 (the year of the first scientific publication about Hasek) a legitimate object of scholarly study. His style became an integral part of the literary canon. His influence upon Czech literature can be discerned in the works of many important prose writers like Kundera, Hirabal, Kohout, Vaculik and Others.

The manner in which Hasek's style enters into the history of modern Czech prose and moves towards canonization can be represented as a tonic - dominant move:

Cannon



His style was quite distant from the tonic but already part of the literary system. One might say that it was the dominant of the time, the dynamic, the changing

element in the system. There is no doubt that Hasek's art possessed the "vitality" or "productivity" necessary for a rising style to assert itself.

Of course we cannot speak here of a constant ratio of 2:3 but there is a constant pattern of relationships between a canonized style and a rising style or between any tonic and any dominant. The various forms of this pattern demand a detail analysis and I shall have to leave it for a separate study.

In conclusion I would like to point out that I am aware of the fact that the choice of the tonic + dominant principle and of the circle of quintas might seem somewhat arbitrary as there are many other regular relations and kinships between tonalities and intervals. Each of the kinships between tonalities might possibly render some interesting insights into literary structures and processes. But for our purposes—the study of the two aspects of dominance in a constantly dynamic process—our choice seems to be the most apt one.

Notes and References

1. The concept of dominant was introduced into the theory of literature by J. Tynjanov in his *Problema stichotvornoqoo jazyka* [The Problem of verse Language], Leningrad 1924. Jakobson introduces a concept which by then was known also to the Prague scholars. Thus, for example, in an interview in *Rozpravy Aventina* [Aventin's discourse] Jan Mukarovsky uses the term dominant as a well established concept. *Rozpravy Aventina* VII, n.28, 1932.
2. Roman Jakobson, *The Dominant*; in: L. Matejka, K. Pomorska(eds), *Readings in Russian Poetics*. Michigan Slavic Publications, 8, Ann Arbor 1978, p.82.
3. See for ex. Felix Vodicka; *Pocatky krasne prozy novoceske* [The Beginnings of Modern Czech Belles-Letters] Prague 1948, or Lubomir Dolezel, *Narrative Modes in Czech Literature*, Toronto 1973, p.72, as well as many others.
4. *The Dominant*, p. 84
5. Ibid.p.86 (I do not quote word for word, but I am not changing Jakobson's claim)
6. Ibid.p.87.
7. Frantisek Picha, *Vseobecna hudebni nauka* [Theory of Music] Statni nakladatelstvi krasne literatury, hudby a umeni, Praha 1955,p.179.
8. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problemy tvorcestva dostoevskogo* [Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics], Leningrad, 1929.

9. The importance of plays and games in "The Fortunes" is shown in : H. Arie Gaifman, Svej- the Homo Ludens, in L. Dolez, B. stolz, I.R. Titunik (eds), Studies in Honour of Ladislav Matejka, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1984, pp.1-16.
10. The stories appeared first separately in a humoristic journal called "Karikatury" and then in 1912 in a book form under the title *Dobry vojak Svejka a jiné podivné historky* [The Good Soldier Svejka and other Strange Stories]
11. Jaroslav Hasek, *Dobry vojak Svejka v zajeti* [The Good Soldier Svejka in Capivity], Slovanske nakladatelstvi, Kyjev, 1917.
12. See for example Juri Tynanov, *O literaturnoj evolucii* [On literary evolution] in *Arkhaisty i novatory*, Leningard 1929, pp 30 - 47, or the earlier mentioned study by Felix Vodicka, *Pocátky krásné prózy novoceske*.
13. Rene Wellek, *Essays on Czech Literature* ,Mouton & co., The Hague, 1963, p.41.

From Prague to Paris: Formalism as a Method in Literary Study

MICHAEL SPRINKER

"And the Princess and the Prince discuss what's real and what is not."

Bob Dylan

The epochal events in Eastern Europe since 1988 have once more put this region in the historical limelight, as it was on the eve of 1914, in 1938, 1956, and 1968. In the periods between these punctual outbursts, the region has had a tendency to become largely invisible to Western European and American intellectuals, whose cultural horizons only rarely extend beyond the borders established in late antiquity by the western Roman Empire and its Germanic invaders. There are of course complex historical reasons for this general neglect of the non-Teutono-Romance linguistic area of Europe. But it does seem rather odd, given the pivotal role of these nations in twentieth-century politics, that their languages and cultures have received so little sustained attention in Western Europe and the United States, where Slavic studies is almost exclusively a scholarly backwater, not, as they say in Atlantic city, where the action is.

In the specialized domain of literary and cultural theory, one might have expected this situation not to obtain, and indeed the past twenty years or so have witnessed brief, intense bursts of interest in Slavic theory. The most recent, but also the least typical, example of this phenomenon has been the extraordinary popularity of Mikhail Bakhtin, who appears finally to have secured the status of a permanent resident among the pantheon of modern theorists of culture. The visas of other Eastern European emigres, however, are perpetually in danger of non-renewal.

It is worthwhile reflecting briefly on why this latter should be the case. My own suspicion is that the comparative neglect of much Slavic theory is part of a deeper and more widely shared prejudice against poetics itself, indeed against the very notion of a scientific discipline of literary study. In the Anglo-Saxon world in particular, where belletristic criticism has long held sway, poetics in the strict sense of the term are few in number. As a result, the research program that dominated Slavic literary theory from the 1920s through the mid-1940s has never held much attraction, least of all in the current conjuncture, where, as Paul de Man already observed two decades ago, everyone seems agreed that we are well "beyond formalism."

The prejudice against poetics is unlikely to be dislodged in the near future. Yet it will be my contention in the following paper that: 1) no consequent understanding
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of literature as a distinctive entity can be achieved without the aid of formal poetics; and 2) curious as this may at first sound, the research program inaugurated by the Russian Formalists and carried forward by the Prague Structuralists reaches its fulfillment in the fragmentary writings on art of a French marxist philosopher. I will go even further: the trajectory from Formalism to Structuralism establishes an itinerary for the theory of literature that can only reach its goal by alignment with the basic hypotheses of historical materialism. In what follows I shall attempt to justify these claims

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At least since Trotsky's famous attack on the Russian Formalists in *Literature and Revolution*, formalism has generally been in bad repute among marxists. One thinks, for instance, of Fredric Jameson's influential account in *The Prison House of Language*, of the various works by Terry Eagleton since his *Criticism and Ideology*, or, more distantly, of Medvedev/Bakhtin's still classic-- and too little read-- critique, *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship*. Formalism, so the story goes, is constitutionally incapable of situating texts in history, at least in the only history that matters for historical materialism, that is, the history of ideology as a product of social life. Little matter that after the first, highly polemical, phase of Formalist manifestoes, texts like Sklovskij's "Art as Technique" or Jakobson's "On Realism in Art," the Formalists were themselves the first to discern the impasse in which claims for complete aesthetic autonomy left them, embarking on a program which, whatever its ultimate methodological limitations, could scarcely be charged with simply or directly denying the determination of literary texts by historical forces and conditions. Here, for example, are two passages from the Jakobson-Tynjanov theses of 1928:

2. The history of literature(art), being simultaneous with other series, is characterized, as is each of these series, by a complex network of specific structural laws. Without an elucidation of these laws, it is impossible to establish in a scientific manner the correlation between the literary series and other historical series.

.....

8. A disclosure of the immanent laws of the history of literature (and language) allows us to determine the character of each specific change in literary (and linguistic) systems. However, these laws do not allow us to explain the tempo of evolution or the chosen path of evolution when several theoretically possible evolutionary paths are given... The

question of a specific choice of path, or at least of the dominant, can be solved only through an analysis of the correlation between the literary series and other historical series. (Jakobson 1987,47,49)

Or consider another text, less well-known, but equally important for comprehending the later project of Russian Formalism (as the one just cited was crucial to the agenda of the Prague School, founded two years prior to its publication). The passage comes from Eichenbaum's introduction to his study of Lermontov:

To study an event historically does not mean to describe it as something unique, and meaningful only in the circumstances of its own time. That would be the naive historicism which emasculates science. For it is not just a question of making a simple *projection into the past*, but of understanding the historical *actuality* of the event and defining its role in the development of historical energy, a force which, by its very essence, is constant: it does not come and go, and for this very reason it operates outside time. A fact which is understood historically is thereby withdrawn from time. Nothing is repeated in history, but this is because nothing disappears, it simply changes its form. Historical analogies, therefore, are not only possible but necessary, and the study of historical events outside the dynamics of history, as individual, "unrepeatable" and self enclosed systems, is impossible, in that it contradicts the very nature of these events. (O'Toole and Shukman 1978, 2)

The theoretical complexity and methodological sophistication of the Formalist-Structuralist project (I shall speak of them as one, since it is not only possible, but I believe necessary, to see them as pursuing a single, continuous, evolving problematic) is or should now be beyond doubt as recent scholarly studies by Peter Steiner and Frantisek Galan have cogently argued and amply illustrated.

My purpose here is not to survey this familiar territory once more, but rather to consider more closely the methodological common ground between a historical materialist science of literature and the general claims made by both Russian Formalism and Prague Structuralism concerning the relative autonomy of literary texts. To suggest in advance what I shall only begin to demonstrate here, the distinctiveness of literary texts from other forms of ideological production is necessary postulate if there is to be any such thing as a systematic rigorous discipline of literary study. Literary things either differ in kind from other sorts of socially produced objects-- material commodities, for example-- or there can be no special science of which they are the object. Perhaps this latter is the case, but then one wonders how all serious students of literature from Plato and Aristotle through Hegel and Marx down to Adorno and Althusser have thought otherwise. Could they all

have been so utterly mystified about the nature of literary artifacts and simply missed the fact that literature is just an instance of ideology in general, with no special claim upon our attention nor any constitutive features of its own? I shall in any event assume that the long tradition of literary formalism has proceeded correctly in designating literature a particular kind of thing, and that such a postulate is commensurate with the basic tenets of historical materialism, as Marx and every consequent Marxist aesthetician since his time believed. What kind of thing, then is literature?

I shall begin to answer this question by considering some of the basic hypotheses in the inaugural text of literary criticism and theory in the West, Aristotle's *Poetics*. First, however, it is necessary to understand the position of this text in the hierarchy of the empirical sciences as Aristotle conceived them. *Poetics* is the science of artificial things, *poiēmata*, and as any number of commentators have observed, these include objects of both useful and fine art, although literary works would exemplify the poetic *par excellence*. The object of poetics is thus distinct from natural things (the forces and atoms examined by physics, or the organisms considered in biology), and from practical things (human societies, which are the object of politics, or right or prudent action, which is the object of ethics). It is crucial to bear this in mind, for the absolute discrimination of the natural and the practical from the poetic is not only the hallmark of Aristotle's investigation, but indeed the unassailable first principle of Formalism - Structuralism (even if the latter will attempt to hedge the point somewhat). Moreover, significant consequences follow from this inaugural distinction, in particular the fact that poems do not give us any theoretical or practical knowledge. Aristotle of course thought that the arts did have a social function, but he was adamant in his belief that this was not something poetics strictly defined could tell us about. And I believe he was entirely correct to do so. The object of poetics is the structure of artificial things, i.e., those formal relations that inhere in poem and constitute their specificity.

For Aristotle, to understand the nature of a thing requires an account of its causes, which are four in number: formal, material, efficient, and final. In the familiar example of the silver bowl, the formal cause is the shape, the material cause the silver, the efficient cause the hammering of the silversmith (or, if you like, the silversmith himself), and the final cause the purpose for which the bowl is constructed (to hold grapes, or to be used in religious rituals, for instance). When it comes to fine art, this scheme of causes still holds, but with one important twist: the final cause of products of fine art is just to be what they are. The purpose of a tragedy, for example, is to be the best-formed tragedy it can be. Faults in construction (implausible actions or speeches by characters, the use of a *deus ex machina*) are merely that. It's no good, on an Aristotelian view, saying that such and such a work

is decadent or is likely to corrupt-- Plato's charge against nearly all the extant literary art in classical Athens-- for these are extra- poetic concerns.

The focus of the early chapters of the *Poetics*, therefore, is on the material, formal, and efficient causes of art. By describing their characteristic realization in particular arts, Aristotle is able to differentiate among them and ultimately to establish the definition of tragedy as an art form, his principal object in the treatise. I'm going to go over this ground rather quickly, and with the sole purpose of highlighting the similarities and differences between Aristotelian formalism and its heirs in twentieth-century Slavic poetics.

Arts differ first in their materials of imitation, color and shape in the visual arts, rhythm, speech, and harmony in the auditory or performing arts (1447a.20-22). Not all the arts utilize all the materials of imitation; for example, "dancers imitate rhythms alone without harmony (or speech, obviously]" The distinguishing mark of dramatic art (at least as it was practiced in Aristotle's time) is its use of all three material causes of verbal art, though not always in every part (some speeches were spoken without musical accompaniment, and music could occur when no one was speaking; Nietzsche was thus not simply wrong to see in Wagnerian opera the analogue in principle, if not in actual achievement, of Greek tragedy).

Secondly, the arts can be differentiated according to their objects of imitation. these for Aristotle are always agents, i.e., human subjects capable of action. One commentator has put the matter very well and I shall simply quote him to elucidate the point : "All art imitates human agents ... either by imitating man in the fullest, most concrete sense—that is, man as agent or man as possessing definite traits of character acting or being acted upon in situations determined by agents—or by imitating some aspect of man abstracted from his total being" (Telford 1961, 72). This provides the basis for the famous differentiation of tragedy from comedy : "for the latter wished to imitate men worse than those of now, the former who are better" (1448a. 17-18).

Finally, works of art can be distinguished by their manner of imitation. Here, as in the previous criterion, the examples adduced are entirely literary. The manners of imitation discussed are two : narration (which is proper to epic) and direct imitation of action and speech (which is proper to drama).As is well-known, the bulk of the remainder of the *Poetics* will be devoted to discussing tragedy as one kind of imitative object, giving a taxonomy of its necessary parts, establishing a hierarchy among them, and presenting many examples of better and worse ways to construct tragic forms. Epic is also taken up briefly, but only to distinguish it from tragedy. The promised consideration of comedy never materializes (or, as some believe, it has been lost).

What is evident on even a first reading of the *Poetics* is the rather narrow scope of its accomplishment. While the lineaments of a full-blown theory of literary art can be gleaned from it, no such theory is made explicit in the text that has come down to us. In fact, one can legitimately doubt that such a theory would ever have been proposed by Aristotle himself, since from what we do know of his manner of proceeding, poetic science advances only by describing the nature of kinds of imitation, tragedy versus comedy, tragedy versus epic, the art of the aulos or the kithara versus that of the dithyramb, and so forth. Thus, for Aristotle, there is no such thing as a global theory of literature (except in the most general sense that literary texts are all imitations, but so are paintings, statues, and songs; or that literature imitates the actions and passions of men, but so does the dance), there can only be scientific descriptions of features necessary to various literary kinds. On some accounts, this could scarcely be called science at all, since the accent falls so heavily on the empirical and the descriptive, rather than on the causal and the explanatory. Aristotle's appeal to the innateness of imitation in human nature, and the intrinsic pleasure we derive from imitating or observing imitations, a pleasure linked to learning (1448b.5-20), is surely the weakest point in the *Poetics*, if also the most provocative. I shall return to this problem area later, but for now I want to move forward to compare the research program of Formalism-Structuralism with its Aristotelian forbear.

One signal difference between early Russian Formalism and the method of the *Poetics* lies in the former's insistence not just on the possibility but the necessity of a global science of literature. Concepts like "literariness" and "deautonomization" are presented as universal features of literary texts, that which distinguishes them from, say, ordinary language or discourse. Secondly, as Bakhtin/Medvedev observed, early Formalism focused almost exclusively on what Aristotle would have called the material cause of literature, language as an autonomous system of signification locally determined in its effects, to the exclusion both of the efficient and the formal causes. Despite the axial distinction between story and plot, it is by no means clear that analyses like Sklovskij's famous essay on *Tristram Shandy* produce a concept of plot in the rigorous Aristotelian sense of the term. Also, in breaking with positivist notions of the relationship between the author and the text, Formalism effectively (if temporarily) brackets the entire problem of efficient causality.

This latter strategy poses an interesting dilemma, which can be stated in the forms of a question: who or what is the agent of literary production, once the author as biographical subject has dropped out of the equation? For formalism *stricto sensu*, Jakobson's famous pronouncement gives the definitive answer: "if the study of literature wants to become a science, it must recognize the device as its only hero" (quoted in Medvedev/Bakhtin 1978, 117). The efficient cause of any literary work

is the immanent tendencies within the aesthetic horizons of a given period. Summarizing an early text by Mukarovsky (one that can be characterized as "a straightforward outgrowth of formalism" [P. 27], Frantisek Galan makes the point thus: "a poet is not free to choose any random configuration or structure of elements--any form--but must confront the canon inherited from his or her precursors. It is not by delving into the poet's private or social life that the critic can uncover the reasons why and the way in which the particular poem came about. Rather, it is necessary that the critic come to grips with the state of aesthetic norms of the time, to which the poet must have reacted" (Galan 1985, 25).

In this very formulation, we see the door opening to the passage from Formalism to Structuralism. For once it is conceded that aesthetic norms are historical and contingent, at the same time that they are trans-personal, instantiated in a system rather than in individual works, the domain of formal poetics is no longer sufficient to account for the nature and causality of works of art. The canonical statement of this shift in emphasis is surely Mukarovsky's "Art as a Semiotic Fact," where the programmatic concept of the aesthetic sign is presented as follows:

the objective study of the phenomenon of art must regard the work of art as a sign composed of sensory symbol created by the artist, a "meaning" (=aesthetic object) lodged in the social consciousness, and a relation to the thing signified--a relation that refers to the entire context of social phenomena. (Mukarovsky 1978, 85)

The direction of Mukarovsky's own research would be two-fold. In what Peter Steiner has called the "second stage of Mukarovsky's structuralism," (Mukarovsky 1978, xxv), the accent fell on the socio-historical horizon of aesthetic codes. But from the late 1930s onward, the problem of aesthetic universals increasingly occupied him. The position he ultimately adopted is captured in the following quotation:

Let us proceed from the fact that the ultimate source of aesthetic norms--and of all norms alike--is man's attitude toward the world. And man, despite all his historical and social changeability, is by his physical and partially also by mental organization an anthropological constant. Well then, are there some principles related to aesthetic norms which could constitute a permanent basis for them? Yes, there are; one such principle is the rhythm given by the physiological processes in the human body; another anthropological constant is the symmetry furnished by the structure of the human body and by its practical consequences for the physical and by its practical consequences for the physical and mental behavior of man. (Mukarovsky 1978, xxx)

Mukarovsky reproduces here one of the oldest shibboleths of aesthetics in the West: as Goethe and Schiller asserted at the end of the eighteenth century, the specificity of the aesthetic is grounded in human physiology, more particularly, in the coordination between mental activity and the biological structures of the species. Structural aesthetics finds its ultimate warrant in cognitive psychology. Doubtless, there is a measure of truth in this position, since the special cognitive attainments of the human species are clearly necessary for the production of art works. We know of no such thing as simian sonatas or canine quattrocento, while archeological evidence can be cited to show that all human cultures have produced art works. But what tends to drop out of the equation between species specific capacities and structures and individual art works is just the historical specificity of the latter. Structural aesthetics remains weak where Formalism is comparatively strong: in the description of the formal features of particular, historically realized artifacts.

The acuteness of Mukarovsky's dilemma is revealed in his essay, "The Individual and Literary Development." In that text, he locates the principle of individuation and change in what he labels "personality": "Personality comprises a focal point at which all the external influences that can affect literature meet, and at the same time it is the starting point from which they penetrate literary development" (Mukarovsky 1977, 168). Far from veering back in the direction of some personalist conception of aesthetic creation, or, what would perhaps be the more likely temptation, towards a Gadamerian conception of the classic, however, Mukarovsky pointedly situates personality within the overarching determinations of historical development:

Here [in the individual work of art] the past and the future are always implied in the present, and therefore not even the disturbance caused by the partial disagreement between the creator's (the poet's) dispositions and the preceding state of the structure lacks predetermination. The choice of appropriate individuals for the realization of a certain developmental tendency must certainly be presupposed with the respect to a negative relation to the preceding structure. Thus not even the very contents of personality, the set (the quality and the hierarchy) of its dispositions, are unrelated to the immanent development of literature, are accidental with regard to this evolution. (174)

The model of literary history adduced in this passage would seem to return to a strictly Formalist conception of the immanent development of the literary series, not to mention its hypostasization of absolute determinacy, the mastery of the accidental or aleatory in a teleological structure. One can find evidence elsewhere in Mukarovsky's writings of this period for his concept of evolution as an essential homeostasis between structure and event, rendering more or less unthinkable any

notion like a "revolution in poetic language" (see Mukarovsky 1978, 3-16, especially 4-6). Further, on the global theory of the social origin of signs which Mukarovsky endorses, the ultimate determining facts of literary evolution would have to lie beyond literary works themselves, so that what Mukarovsky has called "personality" is less the realization of certain intra-literary potentials (as would be the case in a strict Formalism) than "a bundle of dispositions, either inherent or acquired (through education, through the influence of the natural and social milieux, through occupation etc.)" (Mukarovsky 1977, 178)

Clearly, Mukarovsky treads on dangerous ground here, since such a model of the relationship of individuals to history risks falling into the very sociology that Formalism-Structuralism had rejected from the first. Mukarovsky recognizes this danger, and attempts to deflect it in the final sentences of the essay. Although he names no names, it would seem that his target here is vulgar Marxist literary sociology:

The fact that a poet comes from a certain social stratum, for example, can be-- and most probably will be-- a factor in his mental structure, but even the extreme case in which this fact remains-- especially if it is paralyzed by another stronger influence-- without any effect is conceivable. If social origin has become a factor, its influence is not necessarily direct; the poet can be an exponent of another stratum than the one from which he has come or of several strata in succession. Indeed, he can even become an adversary of the stratum from which he has come (179).

It should not be necessary to point out that the best examples of Marxist criticism of the arts, from Marx and Engels on Balzac down to Benjamin on Proust, Macherey on Jules Verne and John Berger on Picasso, strictly observe the protocols of interpretation bruited here. This is to say, what I expect you have already guessed, that the apparent antagonism between the sociological dimensions of Mukarovsky's project and historical materialism is more superficial and conjunctural than substantial and theoretical.

Still, it would be wrong to say that Prague Structuralism is just Marxism *manque*. Mukarovsky's continuing entanglement in the classical problematic of aesthetics, his commitment to a resolution of the antinomy between subject and structure in cognitive psychology, separates him decisively from the key tenets of historical materialism, all of which derive from Marx's famous axiom in the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness". (Marx 1970, 21) For historical materialism, the key category in literary or aesthetic analysis

must necessarily be ideology, which is at once universal in form and historically contingent in its contents.

It will come as no surprise to at least some of you that my route through this area will follow certain indication given by Louis Althusser. I shall begin with his much vilified description of art versus ideology in the "Letter on Art in Reply to Andre Daspre." The Key passage is as follows:

Art (I mean authentic art, not works of an average or mediocre level) does not give us a *knowledge* in the *strict sense*, it therefore does not replace *knowledge* (in the modern sense; scientific knowledge) but what it gives us does nevertheless maintain a certain *specific relationship* with knowledge. . . the peculiarity of art is to "make us see," "make us perceive," "make us feel" something which *alludes* to reality. If we take the case of the novel, Balzac or Solzhenitsyn. . . , they make us *see, perceive*, (but not *know*) something which *alludes* to reality what art makes us *see*, and therefore gives us to in the form of "*seeing*," "*perceiving*" and "*feeling*" (which is not the form of *knowing*), is the *ideology* from which it is born, in which it bathes, from which it detaches itself as art, and to which it *alludes*. . . Balzac and Solzhenitsyn give us a "view" of the ideology to which their work alludes and with which it is constantly fed, a view which presupposes a *retreat*, an *internal distancing* from the very ideology from which their novels emerged. They make us "perceive" (but not know) in some sense *from the inside*, by an *internal distance*, the very ideology in which they are held (Althusser 1971, 22-3).

Leaving aside the slip about "authentic art," a category that remains largely *impense* in Althusser's work, we can recognize there the distinctive features of historical materialist aesthetics, its agreement with certain aspects of Formalism and Structuralism, as well as its divergence from them.

What does Althusser say? First, art is not knowledge. Like Aristotle, he distinguishes between the theoretical domain of the sciences and the productive domain of the arts. Second, art is not ideology, or, more precisely, it is ideology but ideology presented in an unusual way. It is ideology displaced from its ordinary conditions of functioning; art is ideology made visible. To borrow from a famous slogan of the early Formalists, the specificity of art is to lay bare the device of ideology.

At this point, it will be useful to recall Aristotle's system of causes and to deploy them in an analysis of Althusser's description of the aesthetic function in the passage cited, comparing this with the somewhat different formulations made

by the Formalists and Structuralists. For Althusser, the material cause of the work of art is neither matter in the ordinary sense (color and shape in the visual arts), nor in the somewhat more figurative sense that language can be said to be the material cause of literature. Rather, on Althusser's account, the material cause of art is ideology. In the Aristotelian schema, the closest analogue to ideology would be thought (*dianoia*), although ideology is probably a larger category than this, encompassing diction (*lexis*) and character (*ethos*) as well.

Somewhat more startling is the realization that ideology is also the efficient cause of the text. It is certainly not the author whose intentions govern the text's structure, as Althusser makes plain in another place: "at issue here is the play's latent structure and nothing else. . . what counts, beyond the words, the characters and the action of the play, is the internal relation of the basic elements of its structure. I would go further. It does not matter whether Bertolazzi [author of the text in question, *El Nost Milan*] consciously wished for this structure, or unconsciously produced it: it constitutes the essence of his work" (Althusser 1977, 141). Nor, as the early Formalists would have it, is the efficient cause literature itself. Althusser is quite explicit on this point in disagreeing with his interlocutor Daspre, who had claimed that Balzac "Was forced by the logic of his art to abandon certain of his political conceptions in his work as a novelist." Althusser replies: "The fact that the content of the work of Balzac and Tolstoy is 'detached' from their political ideology and in some way makes us 'see' it from the *outside*, makes us 'perceive' it by a distanciation inside that ideology, *presupposes that ideology itself*. It is certainly possible to say that it is an effect of *their art* as novelists that it produces this distance inside their ideology, which makes us 'perceive' it, but it is not possible to say, as you do that art *has its own logic* which *made Balzac abandon his political conceptions* on the contrary, *only because he retained them could he produce his work*, only because he stuck to his political ideology could produce in it this internal distance which give us a critical view of it " (Althusser 1971, 224-5).

This brings us to the real nub of the issue: the means by which art produces this "internal distance" from the ideology it presents, and out of which it has been made. What, to reinvoké once more Aristotle's categories, is the formal cause of art works? Aristotle's answer for narrative or dramatic art was the plot, the causally ordered sequence of events that gives the action its particular shape. In one sense, this conception of form would hold for Althusser as well, as his analysis of *El Nost Milan* illustrates. The sequence of the action is decisive for the play's emotional power and its thematic point. But whereas in Aristotle's model for the well-made artifact, Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* the resolution of the plot involves the titular hero's recognizing the meaning of the events he has witnessed, Althusser's more properly Brechtian poetics hypothesizes a structure of events (or, in the case of Cremonini's

paintings, of shapes) that is nowhere presented as such in the text itself: "The structure is nowhere exposed, nowhere does it constitute the object of a speech or a dialogue. Nowhere can it be perceived directly in the play as can the visible characters or the course of the action. But it is there, in the tacit relation between the people's time and the time of the tragedy, in their mutual imbalance, in their incessant 'interference' and finally their true and delusive criticism" (Althusser 1977,141-2).

The key concepts in the Althusserian theory of art are nothing other than contradiction and overdetermination, which underpin the quite un-Aristotelian and anti-aesthetic (in the classical usage of the term) notion that the formal relations among elements in an artifact are untotizable. Art works mobilize ideological materials in a structure that foregrounds their mutual incompatibility. In *Lord Jim* or in the Michael Redford film *White Mischief*, for example, plot, character, and thought combine to show the inherent contradiction between the code of honor invoked to justify imperial adventure and the ruthless pursuit of individual advantage required to sustain it. Or, to take a classical example and subject it to an Althusserian (rather than an Aristotelian) analysis, one could interpret the *Oedipus* as the presentation of an unresolved contradiction between the requirement of social order and the necessity to vest power and authority in individuals. One could, that is, see in the play the same problem that structures Rousseau's *Social Contract* in the tension between *etat* and *souverain*.

What, then, is the object of literary science for historical materialism? It is none other than the overdetermined structure of contradiction, the formal means of representation, that literary texts can be shown to exhibit. The contradiction is presented on the literal level of the texts, in thought, character, and action, but its motivation lies elsewhere-- in the ideological signifieds for which these are the overdetermined signifiers. It therefore follows that literary scholarship is a sub-discipline of the global science of the history of social formations which marxism has always claimed to be, and that the investigation of the formal structure of literary texts is subadjacent to the study of ideologies. This need not diminish or belittle the importance of literary study. It was Marx himself who confessed to have learned more about the capitalist mode of production from reading Balzac than from all the works of classical political economy. Aristotle was correct to say that we learn from imitations, but wrong to believe that what we learn is only the structure or form of the imitation itself. We also learn, if only provisionally and partially, about the things to which the imitation alludes.

The task of any consequent materialist science of literature is to transform the ideological problematic presented in literary texts into a knowledge of the text's

own ideology. The extent to which such knowledge can contribute to our understanding or actual historical societies is an empirical and contingent problem, dependent upon the level of explicit knowledge already available about the particular society, and also upon the perspicuousness of the text itself. None of this can be decided in advance. It remains an open question, in my mind at least, whether the existing histories of the *belle époque* are more or less insightful about certain aspects of French society in that era than is Proust's *Recherche*. As Walter Benjamin once observed, the truth of Proust's text will only be revealed at the moment of the bourgeoisie's final struggle. The recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union reveal all too clearly that that moment has yet to arrive.

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Belated Meetings : Art History and Prague Structuralism

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In 1988 Jan Mukarovsky, an important theorist of the Prague Linguistic Circle, was made an "honorary Frenchman" by Norman Bryson so that his "Art as a Semiological Fact" (1934) could be read in *Calligram: Essays in New Art History from France*, along with contributions from Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Louis Marin and Michel Serres.¹ In *The New Art History*, English style, another anthology of the same year, neither Mukarovsky, in particular, nor Prague School structuralism, in general, is mentioned; here, in a discussion of "Saussure versus Peirce: Models for a Semiotics of Visual Art," Roman Jakobson is referred to only as a "distinguished linguist," with roots in Russian Formalism and notable enthusiasms for Peirce (Iverson, 84). Yet Mukarovsky's 1938 essay on the semiotic function of architecture, conjoined to Jakobson's later discussion of the six primary elements and functions of linguistic communication, is pivotal in Donald Preziosi's architectural studies of 1979. Although Jakobson and Mukarovsky's stock has fallen some in Preziosi's later *Rethinking Art History : Reflections on a Coy Science*, as that of Derrida and Foucault (and the pervasive spectre of Nietzsche) has risen, he still maintains that Jakobson's communication model may provide guidance for on-going art historical research (1989,149-152).

A coincidence of *belatedness* links some varieties of new art history with old-- but newly translated and disseminated-- Prague School semiotics. Not only are present interests in Czech structuralism belated, in the sense that earlier acquaintance might have cut through pervasive confusions in the field of art history about what it is that semiotics *does* or could do, and what *art historians* might do with semiotics, but, in their respective belatednesses, each now stands in an ambiguous relation to the dominant French strain of contemporary (semiotic/philosophic, psychological, ideological) "*theory*," as it has developed in a continuum of overlapping refutations, revisions, and refractions, from structuralism to poststructuralism, from Saussure to Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault. The Prague Linguistic Circle's earlier assimilation and critique of the *Cours*, its radical shift of emphasis from, *langue* to *parole*, from synchrony to diachrony, and from form to function, comprise a wealth of constructive corrections that *open semiotics to historical studies*. This early modification of Saussure, begun by Roman Jakobson and Jurij Tynjanov in the late twenties, had little influence on French structuralism of the sixties²; the structuralism, of course, whose beyond is the dense poststructuralist "theory" of the present, in

which it survives both as an object and means of critique.. Part of the belatedness or the alienation of both art history and Czech structuralism from topical debates is that neither can be properly poststructuralist, having no (French) structuralist antecedents, never having made the (French) structuralist mistakes. And part of the "crisis " that new or revisionist art history brings to the discipline stems from its mixed deconstructive and reconstructive motives, the tangle of structuralist and poststructuralist perspectives that now descend on virgin territory, all together and at once.

Like Preziosi's *Rethinking*, Bryson's contributions to the semiotics of painting in three closely spaced books, *Word and image* (Wi 1981) *Vision and Paintingg* (VP, 1983), and *Tradition and Desire* (TD, 1984) are written in a mode of intermittent deconstruction (of Gombrich's alleged perceptualism, of certain semiotic constructs) and reconstruction (of a semiotic approach to painting), which creates an atmosphere of extreme semiotic density. Similarly, the perspectives of Rosalind Krauss's *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths*, are both constructive (in providing new insights on visual works or "texts" and laying out hitherto unnoticed relationships among them) and deconstructive (of "Modernist Myths," of the obsessive biographical rummaging of art historians). Both Bryson and Krauss are identified with an enfused "semiotic/deconstructive" position in "Conflicting Logics: Twentieth-Century Studies at the Crossroads" (1987), in which the rift between this alloyed revisionism and more traditional scholarship in art history is characterized by Donald Kuspit as so extreme that it can only be "staged" to exhibit the two irreconcilable and antagonistic perspectives. To the extent that Bryson, Krauss, and Preziosi as well (the three are among those most closely identified with semiotics in the minds of Anglo-American art historians) are genuinely deconstructive, Kuspit is of course right; they must continue to take an adversarial interest in the established disciplinary traditions whose various "myths" or "logocentrisms" remain to be exposed; the tradition can ignore deconstruction but there can be no "live and let live" at the opposite pole. When the compound label is decomposed, however, and the semiotic inspirations of their "practical" or constructive studies are examined, Jakobson becomes prominent as a source of semiotic distinctions and suggestions that they variously employ. It may be true, as Preziosi claims, that contemporary *theory* is "firmly and explicitly attentive to issues of signification and representation," (1989, 120) but if it yields no distinctive semiotic *method*, as he also claims, then the tentative ventures of those who write about visual artefacts or works of art from a semiotic point of view are guided by bits and pieces of earlier theories and earlier practices --venerable theories and surprisingly little bits. While the author of "Saussure versus Peirce:: Models for a semiotics of visual Art" ruminates about which theorist may provide the more useful frame work, in practice both are often drawn together

in contemporary studies (at times thanks to Jakobson's own efforts to integrate his ideas with those of Peirce).³ How Jakobson and Mukarovsky are useful or interesting to Bryson, Krauss, and Preziosi --and how they are not-- should help to dispel the notion of a unified "semiotic" or "semiotic/deconstructive" point of view, a false impression of solidarity held by many art historians who do not seem to realize that it is necessary to take a semiotic point of view, or to make one, and that semiotics is at least as varied, unsettled, and contentious a field as art history itself.

II

Before considering more recent writings, let me [point out the single reference to Jakobson in E.H. Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*. Gombrich states, in the context of his famous "Ping-pong" example, that : " It was Professor Roman Jakobson who first drew my attention to the fact that synesthesia concerns relationships" (370). If he had no further influence on art history, Jakobson's contribution to the field would already be immense. Though Gombrich is notoriously unimpressed by abstract art, his discussion of artistic "expression" in *Art and illusion* and *Meditations on a Hobby Horse* is still the best general semiotic description of how abstract art comes to take on the meanings that it has. Without ever using the linguistic terminology of "syntagmatic," "Paradigmatic," or "differential value." ⁴ Gombrich lucidly explains how these relational constructs enter into the significances that artists and beholders attribute to visual forms.

Krauss, for whom the "purely differential " making of meaning is an article of Saussurean faith, allies herself firmly with (French) "structuralism, with its later poststructuralist modifications," (1985,2) the synchronic perspective, and the later enterprises of Barthes and Derrida. Jakobson enters into this frame of reference mainly through the intermediary of Barthes; he is cited by Krauss--in significant conjunction with Peirce --in only one essay of her recent anthology, the two-part "Notes on the Index," one of the earliest and , to my mind, the best of her theoretical efforts. This elegant meditation cuts through the apparent *stylistic diversity* of the art of the seventies to reveal an underlying *semiotic consistency* in its pervasive preoccupation with indexical signs. In Part I, a precedent -- not an " influence" --is found in Marcel Duchamp's self-conscious exploration of a wide variety of indexical devices, from the painted "panorama of the index" of 1918, *Tu M*, through Man Ray's photograph of the accumulation of dust on the surface of *The Large Glass* (1915-23), to *With My Tongue in My Cheek* of 1959, where an actual cast of the artist's cheek and jaw is continued as a drawn profile in the area of the nose, eyes, and brow (198-206). Through Duchamp, the index is related to the gesture of refusal, rupture, or loss of faith--that is , the refusal to stay within the preserve of the familiar "pictorial language " of images, or even its Cubist dismantling, and the still more

drastic refusal to continue to play the aesthetics game. And , through Duchamp's notes to *The Large Glass* , preserved and published as a primer to intelligibility, the dissolution of "pictorial language " is seen to engender, too, the need for linguistic reiteration or supplement.

Krauss points to the expanded role of the photograph in the visual art of seventies-- in photo- realism, of course, and video, but also in all the new forms that require either photographic documentation or linguistic explanation or both, such as earthworks, performances ,body art and story art (206). In photo-realism and its three- dimensional equivalents-- the cast, painted, and bewigged figures of Duane Hanson and John de Andrea-- the devices of direct casting and photographic replication have similar implications of refusal, for contemporary artists and viewers, that they had for Duchamp : " the indexical presence of either the photograph or the body-cast *demands that the work be viewed as a deliberate short - circuiting of issues of style*" (my emphasis, 208). The photograph is seen by Barthes as a "message without a code," a semiotic paradox. Although it can be faked or doctored-- made to lie-- the photograph's peculiar claim to descriptive adequacy, as Peirce says, is not in its iconic repleteness but in its indexical origin, that is, its "having been produced under such circumstances that were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature " (215).

As indices, photographs are kin to imprints, traces, and symptoms which refer back to the physical forces or events that cause them, and these more direct indices, too, are pervasively employed by artists discussed by Krauss. Indexical devices are related to the genre of the *installation piece* whose practitioners find inspiration in particular places or spaces or conditions of exhibition, allowing their works to enter into dialogue with their settings, conceiving them, like architects, in relation to particular sites; and they are reflected in "works " that are the bald residues of physical acts of cutting, strewing ,or heaping ,that make no "statements " beyond the demonstrations of the properties of various material substances and physical laws.

As Krauss' title indicates, these are *notes* on the index. The concept of indexicality (Peirce) is presented, deepened and complicated in relation to photographs (Barthes), to certain linguistic phenomena (Jakobson), and to psycho-linguistic traumas (Jakobson/Lacan), teased and traced through many artistic manifestations, and convincingly interpreted as a broad-based structural change (a counter-aesthetic/ a functional change). Krauss deftly extracts what is needed from her semiotic references: the equation of the pronominal "shifter" to the Peircian "indexical symbol" is readily made by Jakobson and conjoined to Barthes' discussion of the photographic paradox of " the message without a code." Krauss scoops up all of this "semiosis" and applies

it brilliantly to new problems in different regions. Semiotic constructs are demonstrated in visual applications. They are not belabored or overextended, and part of the essay's strength is its suggestive understatement. Although she clearly identifies a *functional* tendency and a functional *change*, Krauss does not refer to Jakobson's six part model. Yet his well-known definition of the poetic function as a projection of "the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination" (Sebeok, 358) would sharpen the distinction she makes between the relatively autonomous paintings of Ellsworth Kelly and the context dependent abstractions of Lucio Pozzi, who evades the strictures of a formal system by allowing the lines and colors of surrounding walls to determine the internal structure of his canvasses, so that they function "as shifters, empty signs (like the word *this*) that are filled with meaning only when physically juxtaposed with an external referent or object" (216). Nor does she deal fully with the index as part of the Peircean triad of icon/index/symbol.⁵

There is something of an anomaly in the admission of the *index* to the Saussurean milieu of *The Originality of the Avant-garde and other Modernist Myths* and its centrality in this single influential essay⁶. If the only alternatives for the confirmed Saussurean are either to accept Jakobson's annexation of Peirce or else to disregard his contending semiotics, Krauss opts for the latter as much as possible --which may be wise if, as Umberto Eco argues, the Jakobsonian annexation falls to convince: "It was not until one of the greatest figures of contemporary linguistics, Roman Jakobson, came to consider the problem of a semiotic discipline, and brought into contact with each other the two traditions of Peirce and Saussure, that there began to emerge the outline of a conjunction which is still not fully realized today" (Sebeok, 1975, 10). But Jakobson's conjunction is not fully realized, Eco's own attempt (1976) is too tortuously complicated to be useful --and there is no question that some way of moving between the two theoretical schemes is, in discussions of visual signs, very useful indeed.

In *The Semiotics of the Built Environment*, Preziosi acknowledges the Problems that Eco raises but, nevertheless describes "architectonic meaning" from the overlapping perspectives of function and the Peircean triad. Of all visual "Semiotic/deconstructive" theorists, Preziosi is closest to the Prague School approach, especially to Jakobson's way of thinking. Preziosi knew Jakobson in Cambridge and cites his writings frequently: his painstaking descriptions of the formal and material structures of architecture and its "hierarchy of signs" indicate a thorough assimilation of principle of linguistic analysis. And yet Preziosi insists throughout that the built environment is not language-like in important respects and can only be fully understood in relation to other "immanent" social series or realms. In short, his semiotics of the built environment is based on Jakobson's general ideas as

well as on Mukarovsky's "On the Problem of Function in Architecture" (Burbank and Steiner, 236-50). But if Preziosi inherits the fruits of a sustained and sophisticated semiotic inquiry which enables him to reject the partiality of "the semiotics of the code" and to move surely from message to code and from synchrony to diachrony, he also inherits some of its problems.

How does a building mean? Every element of architectural structure has "meaning" Preziosi claims, in relation to other surrounding, containing an component forms (and materials);⁷ the 'meaning' of a given architectonic construct is internal to its own code whereas its 'reference' may implicate a culturally co-present set of texts, doctrines, or beliefs, which themselves comprise significative formations in their own right in adjacent codes" (1979a, 63) in relation to reference Preziosi maintains,

"The architectonic sign comprises a formation (*signans*) or that -which signifies, plus its referent (*signatum*), or that- which -is signified. In concurring generally with the Peircean notion of 'meaning' [*not the internal and differential 'meaning' described above*] as a translation or transmutation connecting one medium (e.g. a material formation) with another (e.g., a set of behaviours of a set of cognitive domains-- which may include the formation itself), we can assert that such translational connectives are of several types" (1979a, 70).

The connectives or grounds for reference that Preziosi describes are icon, index, and symbol.

Between the two discussions of meaning and reference quite above is an extended analysis of "architectonic multifunctionality," in the course of which Preziosi, following Mukarovsky, equates the referential function of a building with its customary use. Architectural signs and functions are drawn into close proximity by Mukarovsky's claim that "the affinity-- though not the identity-- of the problem of function with the problems of the sign follows from the fact that the object not only performs but also signifies its function" (Burbank and Steiner, 236). But how does a building signify its function? Mukarovsky does not specify and Preziosi invokes the Peircean triad to explain. The relation between the architectural formation (signified) and a use/referent (signified), such as "church" or "house" or "gathering place" is a symbolic (or conventional or arbitrary), Preziosi argues, on the ground that there is "no universal 'house' type because the notion of dwelling is a specific function of the definitions of given society. It is only the systemic sum of all architectonic types at a given place and time which characterizes the topological association of individual formations" (1979a, 64). But, given that signifieds or referents are culturally constituted, they may still be signified in multiple modes, a point that Preziosi often makes in other contexts. Too, there seems to be an indexical link between an architectural formation and its customary function, an associative bond of contiguity that "place

of worship" suggests-- but I do not wish to quibble with Preziosi's assignment of iconic, indexical, or symbolic labels as much as to consider his need for them. First, here is Preziosi's diagrammatic summary comparing "architectonic semiosis" to "linguistic semiosis" (1979a, 70) :

architectonic semiosis			linguistic semiosis		
orientation	function		orientation	function	
context	:	<i>referential (use)</i>	::	context:	: referential
<i>formation</i>	:	aesthetic	::	message	: poetic
<i>code(struct)</i>	:	allusory (<i>historic</i>)	::	code	: metalinguistics
contact	:	territorial	::	contact	: phatic
addresser	:	expressive	::	speaker	: emotive
addressee	:	exhoritive	::	hearer	: conative

Preziosi makes many sensible and sensitive qualifications in bringing architecture and language into partial alignment, especially in relation to the possibly multiple or various identities of architectural addressers and the stipulation that behavior, not cognition or interpretation *per se*, may be the interpretive consequence of architectural signs. The terms that I have underlined, however, remain problematic, because the formal structures, hierarchical relations, and material distributions of architecture Preziosi describes are *not coded*, though he often refers to these *systems of forms and materials* as codes: perceptible elements and qualities have no more lexical or semantic sense than the elements of an abstract painting of a musical composition and their syntagmatic configurations are *not automatically messages*. Buildings say nothing, the stones are dumb, and it is only through difference, as Preziosi rightly notes, that meaning comes to inhere in things. That difference makes meaning is axiomatic to any Saussure- derived theory of signs. But it is precisely in order to get from *difference* to *reference*, to semanticize formal differences, that Peirce is brought in and the differential choices made manifest in perceptible structures are semanticized as iconic or indexical signs. For Preziosi, icons and indices hang on various elements and dimensions of architectural structure, just as they hang on various levels and aspects of language for Jakobson. But by assimilating "iconicity" too directly to "resemblance" neither theorist quite succeeds in bringing into visibility the difference between *showing* and *telling*, which is implicit in Peirce's semiotic scheme.

For Mukarovsky, I think, the problem of recognizing something as a church and identifying its dominant function, is on a par with recognizing a work of art and identifying its dominant aesthetic function. In both cases he is concerned with the link between a *material structure* that is "(1) a perceptible signifier, created by the artist" and a *social construct*, that is, "(2) a 'signification' /= aesthetic object, [for a practical object one might project] registered in the collective consciousness." But before allowing us to see just where the Peircean triad might be introduced, as the relation of (1) and (2), Mukarovsky takes off in another direction and avers that the third constituent of an "autonomous sign" is "(3) a relationship with that which is signified" (Matejka and Titunik, 6), not with anything in particular, but with a global and diffuse reflection of the sign's social milieu.

Preziosi notes the vaguely Peircean quality of this formulation, as well as its inherent vagueness, and speculates briefly about how the character of an "autonomous sign" might apply not only to works of art but "the entire range of artifactual systems in a society" (1989, 117)⁸. What Preziosi needs from Mukarovsky, and what Mukarovsky sometimes seems to be aiming toward in the distinctions he makes here between "autonomous" and "communicative" (and, elsewhere, between intentional/unintentional) signs, is something like Goodman's description of the "difference in direction" in *how we interpret things* on the basis of their perceptible qualities and our socially conditioned understanding of things and *how we interpret linguistic signs or the signs of any "arbitrary" system* on the basis of our prior knowledge of a code. Goodman's rejection of "resemblance" as grounds for reference is notorious, but his distinction between exemplification and denotation retains something of Peirce's differentiation of icon and symbol in respect to the "immediate interpretant" or potential "interpretability" of each (Peirce, 1953 p.36).

In Goodman's terms, our understanding or any denotative reference to "church," in a linguistic text or in a representational painting is entirely dependent on our understanding of the *readymade correlation of signifier/signified* in each (different but equally arbitrary) code. Understanding some material configuration of stone or brick as a "church," on the contrary, is to *make a correlation*² between a perceptible structure and a cultural construct (whose equivalent linguistic "label" is "church") and at the same time, since this is never done piecemeal, *to apply a differential frame* (schemata) (1968, 71-74). As an example of a place of worship, or Gothic Cathedral, or ribbed-vault construction, or, most broadly, as architecture, the same material structure may be cast into various conceptual frames, more or less general and more or less historically extended. It is "seen," therefore, in ways that fluctuate with the historical positions, knowledge, and interests, or interpreters. Goodman's nominalistic discussion of labels, ranges, realms and schemata generally reflects Mukarovsky's understanding of the differential workings of signs as well as of their

temporal mutability. The shift from the material to the phenomenal is characterized by Goodman as inherently semiotic; and although he considers exemplification as a "symptom" of the aesthetic examples may function "instrumentally" or "referentially" as a means of apprehending the abstractable information they contain.

Preziosi lays out the semiotic foundations of architecture in their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic dimensions. He is enough of a classic structuralist to include a synchronic analysis of a corpus of "Minoan hall systems" in buildings erected on Crete around 1500B.C., along with a meticulous description of various levels and aspects of architectural structure-- units, combinations, and alternative patternings of material forms. The contrast between this exhaustively complex formal description (systemic/syntactic), its fragmentary projections into semantics (via isolated icons and symbols, the indexical implications of difference, and diagrammatic resemblances) and the relatively simple and succinct classification of (pragmatic) function, underscores the value of the latter. In terms of their overlapping and intersecting functions, signs that differ significantly in semantic/syntactic structure are comparable on the basis of their purposes and effects. Given their wealth of writings on linguistics and literature, Mukarovsky and Jakobson say relatively little about architecture and visual signs, so that applying their ideas in these domains is a rather difficult task of theoretical projection.

In my opinion, Preziosi is the best semiotic theorist among contemporary "semiotic/deconstructive" commentators (his architectural studies, moreover, are not deconstructive at all). Because he begins with an understanding of the complexities raised by the Prague School's sustained semiotic investigations, he has an eye on alternative and subsequent developments, and he recognizes certain arbitrary, but methodologically convenient, aspects of his own analytic stance. In contrast, Krauss seldom theorizes. She alludes, rather, to a bundle of structuralist/poststructuralist positions that are argued or unfolded else where. While Kuspit points to Krauss's uncritical acceptance of Barthes' and Derrida's ideas as "dogmatic platitudes" (127), he observes with approval that "Bryson... is as critical of the semiotic perspective as he is of the point of view he uses it to criticize" (117).

This is misleading. Bryson does not criticize the semiotic perspective, but merely certain aspects of the French structuralist/poststructuralist development that constitutes his primary frame of reference. Working forwards from Saussure's inaugural notes on structural linguistics and doubling back from the post-structuralisms of Barthes and Derrida, Bryson arrives at a position somewhere between the most Apollonian of semiotic projects and their wildest Dionysian reaches, eventually rejecting both varieties of "formalism" as the twin chimeras of *langue*. Bryson's frame of reference is ventilated and enriched by philosophic perspectives that provide a means of

correction or expansion of the structuralist/ poststructuralist continuum from without ("The misfortune of the French is not to have translated Wittgenstein; instead, they read Saussure." VP, 77). As a result, the full complexity of "the structuralist debate" floods into the center of art historical erudition and expertise, that is to say, the explication of "major monuments" of Western art, the paintings of Giotto and Massaccio, Vermeer, Watteau, Chardin, and David.

Whereas Preziosi begins with Prague School semiotics as the most adequate of available theories, however general and partial its understanding of architectural signs, Bryson's rejection of semiotic "formalism," his insistence on the constraints that socio-historical contexts exert on the free play of signs, and his emphasis on the active and transformational power of interpretation, project him into positions that correspond to those articulated by Prague School theorists, even though these are not directly discussed in *Word and Image*, *Vision and Painting*, and *Tradition and Desire*. After the fact, so to speak, after Bryson's major contribution to the semiotics of painting, his admiration for Muakrovsky is acknowledged (1988, xvii, xxviii). Within Bryson's own work, however, Mukarovsky is not mentioned and Jakobson is given only a limited part to play, rather, it is V. N. Volosinov's *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* that represents the Slavic alternative to French structuralist views, an alternative that Bryson largely accepts as corrective. No doubt, Bryson wants to make an explicit connection between semiotics and Marxism and, undoubtedly, he views his own double critique of structuralism and perceptualism on a par with Volosinov's double -barreled polemic against "abstract objectivism" (Saussure and his followers) and "individualistic subjectivism" (Wilhelm von Humboldt, et al). Yet much that interests Bryson in Volosinov's ideas is further developed by Mukarovsky and Jakobson. It is strange that he does not make use of the more refined Prague School constructs which would clearly be useful to him.¹⁰ But perhaps in the interests of (1) blocking out how his position contrasts with both French semiotics and the art historical tradition (*Vision and Painting*) and (2) demonstrating broadly how a history of painting's narrative structures would differ from the stylistic history of art (*Word and Image*) and (3) examining how David, Ingres, and Delacroix conceived and altered the inheritance of their artistic tradition (*Tradition and Desire*), he cannot afford to deal with the modifications and complexities that developed after Volosinov's prolegomena.

More importantly, Bryson begs the larger question of whether or not words and pictures signify differently and describe "reality" in fundamentally distinct ways by shifting attention to the issue of *how the effects of the real are produced in literature*, taking up the account of literary realism which suggests the varisemblance in writing results from a *supposed exteriority of the signified to the signifier*" (VP, 55). A fictive "reality" takes on credibility through the textual elaboration of details,

descriptions, and digressions which are largely peripheral to the development of any central narrative or theme of the whole. This sense of distance from the text as text, "*distance from the patent site of meaning is interpreted as distance towards the real*" (VP, 56), by analogy of narrative literature to narrative pictures, as paintings take viewers further and further from the narrative core of their literary/religious sources through various augmentations embellishments and devices of visual organization independent of the linguistic pre-texts. Similarly, distance away from the "minimal schema" or the "nuclear sentence" of an iconographic type may be understood as distance towards the real. Beginning from the idea of painting as narrative, rather than as description, Bryson claims that "the equivalent *within the image* to paradigm in language is the schema" (VP, 122, my emphasis); and narrative schema are identified with iconographic types, such as "Nativity," "Last Supper," or "Annunciation," which are doubly determined by (biblical or alternative) textual sources and the socio-religious forces, the very *raison d'être* for their visualization. The "discursive" in painting is itself identified with the *textual*, the *coded*, the *paradigmatic*, the *schematic*, as well as with the *denotation* of painting, its paraphrasable *referential* sense. The "figural," which supplements and contrasts with the "discursive," is "the area of predominance of syntagm over paradigm" (WI, 21); the "figural," in turn, is identified with the *extra-textual*, the *uncoded* or the *transgressive*, the *syntagmatic*, as well as with the *connotive*, which includes all the extra referential dimensions of the pictorial sign. The figural and the discursive *coexist within individual paintings* as an internal ratio. For example, the discursive part of Piero della Francesca's *Flagellation of Christ*--Romans-whipping-Christ-- is confined to a small area of the painting's surface, while its syntagmatic expansion includes the large-scale observers in the foreground, together with Piero's mathematical perspective and his modeling of the figures, all of which are semantically irrelevant to denotative recognition of the iconographic theme. The "effect of the real" is described as "a specialized relationship between denotation and connotation where *connotation so confirms and substantiates denotation that the latter appears to rise to a level of truth*" (VP, 62).

Bryson is generally dealing with paintings that are densely "literary" or "narrative" in various interesting ways that his "discursive/figural" polarity genuinely illuminates, but there are a great many grounds for objection to his theoretical framework of discussion, some art historical¹¹ and some semiotic¹²--its extreme verbo-centrism is further extended into the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of systems of visual signs:

"If the founding axiom, of Jakobson's semiology is true-- that all sign-systems can be analysed into a vertical axis of selection from the repertory of available forms and a horizontal axis along which the selections are combined-- then in the case of

painting both axes of the sign are *veiled*: the schema is invoked only in order to be transgressed, taken out of the matrix of selection; the *duree* of painting is systematically disavowed. The result of this double assault on or obfuscation of the painting is its eventual unthinkability as sign --the impossibility of theorising the image except in terms of its own propaganda, as the re-presentation of perception, as the Zeuxian mirage" (VP, 130)."

Some of the obfuscations that Bryson discovers are inherent in how he applies the paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction to images, especially in his equation of the visual syntagm to the temporal processes of its making and viewing. Jakobson, of course, understands the visual syntagm as spatial (1971, 334-44), not as "denying" or "arresting" the "syntagmatic movement" that it does not have (VP, 120, 122). While the axial structure of codes is stretched out of the shape of Jakobson's formulations (and Saussure's and Barthes'), one cannot just say that *Bryson does not understand Jakobson* because his discussion is "bracketed" by the "effect of the real," namely that which prevents the systems of painting from coming into view. Bryson knows very well that "a code is, by definition, a structure of permutation and multiplication," it is neither simple "addition, citation, inventory, list" (VP, 140) nor "the free play" of signs. His argument with Barthes' two views of literature as repetition or transgression, yielding *plaisir* or *jouissance*, is that both depend on the theorization of signification at the level of langue and are thus "outside the social formation, and outside history" (VP, 142). In the material practice of painting, however, the social and dialogic nature of painterly *parole* holds innovation within the bounds of intelligibility, so that repetition and transgression coexist. Although Bryson's emphasis on the social, the material, and the interactive, intermittently reflects the influence of Volosinov, this influence is not as thoroughly integrated into Bryson's understanding of signs as Barthes' constructs that have been put "under erasure" but keep showing through. Consequently, Bryson stays too much within the simple alternative of repetition or transgression on a global thematic plane. The "schema" is regarded as a fixed syntagma, a paradigmatic compound, more stereotype than type. Bryson often returns to the Byzantine icon as the prime example of the painted paradigm for, to the degree that an entire schema-- the subject in a particular compositional format-- must be *duplicated*, this is the closest that painting has come to the photographic message without a code." This equation of schema with stereotype keeps Bryson from theorizing how certain aspects of "connotation" or "expression" arise and are understood, as neither repetitions nor transgressions, but as manifestation of artistic choices of diverse hierarchical level and types.


Although Bryson claims that the "excess of the image over discourse can only last as long as texts can" (WI, 12), the ratio of illustration between iconographic types and their individual tokens is only one manifestation of the *type-token relation*

which is central in Bryson's consideration of signs. As large-scale semantic wholes, *genre-types*, such as "landscape," "portrait," or "still-life" function similarly to "Nativity," "Annunciation," and the like, in establishing a certain ratio in complex pictorial signs. In subject-genres that are detached from specific narrative pre-texts, this ratio is more clearly between the standard and variant features of specific paintings or, more accurately, between standard and *historically emergent* contra-standard tokens of type. In Bryson's brief discussions of Gros' *The Battle of Eylau*, Gericault's *Madman*, and Manet's *Olympia*, established norms of the genres of "battle scenes," "portraits," and "odalisques" are clearly *transgressed* not *augmented*, and Bryson accounts for the "realism" of Leonardo's *Portrait of Ginevra de' Benci* by "the fact that the inherited schema of portraiture has been hidden from view," giving the image an intensity of lifelikeness absent from Antonella" (VP, 127). Bryson's first consideration of realism as an expansion of information and an accretion of gratuitous details is displaced by a second emphasis on norm-breaking novelty or deviation from established practice -- practice with which it was intertwined all along.

As Jakobson affirms, in fine formalist fettle, "the painted image becomes an ideogram, a formula to which the object portrayed is lined by contiguity. . . . The ideogram needs to be deformed. The artist-innovator must impose a new form on our perception, if we are to detect in a given thing those traits which went unnoticed the day before" (Matejka and Pomoroka, 40). To be sure, Jakobson also notes that *either* the familiar *or* the innovative may be honorifically equated with the real, so that it holds also true, as Goodman maintains, "that a picture looks like nature often means only that it looks the way nature is usually painted" (1968, 39). In these terms, either a Van Eyck or a Monet may become an "ideogram". What counts is not the quantity or quality of information that the "figural" contains but the fact that it is-- by Bryson's initial definition-- the novel of "deautomatizing" aspect of the image generating the "effect" of the real. For Bryson, the figural or the connotative "confirms and substantiates denotation" in the sense that the viewer of Giotto's *Betrayal* may be persuaded by the painter's (historically innovative) superior articulation of spaces and volumes of the reality of this biblical event or, on another level, the viewer may be moved to reflect-- by the painter's (historically innovative) expressive delineation of the profiles of Jesus and Judas-- on the deeper psychological and theological implications of the painting's theme. Such focus on the particulars of *this Betrayal*, this artistic message in all its palpable specificity points to the presence of an aesthetic set toward the image, as well as to an act of interpretive integration, an effort of semantic unification on the part of the viewer. With no differentiation of "functions" and no clear-cut differentiation between denotative and connotative

codes, the glaring weakness in Bryson's theory is that all- important *connotation* is so vaguely and variously described.

At times Bryson emphasizes the indistinct unauthorized quality of connotation, but at other times connotations stiffen into the three "great" or "crucial" codes of "the face and body in movement (pathognomics), the codes of the face at rest (physiognomics), and the codes of fashion or dress," knowledge of which is "distributed through the social formation in a diffuse, amorphous manner that contrasts sharply with the exact and legalistic knowledge of iconology [*iconography*]" (VP, 68-69). While denotative recognition is straightforward identification or decoding, " the codes of connotation are underdetermined and acquire intelligibility *in situ* " (VP, 159), they seem to engage the viewer in a private act of investigation far more intimate and personally determined than the public activity of iconographic recognition" (VP, 64); and because this "requires a certain amount of hermeneutic effort, because it must extract meaning from the image under conditions of difficulty and uncertainty, connotations are experienced as *found*. not made " (VP, 64). Bryson diagrams the inert "image" as semiotically vitiated from above by " the codified" and pointing down to the " the concrete" (VP, 76)¹³ .



What interests Bryson in Volosinov's discussion of signs (in which "semiotic" and "ideological" count as synonyms) is a sense of connotative "recognition" that falls somewhere between private mnemonic acts (I recognize someone that I have seen before) and straightforward decodings (I recognize the word because I know the code) in " the consciousness of the perceiver," which, according to Volosinov, is a changing social consciousness or a "changing behavioural ideology."

"The work combines with the whole content of the consciousness of those who perceive it and derive its apperceptive values only in the context of the consciousness. It is interpreted in the spirit of the particular content of consciousness (the consciousness of the perceiver) and is illuminated by it anew. This is what constitutes the vitality of an ideological production. In each period of its historical existence, a work must enter into close association with the changing behavioural ideology, become permeated with it, and draw new sustenance from it. Only to the degree that a work can enter into that kind of integral, organic association with the behavioural ideology of a given period is it viable for that period (and of course, for a given

social group). Outside its connection with behavioural ideology it ceases to exist, since it ceases to be experienced as something ideologically meaningful" (Volosinov, 91).

And Mukarovsky makes the same general point:

"The perceiver's initiative-- which is as a rule individual only to a small degree, being determined for the most part by general factors such as time, generation, and social milieu--provides the possibility that different perceivers (or rather different groups of perceivers) will invest the same work with different intentionality, sometimes considerably divergent from that which its originator gave it "(Burbank and Steiner, 98)"

To the extent that Volosinov's premises parallel those of Mukarovsky or are taken up and developed by him (cf. Galan, 133), Bryson perhaps gets the gist of "Intentionality and Unintentionality in Art" from *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, but his "connotation" might be defined through Mukarovsky's understanding of the dynamic interplay of "intentionality" and "unintentionality" in interpretive responses, who asserts, in his most radical formulations, that a work of art "*means* the perceiver's existential experience, his mental world"(Burbank and Steiner, 96, my emphasis) and "*is simultaneously a thing and a sign*" (Burbank and Steiner, 106, my emphasis). But this is precisely the point where Mukarovsky is most ambiguous, where the Saussurean frame work is least helpful, where signification is most diffuse, and where signification and function sometimes merge. As Preziosi observes in relation to architecture (1989, 118), there seems to be a theoretical gap in Mukarovsky's explication, which is most problematic outside of literary art and representational painting, when signs are least "communicative" and closest to things. Here, the interpreter's "semantic gesture" is more constructive than unifying, and as such it is more convincingly explained by Goodman (cf. Holmes, 1981) as motivated, grounded in exemplification, and differing in direction from other varieties of signification with which it may or may not be intertwined. Bryson's diagrammatic formulation of the image, floating between what has been put into it and what may be read from it, is reminiscent of Goodman, but then a great many semiotic theories hover around his discussion of connotation without coalescing into clear view¹⁴ ..

iii

The value of Prague School semiotics for theorists, historians, and critics of visual art is generally the same as it is for literary theorists and critics. Although some of Jakobson's and Mukarovsky's ideas on visual art and architecture suggest

directions for further investigation, it is on the level of a general theory of signs that their ideas are most useful. Jakobson's communication model, his and Mukarovsky's understanding of polyfunctionality, Jakobson's development of the double axes of language, Mukarovsky's focus on the perceiver's role on making and remaking meaning, yield powerful descriptive and analytic constructs which are as relevant to visual art and visual signs as to those in other modalities. In contrast to the "verbo-centric dogmatism" of later structuralism, Galan points out that "the founding [Czech] structuralists, nearly all of them highly distinguished linguists, were never tempted to commit the kind of linguistic fallacy that misled their French successors, most of whom lacked extensive training in linguistics"(39). Too much has been made of the obdurate conservatism of art history as reason for its coolness to French structuralism, whose didactic claims for the arbitrariness of signs, their double articulation and, for the superiority of the synchronic perspective, sets it at the greatest possible remove from the mainstream concerns of *historians* of a visual tradition in which *mimesis* has a special and problematic place and signifying systems are generally *non-articulate* or analogue at the level of form. Indeed, many of the structuralist roads not taken by art historians have proven to be scenic detours, if not methodological dead-ends, in other fields.

Focused as it is on the evolution of art in its cultural context, Prague School semiotics, both in its aims and its extra-linguistic dimension, is in closer alignment with art history's theoretical foundation. Mukarovsky was schooled in the same tradition of German philosophical aesthetics, whose influences Michael Podro traces from Riegl to Panofsky in *The Critical Historians of Art*, and in important respects in Czech theorists' determination to "steer the difficult course between two extremes: a theory which provides a history, but not mainly of art, and one which, by studying art itself, excludes the full dimension of history" (Galan, 2), converges with the central concern of the critical historians of art. 15 By leveling art historical theory to a native "perceptualism," Bryson deconstructs a straw-man position which nobody, least of all Gombrich, actually holds, and ignores the complexities of critical art history, 16 while making gestures of approval toward the Slavic semiotic tradition with which it has most in common. Prague School semiotics is so little known to Anglo-American art historians that it is not mentioned in Christine Hasenmueller's "Panofsky, Iconography and Semiotics" (1978), in which the "historicity of Panofsky's method" alone is almost enough to deny its semiotic validity (297). In Preziosi's interesting brief comparison of Panofsky and Mukarovsky, on the other hand, it is the philosophical conservatism of both theorists that is emphasized and found wanting in relation to "(post)modernist semiology" (1989, 120). 17

Mukarovsky is ushered out of Preziosi's consideration of old art history at the same time that Bryson welcomes him, in *Calligram*, to the poststructuralist company

of the new. Preziosi's rethinking of art history has come to foreground the *ideological functions* of signs, taking the direction in which "poststructuralism" has generally progressed, in tandem with a dramatic and metaphoric equation of "the prison-house of language" with all that is oppressive and duplicitous in the inheritance of "logocentric" thinking, historically evolved disciplinary perspectives, and the social *status quo*. Indeed, as Galan points out,

"In comparison with 'poststructuralism,' the Prague School writings are free of anxiety or aporia that language may be a constricting grid which conceals reality as much as it reveals it stifling as much as stimulating individual expression. For Prague linguists, language presented itself as an object of technical study; and for Prague literary scholars, it appeared, in its aesthetic function, as a perpetually renewable source of the perceiver's ever more finely calibrated perception of and ever more subtle orientation in the world. The Prague School, in short, retained its scientific, and its scientifically optimistic, spirit throughout" (205).

Like Goodman's *Languages of Art*, Czech structuralism may not be ideological enough, it seems, for current tastes. or, also as with *Languages of Art*, it may be that Mukarovsky's consideration of visual art operates too exclusively on the level of aesthetics to interest art historians. For it is not as much Bryson's theorizing as his *demonstrations* of how semiotic scrutiny may alter and revitalize our understanding of paintings that brings his semiotics into the mainstream of art historical concerns. But regardless of how unfashionably optimistic or scientific or logocentric, Prague School semiotics is forbidding in its complexity, its subtlety, its dynamism, as well as in its theoretical aspirations toward a total integration and comprehension that its practical studies cannot fulfill-- as no others have or will. In ways that both Preziosi and Bryson either demonstrate or suspect (and surround with other demonstrations and suspicions), the Prague School may well be the best place for a semiotic art history to begin-- or to resume, since it would be something of a fitting reunion for the discipline of art history, one of the important inspirations of Russian formalism, to converge with Formalism's semiotic successor.

Notes and References.

1. In his introduction to *Calligram*, Bryson mandates two projects for art history: (1) the *archival*, focusing on the work of art in its original context of production-- as art historians have traditionally done-- but with "context" defined (in Prague School fashion) in a broader, more global, sense than patronage studies, as "the complex interaction among all the practices that make up the sphere of culture: the scientific, military, literary, and religious practices; the legal and political structures; the structures of class, sexuality, and economic life in the given society" (xxviii); (2) the *hermeneutic*, "the basic act of interpretation," equivalent to current practice

in literary criticism-- which art historians have not traditionally done, and which Bryson rightly claims is underdeveloped in the study of visual art due to the dominance of the objectivist/historical perspective (See, too, Svetlana and Paul Alpers ,1972). According to Bryson, "all art history needs to do" is to "take from literary criticism every thing of service to itself, making reading and practical criticism regular components of art historical training, and the discipline will be at once more stable, more mature, and more nourishing than before" (xxix). Bryson categorizes Mukarovsky as a theorist of the archival ,suggesting that his integrative and historical semiotics can contribute to the semiotic reorientation of art historical studies.

2. The claim that there was no significant development from Prague to Paris, that French theorists started anew from Saussure and drew different implication from the *Cours*, requires some explanation of Jakobson's presence in both structuralist spheres. The "phonological revolution" accomplished by Jakobson and Trubetzkoy was, for Claude Levi-Strauss and other French structuralists, a clear demonstration of the differential and insubstantial foundations of language proclaimed by Saussure (Culler, 1975, 6-7), easily detached from Jakobson's interest in the systematic nature of phonological change and his wider polemic with Saussure. Jakobson is frequently cited in *Elements of Semiology*, Barthes' celebrated attempt at an extraction from linguistics of analytical concepts which we think a priori to be sufficiently general to start semiological research on its way" (12), but with no recognition of the scope- and subtlety of Jakobson's earlier achievements, together with his Prague School colleagues, in tackling the very same problem. For Barthes, Trubetzkoy and Jakobson are a source of "appended concepts isolated since Saussure's day" (*Elements* ,19). Barthes credits Jakobson's treatment of the two axes of language with opening vistas for semiology, especially in relation to metaphor and metonymy and other possibilities for creative transgressions of the normally distinct poles (60), but this is presented within Saussure's enframing perspective in a way that the Prague School's programmatic shifts from *langue* to *parole* and from synchrony to diachrony cannot be. By way of their discussion in *Elements de semiologie*, "Shifters, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb" (1957) and "Two Aspects of Language and Two types of Aphasia" (1956), published in Jakobson's *Essais de Linguistique Generale* of 1964., enter into the French structuralist canon in isolation from the dynamic and dialectical totality of Prague School thought. While references to Mukarovsky--by art historians or others- almost always signal an interest in the Prague School in *1010*, references to Jakobson need not.

3. Even in Annette Michelson's "Art and the Structuralist Perspective," an early consideration of French structuralism from the perspective of the visual arts, Saussure's linguistic framework is presented along with Peirce's icon, index, and symbol (in *On the Future of Art*, New York: Viking, 1970,45-46.)

4. Gombrich states in a letter to Leonardo (1985, 126): "If the reader cares to look at p. 120 of *Art and Illusion* he will find me making use of the linguistic notion of 'distinctive features' in a discussion of board games, which 'allow us to study articulation, the creation of distinctions without the intrusion of the problem of likeness or representation'."

5. It may be a certain Saussurean fundamentalism that prevents Krauss from expanding her findings too far in the direction of Jakobson or Peirce, even though either extension would serve to broaden the scope of her findings and account for other recent trends (minimal art, conceptual art) in the same theoretical frame. The phenomenon that interests Krauss is a double refusal of iconicity, first of iconic images and second of the diagrammatic or metaphoric icons of abstract art, with a compensatory expansion of indexical and symbolic signs. Alternatively, one could work more closely with Jakobson's discussion of aphasia and describe the various dismantling of the normal/bi-polar visual language of classic modernism in later art as an array of "similarity disorders" and "contiguity disorders".

6. Peirce is not mentioned or cited until Part II, although his thinking informs much that is said in Part I, and neither he nor Jakobson is referred to else where in this anthology, and yet, as I have suggested elsewhere (1989) "iconic" and "indexical" signs creep into other essays as well.

7. Preziosi differentiates between the formal system of solids, voids, and planes-- what is enterable or blocks entry-- and material components and qualities-- wood, stone, color, texture, etc. Here and elsewhere, I simplify his discussion of the built environments by aiming toward the semiotic scaffolding of his ideas.

8. For an interesting comparison of Charles Morris' understanding of the "esthetic sign," compared to that of Mukarovsky, see Peter Steiner's "Jan Mukarovsky and Charles Morris: Two Pioneers in the Semiotics of Art," *Semiotica*, 19(1977), 321-34. The traditions of Peirce and Saussure come at signs from different directions: one originating in the fact of interpretation and theorizing, along the lines of Hume's association of ideas, that *anything* interpreted must have iconic indexical or symbolic grounds the other starting from the *fact of langue*, of existing systems of arbitrary/conventional signs posits that "meaning" is founded on a systemic understanding and must have a corresponding structural shape. The Anglo-American tradition's multiple *verbs of reference*-- like Goodman's *denote or exemplify or express*-- imply both different (pragmatic) interpretive interests and different semantic grounds. From the perspective of this tradition, the verb "to signify" is uninformative when expanded from Saussure's original sense and partial when preserving it; the subdivisions of "denote" or "connote" are equally vague when connotation is stretched from Hjelmslev's qualified definition to become a catchall for all extra--

referential dimensions of signification, all the "functions" and "figures" of language that an exclusive focus on *langue* cannot explain. For the staunch Peircean, each "function" of language involves a separate "sign," having different iconic, indexical, and symbolic ground. A rough Peircean overlay on Jakobson's model of the elements and functions of language suggests that its horizontal axis is generally indexical, focused on the causes and effects of signs, and, while the vertical axis eludes such easy generalization, any correlation of material/formal systems with extra-formal entities or concepts, either pre-coded or posited by interpreters, must have symbolic or iconic grounds.


9. To make a correlation *that the phenomenon itself allows*. Goodman's more technical and terse formulation reads: "The constraint upon exemplification as compared with denotation derives from the status of exemplification as a subrelation of the converse of denotation, from the fact that denotation implies reference between two elements in one direction while exemplification implies reference between the two in both direction. Exemplification is restricted only insofar as the denotation of the label in question is regarded as having been antecedently fixed (1968, .59).

10. In disputing the "fallacy" that "meaning derives from the internal order of language and owes nothing to the material context of its utterance" (VP, 82), for example, just where he might be expected to introduce Prague School discussions of the intersecting pressures of code and context or the multifunctionality of language, he instead reproduces the page-long quotation from Dostoyevsky's *Diary of a Writer* cited by Volosinov in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* to illustrate the contextually varying implication of "one little word" that cannot be determined from its lexical sense.

11. Bryson largely ignores the complex interrelation of visual texts and their literary pre-texts explored by Meyer Schapiro in *Words and Pictures*, which suggests, among many other things relevant to Bryson's discussion that illustrations are necessarily visual *interpretations* for texts of *interpretations of interpretations*-- since the biblical texts themselves are subject to exegeses.

12. Among the fundamental differences between visual and verbal representation that are not acknowledged is the fact that images never signify with the bald neutrality or generality that is possible in language. Peirce suggests that "icons" cannot simply "mention" but must *characterize or describe in order to refer*, so that even the most schematic drawing of a man or tree or boat corresponds to an extended verbal description. As Peirce says in a frequently cited passage of *Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs*: "For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by direct observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction." (1955,105).

13. In alignment with Goodman's discussion, this diagram could be reformulated:



14. Because Goodman, like Mukarovsky (and Jakobson also, to a great extent), is not directly discussed by Bryson, it is surprising to learn-- from his comments in a hitherto "unpublished manuscript"(which is collaged into David Carrier's presentation of "the semiotic theory " in "Theoretical Perspectives on the Arts, Sciences and Technology,": 1984.) that Goodman's ideas are part of the background of Bryson's project:: "Barthes talked of the effect of the real while independently Nelson Goodman argued that the effect of life - likeness arose from informational 'density.' " (Bryson, in Carrier, 1984) Here, too, we learn from Bryson that: "Volosinov, the Soviet theorist of language, may in fact have more to say about subjectivity in vision than Lacan. For Volosinov verbal consciousness is only 'unvoiced speech;' not a domain of the spirit separate from the social domain, but an activity working entirely with the socially constructed blocks and rules of language... The urgent problem is to account for visual 'consciousness' in comparable terms, terms which allow at least the description of a subjective life of signs, separate from the social codes or public visual life, but not divorced from these or banished from discussion." (Bryson in Carrier, 294) Neither Mukarovsky nor Jakobson is mentioned in Carrier's citations from Bryson's manuscript, whether because Carrier does not choose to excerpt passages in which they are discussed, or else because they are not important enough in Bryson's semiotic frame of reference to warrant individual discussion.

15. Similarly, Podro explains: "Either the context- bound quality or the irreducibility of art may be elevated at the expense of the other. If a writer diminishes the sense of context in his concern for the irreducibility or autonomy of art, he moves toward formalism. If he diminishes the sense of irreducibility in order to keep a firm hand on extra- artistic facts, he runs the risk of treating art as if it were the trace or symptom of those other facts. The critical historians were constantly treading a tightrope between the two " (*The Critical Historians of Art*, xx).

16. As Podro's review of *Vision and painting* points out: "Misconceived Alternatives," *Art History* 7 (June 1984), 244.

17. Preziosi does not think that further comparison of Mukarovsky and Panofsky would be a worthless exercise; his brief discussion occurs in the context of a complaint that Panofsky's semiotics is given short shrift Holly's *Panofsky and the Foundation of Art History* and his own wider consideration of art history's semiotic background.

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Pragmatics, Prague- matics, Metapragmatics: Contextualizing Pragmatic Contexts

DAVID HERMAN

...the complete meaning of a sign cannot be but the historical recording of the pragmatic labour that has accompanied every contextual instance of it; . . . to interpret a sign means to foresee- ideally-- all the possible contexts in which it can be inserted (Eco 1937 : 706).

1. Analytic and Structuralist Pragmatics

When Charles Morris(1938) isolated syntax, semantics and pragmatics as three interactive dimensions of semiosis, he thought that he was contributing to an international project envisaged by the founding members of the Vienna Circle-- the project, namely, of the unification of the sciences. Ironically, a half- century after Morris specified these three dimensions, and despite his having defined the notions of syntax, semantics and pragmatics in what no doubt seemed to him a highly general and therefore maximally non- controversial manner, consensus about what falls within the scope of each semiotic dimension remains split roughly along the lines of scholars' nationalities. Herman Parret (1983) has shown how ,in general, scholars working in the Anglo Saxon or Peircean ("analytic") semiotic tradition find themselves pitted against scholars in the ("structural") Continental tradition, which began with Saussure, extends through Hjelmslev and perpetuates itself in post- Hjelmslevians like Greimas (23-88).¹ Specifically, the dispute between the analytic and structuralist factions centers on the element of dynamism that Peircean semiotics, in contrast to Saussurian/Hjelmslevian semiotics, builds into the very nature of semiosis. As Parret puts it, "[t] the dynamism of the sign relation in Peirce is in fact due to the functioning of the third term, the interpreter, which is simultaneously a sign itself and an essential ingredient of any sign relation " (29)

Thus, whereas Peirce's analytical semiotics evolves "a logic of action " (30), the dyadic concept of the sign operative in structural semiotics produces chiefly " a relational logistics " (30), providing " no perspective either on the dynamism and the creativity of the sign and the meaning process or on the *interpretation* regularities and rules of *inference*" (31) at work in that process. We are as a result left with a seemingly irresolvable dispute, ² namely, whether semiotics should be viewed as a formal or rather as a functional grammar (36), with the analytic semioticians setting up semiosis on a functional basis, the structural semioticians by contrast urging for signs closed, immanent systematicity. Historically speaking, therefore ,Morris's dream

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of a general semiotic, 3 which would provide a metalanguage into which the various subsidiary scientific languages of sign- systems could be translated, never got past the first, rather mundane or empirical stage of translating Saussure into Peircean terms and vice -versa.

Indeed, as Parret's analysis suggests, however we choose to redescribe Morris blithely minimalist definitions of syntax as " the study of the syntactical relations of signs to one another in abstraction from the relations of signs to objects or to interpreters" (13); or of semantics as the study of " the relations of signs to their designate and so to the objects which they may or do denote" (21); it is on Morris' definition of pragmatics as " the science of the relations of signs to their interpreters" (30) that the dispute between analytic and structural semiotics hinges. As Jef Verschueren has shown, on the Continent, but not in the Anglo-American tradition, scholars generally adhere to Morris' view that pragmatics should concern itself with, very broadly speaking, the relation of signs to interpreters (1985: 459). By contrast, the Anglo-American tradition includes within the scope of pragmatic inquiry only such narrowly delimited topics as deixis, implicature, presupposition, speech acts and conversation (459-60).

Here, in fact, we witness a strange chiasmus of sorts. On the one hand, the analytic tradition, which began with Peirce's emphasis on the dynamic contribution of interpreters to the process of communication, attempts how to formalize the constraints that delimit just how much interpreters can so contribute. Thus Grice posits "maxims" that constrain permissible conversational implicatures, and Montague develops a grammar that includes and formalizes deictic terms, or rather the deictic *features* of utterances-- features that Montague defines as "the set of all complexes of relevant aspects of intended possible contexts of use" (Montague 1974: 98). On the other hand, scholarship on the Continent, where semiotics originally bore a formalist impress, now resists specifying in any very exact way the constraints within which context dynamizes communication. Instead, pragmatic inquiry in its continental guise concerns itself with " the huge range of psychological and sociological phenomena involved in sign systems in general or in language in particular" (Levinson 1983: 5; cf. Parret 1983: 10).

We have then a quite complex configuration of disputants, *each* of whom, notwithstanding Parret's analytic, structuralist distinction, distributes semiosis between structure and function, code and interpretant- - but in ostensibly incommensurable ways. In order to rethink the syntax-semantics- pragmatics relation as such, it may therefore prove necessary to reinscribe the very notions of structure and function-- or rather the difference these terms capture--within a less interactable matrix of oppositions. Such a matrix can be marked off, I submit, with an alternative set of

distinction invoked, or at least set into play, by Prague School functionalism: the distinctions of provisional versus eternal or intemporal; focal versus global; *de facto* versus *de jure*. But before I attempt to substantiate the importance of the Prague School in this connection, I should like to sketch in, very briefly, the root-concepts of pragmatics operative within the ongoing debate over what constitutes the proper scope of pragmatic inquiry itself. In talking about the notions of pragmatics informing this debate, I shall not only drop Parret's distinction between the "analytic" versus "structural" traditions, but also shift, by and large (though not entirely), from generally semiotic to more particularly linguistic terms. For recent, and in fact nearly all, work in pragmatics (so-called) has been conducted under the auspices of either linguistics or philosophy of language--although I should like to put off making, at least for the time being, any *general* remarks about the relation of semiotic to philosophico-linguistic inquiry in this connection.⁴

2. Definitions, Taxonomies

All issues in pragmatic inquiry are, primarily, the range and specific nature of those mechanisms or, as Gazdar terms them, functions by means of which the contexts of language-use help determine the meaning of the sentences used or uttered. Pragmatics attempts not only to establish that, but also to specify how a context paired with a sentence produces a (meaningful) utterance. Most broadly, pragmatics attempts to derive a function f_p that can map the domain E (the set of all possible utterances) into the range M (the set of contexts for utterances) (Gazdar 1979: 4-5). This pragmatic "function," in turn, takes on a more or less properly mathematical character--that is, f_p signifies to a greater or lesser degree the relation between mutually dependent variables--in proportion with the degree of indeterminacy imputed to M itself. As we shall see, Prague School functionalism in particular assigns (*de jure*) absolute indeterminacy to M and thus allows for only provisional and highly localized maps--non-generalizable functions, as it were--with which to project the set of all possible utterances onto the set of contexts those utterances might conceivably affect or be affected by.

In any event, the broad and therefore quite flexible conception of pragmatics as an attempt to map utterances onto contexts itself remains subject to dispute (see Levinson 1983: 5-35). Lyons (1977), for one, tries to explain away the very notion of pragmatics as a specific mode of inquiry. Lyons resorts to the argument that since working linguists (and, we might add, semioticians) do not always or even often think of themselves as conducting research within the three domains in question, Morris' dimensions lack even a heuristic or regulative value (119). Yet as for example Gazdar (1979: x; 2-4; 89ff., esp. 161-8) and Levinson (1983: 33-35) point out, the

contexts in which language is used supplies language-users with information not derivable just from the syntactic or semantic rules of a language . Thus, whereas syntax and semantics may be necessary conditions for the design and interpretation of sentences, syntactic and semantic features do not suffice to explain how utterances of sentences--utterances specific to a particular place, time and socio- cultural milieu--link up with the meaning of which sentences, semantically speaking, are the bearers (Levinson 1983: 18-9). Sentence-meaning, that is to say, seems to be a function not just of (a) the syntactic rules that determine the design and interpretation of elements coordinated into a meaningful increment of speech; and not just a function of (b) the semantic rules that determine what sort of world- fragment (Parret 1983:9) a given increment of speech bears on; but also a function of (c) the the context in which the utterance, the empirical realization of the abstract or idealized sentence, in fact gets said. But then we still have got to specify how much autonomy or rather instrumentality we should grant to (c) vis-a-vis (a) and (b).

In fact, one way to taxonomize the manifold variants of pragmatic inquiry is to posit a distinction based precisely on the degree of instrumentality assigned to pragmatic constraints. We may distinguish, more specifically, between those who approach the relation of syntax and semantics to pragmatics through what Levinson terms "Pragmatic reductionism," versus those who account for the syntax- semantics-pragmatics relation via "pragmatic complementarism" (Levinson 1985:98) whereas reductionists, making a very strong claim for pragmatics, "seek to show that a systematic pattern of distribution or construction is actually not due to a rule of grammar but rather to a preferred code of use, itself following from a more general principle", complementarists, making a weaker claim, seek "to show that such a systematic pattern, which may or may not be specified by a rule of grammar, is consistent with a pragmatic principle specifying one " (98). I do not have space here to attempt, using Levinson's criterion of reductionism versus complementarism, an exhaustive classification of past and present work done in pragmatics. I shall, however, cite exemplars of each stance toward pragmatics in order to prepare the way for my more substantive claim: namely, that Prague School functionalism, just as it allows us to circumvent any rigid distinction between form and function insemiosis in general, allows us to rethink pragamatic constraints as such outside of the reductionist-complementarist dichotomy in which other accounts of language- as- use remain trapped.

2.1. Pragmatic Reductionism

Take for instance the pragmatic reductionism evident in Austin (1963[1940]). Disputing the ability of logicism or "ideal-language" philosophy (e.g., Carnap's

logico-syntactical method of analysis) to a dispel a number of problematic features of actual language use, Austin argues that

The supposed 'ideal' language ... is in many ways a most inadequate model of any *actual* language: its careful separation of syntactics from semantics, its lists of explicitly formulated rules and conventions, and its careful delimitation of their spheres of operation are all misleading. An *actual* language has few, if any, explicit conventions, no sharp limits to the spheres of operation of rules, no rigid separation of what is syntactical and what semantical. (13)

Although Austin does not use the term "pragmatics" in this context, to the extent that what counts as a syntactic and what as a semantic feature of a given utterance is determined by the use or "situation" of the speech- act, syntax and semantics may be reduced to pragmatics-- at least at a certain (most fundamental) level of inquiry. As Austin puts it a few pages earlier: the reason why I cannot say 'The cat is on the mat and I do not believe it' is not that it offends against syntactics in the sense of being in some way 'self- contradictory. What prevents my saying it, is rather some semantic convention (implicit, of course), about the way we use words in *situations*" (10). Austin here grounds the principle of non-contradiction itself not (or at least not most basically) in an idealized, logically-purified language to which actual or ordinary" language can at best hope to approximate, but rather in the conventions or implicit rules by which language use is from the start constituted.

Austin's subsumption of syntactic features under implicit semantic conventions, and of semantic conventions under "the way we use words in *situations*," 5 points ahead to the question with which Toulmin, in his aptly- titled *The Uses of Argument* (1958), begins. Toulmin starts by asking "how far logic *can* hope to be a formal science, and yet retain the possibility of being applied in the critical assessment of actual arguments" (3). Extending Austin's analysis of both syntax and semantics into situations, Toulmin applies Austinian reductionism to the realm of formal logic in general, placing in question even the view "that the validity of syllogistic arguments is a consequence of the fact that the conclusions of those arguments are simply formal transformations of their premisses" (118). Instead, Toulmin reinscribes the operation of formal logic within the (largely) jurisprudential concepts of "data," "Warrant," and "backing." As Toulmin puts it, "Once we bring into the open the backing on which (in the last resort) the soundness of our argument depends, the suggestion that validity is to be explained in terms of formal properties, in any geometrical sense, loses its plausibility(120). But when logical validity itself becomes a matter of the suitability of arguments (and steps of arguments) for practical purposes or actual situations, pragmatic constraints acquire, in effect, absolute force. The syntactic and semantic determinants by means of which utterances earn well-

formedness and pertinence or fit--such determinants become merely secondary or epiphenomenal. By implication, what makes sense; what counts as meaningful or non- (logically-) absurd sentence or propositional component of a sentence; what figures as semantically appropriate--all this follows from the more fundamental practical or rather pragmatic constraints under which these features of utterances can in the first place be isolated and defined. The limit-case of such a reductionist stance may be stated thus: what you term a syntactic feature of an utterance I may term a semantic one or vice versa; and there are no pre-existent criteria to which we can appeal independently of the practical uses we make of these terms in the process of inquiry or research.

2.2. Pragmatic Complementarism

Yet this reduction of syntactic and semantic to pragmatic consideration is flanked by a line of inquiry we may label complementarist, again to use Levinson's nomenclature. The complementarist and reductionist standpoints on pragmatics are--like formalist versus functionalist approaches to semiosis in general-- at root incommensurable. Parret, for one, points up the incommensurability of the reductionist and complementarist lines in his account of the possible "perversions" of pragmatic inquiry. Indeed, Parret suggests how a complementarist method can pervert not just pragmatics, but syntax and semantics as well. Parret uses "The suffix *icism* in a pejorative way. 'Icisms' postulate sets or relation which do not consist of *interdependent* entities but *isomorphic* ones" (1983: 9). Thus, "syntacticism, " for instance, "is the perversion whereby the sign -function gets a holistic interpretation--- which destroys any possibility of realizing the relations between world and sign, and sign and sign-function (11). Syntacticism simply posits complementary relations between signs ,sign- users and the world- fragments signified, instead of specifying how these relations are mutually constraining or interdependent. Likewise, "pragmaticism" "considers [signs] simply to reflect [subjectivity]..."(10). Whereas pragmaticism, semanticism and syntacticism produce merely "juxtaposed" subdisciplines --modes of inquiry that have "only *paratactic* but not functional relationships" to one another-- pragmatics, semantics and syntactics produce, by contrast, "interpenetrating or intermediating "modes or inquiry (11). Parret's study as whole, in fact, attempts to avoid, on the one hand, the one extreme of complementarism-- whereby it becomes impossible (and indeed misguided) to try to establish the degree of instrumentality of pragmatics vis- a- vis syntax and semantics. On the other hand, Parret also studiously avoids the reductionist extreme-- the non- dialectical approach of subsuming any one "subdiscipline" under any of the others.

Eco (1987), as a matter of fact, points out that Morris' initial formulation of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics as "sciences" smacks of complementarism from the start:

Since every science has a proper object, [Morris'] definition[of e.g. pragmatics as a "science"] risks [transforming] semiotics into a mere confederation of three independent sciences, each of them dealing with three independent objects. In this sense, semiotics becomes a generic label such as 'natural sciences.' . . . (696)

In contrast, Eco himself wants to argue that

Pragmatics cannot be a discipline with its proper object as distinguished from the ones of semantics and syntactics. . . The object of pragmatics is that same process of semiosis [which] also syntactics and semantics focus under different profiles. But a social and perhaps biological process such as semiosis can never be reduced to one, and only one, among its possible profiles. (697)

Eco's remarks suggest, however, the extreme difficulty of maintaining, in one and the same argument, two basically antithetical commitments: on the one hand, an anti-reductionist commitment to pragmatics as only one "profiles" of signification and/or communication (704), consistent with or complementary to its syntactic and semantic profiles; on the other hand, an anti-complementarist commitment to pragmatics as (more or less) instrumental vis-à-vis the syntactic and semantic features of signification and/or communication. This second, anti-complementarist commitment entails that the syntactic or semantic profile of a given utterance *can* (at least at a certain level or stage of analysis) be reduced to the contextual or pragmatic constraints that (at least in part) determine what counts-- what can be isolated-- as a syntactic or semantic feature of that utterance. To say that any adequate or theoretically productive account of the scope and nature of pragmatic inquiry must dialectically balance the anti-reductionist with the anti-complementarist commitments, furthermore, is not to provide any real or at least non-trivial strategy for achieving this crucial balance.

2.3. Metapragmatics

Indeed, I offer these excerpts from the closely- and often hotly- argued debate over the proper scope and nature of pragmatics not because I want to endorse, from

the outset, either the reductionist or complementarist positions. Rather, I wish to suggest that Prague school functionalism points beyond the ostensibly irresolvable debate I have excepted by displacing the terms of the dispute unto a level, or rather into a context, where the terms in fact become commensurable. Within this (larger) context, we are newly equipped to reconceptualize two correlative distinctions in terms of which the debate over pragmatics has (at least in effect) been waged: (a) the reductionism- complementarism distinction and (b) the functionalism- formalism distinction. More specifically, through the concepts set into play by Prague School functionalism, we can map(a) into the context of the *de jure- de facto* distinction; and we can map (b) into the context of the provisional- intemporal distinction. To this extent, and by a necessity occasioned (as I discuss below) by the peculiarly reflexive relation of pragmatic rules vis- a -vis contexts as such, I wish to dwell for the moment at a level that might be termed to meta -pragmatic.

I do not mean here, however, to multiply (meta-) levels and generate neologisms gratuitously. Instead, I wish to contextualize, using in particular the Prague School concept of functional context, what it means to say in the first place that context determines meaning, that sentences are but incomplete idealizations of context- bound utterances. The recognition of the importance of context, I want to argue has its own context. In fact, I shall register in this connection the basic impetus for my argument: namely, the pragmatics as such marks of a generalized institution, at work in all language- use, that the indefinite multiplication (or rather multipliability) of contexts is a condition of possibility for using language to begin with (I here build on the important formulation found in Derrida, 1982[1971] and 1988. On this view, meaning is pragmatically determined because the resolution of meaning to contexts- - more specifically, the resolution of sentence- meanings into utterances uttered in contexts-- is a forever incomplete operation, since a context is by definition always only more or less, never absolutely, specifiable.

Put otherwise, we can always only give, on pain of never completing our list of contextual factors, merely a local specification of context. We can always say only in part what the spatiotemporal, let alone the socio- cultural, context of an utterance is. And it is precisely in the Prague School's notion of functional contexts, in which the various functions of an utterance are always only more or less operative-- and more or less operative always only within particular social collectivities-- that we discover a commitment to the indefinite multipliability of contexts. This multipliability of contexts, as Jakobson and Mukarovsky in particular demonstrate, can be delimited only temporarily and provisionally,⁶ and again always within a further socio-institutional context, by assigning relative dominance to one function of an utterance vis- a- vis its other functions. Thus we might say that the Prague School, admittedly *avant la lettre*, built into its pragmatics, from the start, a meta- pragmatics; or at

least an awareness that, in principle if not at a given moment of analysis, any given portion of the context of an utterance always bears on another portion of that context, any context C_n on context C_{n+1} .

3. Archeology of Speech Acts

In contextualizing the notion of pragmatic context, I shall structure my account, at least to some extent, by means of Mary Louise Pratt's *Towards a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse* (1977). Pratt's book is important in this connection because, in the first place, it brings into focus a particular variant of pragmatic inquiry (speech- act theory) that still provides the terms in which recent debates over discursive practice, in the broadest sense, have recently been waged debates such as, for instance, Lyotard's (1988[1983]) and Habermas's (1981)⁷. In the second place, in setting out the possibilities and limits of its own approach to pragmatics, Pratt's text offers an at once suggestive and misleading description of the purported failure of the Prague School to develop a genuinely pragmatic analysis of literary discourse: suggestive, because Pratt's account, by virtue of what it omits, helps us see how Prague School structuralism anticipated the sorts of criticism leveled against speech- act theory (at least in its initial formulation) by Derrida and Lyotard, among others; misleading, because Pratt's account of Prague School structuralism has been influential in scholarly discussion at large, assisting in the trend to assimilate the Prague School either to Russian Formalism or alternatively to French structuralism.⁸ Hence my purposes here are at one archeological, for I wish to recover the partially lost legacy of the Prague School vis- a- vis current debates over pragmatics, and more narrowly forensic or argumentative, for I wish to suggest that Prague School functionalism can help us rethink the stakes of speech- act theories in particular and pragmatic inquiry in general.

First, then, let me briefly recount Pratt's argument. Pratt states her basic case thus : "[Taking as my departure-point] the claim that literary discourse must be viewed as a *use* rather than a *kind* of language, I have advanced the hypothesis that a descriptive apparatus which can adequately account for the use of language outside literature will be able to give a satisfactory account of literary discourse as well" (xii). Pratt thus argues that "a socially based use oriented linguistics is a prerequisite toward sealing the breach between formal and sociological approaches to literature" (xix). Indeed, Pratt attributes this breach between the formal and sociological approaches to what she calls "the Poetic Language Fallacy" (6ff), a fallacy that Pratt in turn assigns indiscriminately, to both the Russian Formalists and Prague School structuralism. Through the Poetic Language Fallacy, Pratt argues, "the concepts of 'poetic' and 'nonpoetic' (or 'ordinary' or 'everyday,' or 'practical') language were

incorporated by the Russian formalists and the Prague School into the framework of structural linguistics as formal linguistic categories "(xii). Furthermore, Pratt notes how such quasi-linguistic categories, applied in particular to poetics, represent not empirically falsifiable divisions of the material under study, but rather a more or less ingenious way of articulating a foregone conclusion. As Pratt, puts it, "the weakness of the 'poetic language' argument immediately surfaces as soon as 'ordinary language' is treated not as a vacuous dummy category but as a real body of data" (25).

Admittedly, this Poetic Language Fallacy, which Pratt further specifies as the postulation of "a separate grammar of poetry which is related analogically to the grammar of language" (11) at large, and the concomitant view that "intrinsic textual properties constitute literariness" (26), does in fact operate, at least at some levels,⁹ in Eichenbaum's "Theory of the 'Formal Method'" (1971[1926]). Witness for instance Eichenbaum's claim that "[t]he basis of our position was and is that the object of literary science, as such, must be the study of those specifics which distinguish it from any other material" (831), as well as his mention of "the contrast between poetic and practical language that served as the basic principle of the Formalists' work on key problems of poetics". (832) But-- and this is the point I want to stress here" -- even if we grant Pratt's assertion that "the Formalists were only interested in the structural properties of literary utterances" (6);¹⁰ and even if we grant that the Formalists in this respect took their cue from Saussurian structural linguistics, which on Pratt's view "does not claim to describe real utterances of any kind but rather the abstract set of rules which underlies real utterances" (7); we need not grant Pratt's elision of the Prague School with the Formalists, nor, therefore, her contention that "Prague School structural linguistics, though it made a point of calling itself 'functional, 'was, like Saussure, almost uniquely concerned with the function of elements within the linguistic system rather than with the functions the language serves within the speech community" (7).

To say that, for instance, Mukarovsky's functionalism is situated (primarily) upon "the linguistic system" rather than "the speech community" is not just to gloss over important historical differences between the formalist and structuralist movements (Cf note 8.). By misreading Mukarovsky in this fashion-- that is by not reading how Mukarovsky's notion of social collectivities contextualizes Pratt's own rather empty or at least unnuanced idea of speech communities-- Pratt thereby deflects criticism away from the *decontextualizing* effects of her own (pragmatic) metalanguage. Yet Pratt's is a metalanguage whose very claim to descriptive richness vis-a-vis the object-language, literary discourse, rests in the first place on a painstaking attentiveness to contexts. To anticipate: my point is that although Pratt claims to be developing, in contrast to Mukarovsky and the other members of the Prague

School, a pragmatic metalanguage adequate to the relation between literary discourse and discourse at large, her analysis is vitiated by an infinite regress of meta-pragmatic contexts that Mukarovsky's functional analysis, unlike Pratt's approach, builds into the metalanguage from the start and thereby dispels.

In what follows, therefore, I wish to address not primarily the historical but rather the conceptual or theoretical stakes of identifying the Formalist notion of literariness with in Prague School's commitment to the idea of functionality. Thus, I shall not make it my main business here to knock down what we might very plausibly argue to be the merely straw-man Russian Formalism (and for that matter Prague Structuralism) that Pratt incorporates into her argument- perhaps chiefly for heuristic or rhetorical purposes. Rather, I want, first, to dispute, through a detailed examination of (certain of) Mukarovsky's and Jakobson's remarks in this connection, Pratt's characterization of functional contexts as merely the notion of literariness in disguise. Second, I wish to show how Pratt's own pragmatics (and other even more broadly speech- act- based approaches to literary and other discursive practices), with a marked emphasis on use and context, can in turn be construed, meta-pragmatically, as a specific case of that indefinite multipliability of contexts with which Prague structuralism invests language- use in general. As I shall attempt to demonstrate, Prague structuralism generates indefinitely multiple contexts for any and all utterances-- including the utterances constituting pragmatic inquiry itself-- through what may be termed two meta- pragmatic rules: (i) the dialectical interplay of linguistic functions one within another, and thus the dialectical interplay of the sets of pragmatic rules constituting each function; and (ii) the relativization, via the social collectivities in which particular functions arise, not of linguistic functions themselves, but rather of the pragmatic rules by which a given utterance can in the first place be assigned a given function or, in other words, use. 11 These meta-pragmatic rules, I submit, furnish a kind of second- order metalanguage against which certain kinds of pragmatic analysis can be read as an object- language-- an object- language that, as formulated, remains unable to resolve certain paradoxes of reflexivity it nonetheless occasions by its very commitment to contexts.

3.1. Functional Contexts

In order to show how the Prague School stimulates such meta- pragmatic considerations, however, let me first discuss how the Prague structuralist notion of functional context in fact prevents, minimally, any overhasty conflation of (a) the Prague School's functionalist analysis of art and literature with (b) what Pratt attributes (indiscriminately) to (all) the Russian Formalists as the Poetic Language Fallacy: the quixotic search for "literariness" or that intrinsic quality or property of

poetic language that differentiates it from so-called ordinary language. Granted-- and to this extent, Pratt's critique of the Prague School is in fact borne out by the texts at issue-- Mukarovsky does in some instances seem to vacillate between, on the one hand, positing merely a difference in degree between poetic and other utterances, and, on the other hand, making poetic utterances a class or sort of language- use different in kind from other sorts or utterance. Thus, in the first section of Mukarovsky's essay "On poetic Language," "Poetic Language as a Functional language and as a Material," Mukarovsky at one point asserts

that no single property characterizes poetic language permanently and generally . Poetic language is permanently characterized only by its function; however, function is only a *mode of utilizing* the properties of a given phenomenon. Poetic language belongs among the numerous other functional languages. . . . (1977 [1940] : 3-4)

Immediately after this passage, however, Mukarovsky makes the following claim :

The aesthetic "orientation toward the expression itself," which is, of course, valid not only for linguistic expression and not only for verbal art but for all arts and for any realm of the aesthetic, is a phenomenon *essentially* different from a logical orientation toward expression whose task is to make expression more precise, as has been especially emphasized by the so-called Logical Positivist movement ("Viennese Circle") and in particular by Rudolf Carnap. (4)

Arguably, any approach to language- use that calls itself functionalist cannot legitimately label as "essential" the difference between one "mode of utilizing" language and another mode. Nor is it permissible for a functionalist approach to brand "the Logical Positivist notion of language [as] *completely* different from the notion of language as a means of communication in everyday life" (1977 [1940] : 5, my emphasis). Here Mukarovsky's self-contradictory propositions-- the proposition that we must ground meaning in modes of language- use, versus the proposition that philosophical and communicative uses of language are absolutely distinct, not resolvable into even the same universe of discourse-- bear out Pratt's criticism that "[Mukarovsky] end [s] up maintaining a difference in kind and denying it at the same time" (26). For once we grant a difference in kind between the use to which language is put in logico- syntactical analysis and the use to which it is put in communicative situations at large, it is but a short step to the dreaded Poetic Language Fallacy.

Yet I should like to insist, in turn that there is a difference in kind between, on the one hand, locating inconsistencies in Mukarovsky's functionalist argument,

and, on the other hand, resolving the functionalist position itself back into the view to which Prague school (poly) functionalism is manifestly opposed: the view, namely, that utterances are bestowed with intrinsic properties, of a given sort, even apart from the contexts-- and in particular the speech communities or, in Mukarovsky's parlance, "Collectivites"-- in which the utterances are designed and interpreted. To be sure, both Holenstein(1979: 10-11) and Steiner (1982: 198-99) have identified the monofunctionalism evident, for example, in the Russian Formalist Leo Jakubinsky's 1916 essay "On the Sounds of Poetic Language"-- a restricted or very limited functionalism that, as Holenstein notes, merely redescribes in slightly different terms "den Unterschied zwischen gewöhnlicher and poetischer Sprache in finaler Perspektive" (11). For Jakubinsky, "practical " versus "poetic" language may be distinguished on the basis of whether the means of expression in each case are wholly subordinated to the communicative function, or whether conversely the means of expression are accorded independent value, negatively defined against the communicative function (See, however, note 10.). We seem in fact to witness here, in the clear-cut opposition between communicative and non- or extra- communicative (poetic) function, that covert redescription of literariness with which Pratt identifies functionalism generally.

Even in the Prague School's 1929 "Theses" 12 we find evidence to support Pratt's criticism that what should be a commitment to functional gradualism-- a mere difference in degree between different uses of language-- all too often manifests itself as a commitment to generic differences of kind-- either- or distinctions- amongst sorts of utterance. Thus, in the thesis "On the Functions of Language, the members of the Prague school assert that "[i]n its social role one must distinguish speech according to its relation to extralinguistic reality. It has either a *communicative function*, that is, it is directed toward the object of expression, or a *poetic function* that is, it is directed towards the expression itself" (in Steiner 1982: 12). Accordingly, continues the thesis, "[i]t is advisable to study those forms of speech in which one function *totally predominates* and those in which manifold functions interpenetrate" (12, my emphasis). In the first clause of this latter sentence, the Prague School seems to be hedging its bets against precisely that manifold interpenetration of functions which the second clause of the sentence makes room for--- an interpenetration that in turn points beyond what, I am quite ready to grant Pratt, can only be a spurious distinction between poetic and ordinary language.¹³

But other, more developed accounts of functional contexts by the Prague School do not prove so susceptible to Pratt's attack on literariness or rather the poetic language Fallacy. I have in mind both Mukarovsky's extended analysis, in a number of different texts, of the role of the aesthetic function vis- a- vis the other functions, and also the well-known six- function schema set out, long after the official demise of the Prague School, in Jakobson's "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics"

(1960). It is not just that these polyfunctionalist accounts make it impossible to distinguish between literary and non-literary discourse in any absolute or generic sense. By the same token, through what I have identified as two meta-pragmatic rules-- (i) the dialectical interplay of functions and (ii) the relativization of the pragmatic rules by which functions are assigned to particular utterances within particular social collectivities-- through these two rules, Jakobson and Mukarovsky also, in effect, multiply indefinitely the contexts within which a given utterance is in principle operative at a given time t_a , as well as the contexts within which an utterance will potentially be operative, or has possibly been operative, at time t_{n+1} or t_{n-1} . By focusing on the more developed Prague School functionalism that Pratt fails to give its due, I shall now move toward a further specification of just these meta-pragmatic rules: rules that not only give Prague School functionalism a descriptive power beyond that of the speech-act model as such, but also suggest how, specifically because of its bearing on the pragmatic dimensions of language-use, Prague School structuralism can neither be too quickly aligned with other structuralisms, nor too readily set over against a *post*structuralism whose concerns the Prague School had in many respects already articulated.

3.2 Metapragmatic Rules: Jakobson

In (1960), Jakobson states at the outset that

Language must be investigated in all the variety of its functions. Before discussing the poetic function we must define its place among the other functions of language. An outline of these functions demands a concise survey of the constitutive factors in any speech event, in any act of verbal communications (353).

Jakobson, at roughly the same time as J. L. Austin's post-Wittgensteinian researches, here builds on the rudimentary theory of speech acts already in place in Karl Bühler's *Sprachtheorie* (1934)-- on the attempt, which Holenstein associates with the Prague School in general as well as Bühler, "to coordinate the functions of the constitutive components of speech-events and to anchor those functions in such speech-occurrences." ¹³ But Jakobson is also careful to stress the poly or multi-functionality of any given utterance: its constitutive dependence on a field of interpenetrating functions; its status as a speech-act whose effects, far from being delimitable by the rule-system proper to, say, the referential function alone, distribute themselves, in fundamentally indefinite quantities or magnitudes, among the other linguistic functions in which the speech-act is (simultaneously) either in fact or in principle engaged. As Jakobson puts it,

Although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, we could, however, hardly find verbal messages that would fulfil only one function. The diversity lies not in a monopoly of some one of these several functions but in a different hierarchical order of functions. The verbal structure of a message depends primarily on the predominant function. But even though a set (*Einstellung*) toward the referent, an orientation toward the context - briefly the so-called *referential*, "denotative," "cognitive" function - is the leading task of numerous messages, the accessory participation of the other functions in such messages must be taken into account (353).

Insofar as Jakobson emphasizes "the [potential] accessory participation of the other functions" in each particular manifestation of linguistic function, his model avoids driving a wedge of generic or absolute difference between literary and non-literary discourse and thereby falling victim to the Poetic Language Fallacy.

Indeed, Pratt's critique of Jakobson in this connection reveals the antinomy -- the delimitation of contexts by context-based analysis -- on which speech-act models for pragmatic inquiry must inevitably founder. Pratt, in commenting on the polyfunctionalist view Jakobson here articulates, in effect reverses direction and faults Jakobson, it seems, for making *too* gradual the distinction between the various uses to which language can be put. Pratt suggests that the descriptive power of Jakobson's model suffers in part because, for Jakobson, "there seems to be no one set of linguistic properties in terms of which the six functions are distinguished and related," and in part because "there are some important types of verbal structure for which the model does not attempt to account" (31). But in the one case, Pratt, assuming a set of linguistic properties prior to or more fundamental than the functions or uses to which language is put, seems to contradict her own professed desire to redefine so-called kinds of language by appeal to the context or use of utterances typically associated with that "one set of linguistic properties" Pratt here seems to retract her own concerted opinion that "with any utterance, the way people produce and understand [it] depends" not on linguistic properties against which the various possible functions of the utterance may be defined, but rather "on unspoken, culturally-shared knowledge of the rules, conventions, and expectations that are in play when [the utterance] is used in [a particular] context" (86). In the other case, Pratt, criticizing Jakobson's model to the extent that it does not account for certain kinds of verbal structure, seems to conflate with the *de jure* generative power of a theoretical model the particular applications that have, in fact, been generated from that model. In this respect, too, we witness, on the part of one who wishes to dissolve meaning into use, a certain baffling tendency toward reifying the achieved results of a theory, instead of addressing the possible applications or uses of it.

But the singlemost revealing criticism Pratt ventures in this connection is that, vis- a-vis the poetic function, Jakobson "does not provide any criteria for determining when [the] presence [of the poetic function] has reached the point of dominance" (33). Such criteria, however, presuppose not a mobile interpenetration of the functional contexts in which any given utterance participates-- not a continuously shifting configuration of functions comprising, at all times, accessory functions-- but rather a static structure of functional relations to which one and the same set of criteria can be applied, over and over again, in order to determine the dominance of this or that particular function. The demand for such criteria, as I see it, constitutes a demand for (fixed) language -kinds versus (unfixed) language- uses. Thus, meta- pragmatically speaking, Pratt's particular mode of pragmatic inquiry--even in setting out its object and specifying its limits-- countermands its own avowed intention to meet "the need for a contextually based approach to texts. " Pratt instead embarks on the dubious mission of developing context-free criteria with which to describe, classify and to some extent predict context- bound instances of utterances. Pratt's analysis does not answer the imperative, of peculiar force in pragmatics, to maintain a homology of context -boundedness between the metalanguage and the object language; whereas Jakobson's metalanguage-- in that very inability to "deduce" "a text's function" from "a text's intrinsic properties" which Pratt criticizes (31)-- by contrast meets the double imperative of specifying both pragmatic and meta-pragmatic contexts.

3.3 Metapragmatic Rules. : Mukarovsky

At this point, however, in order further to clarify the meta-pragmatic yield of Jakobson's stress on the accessory participation of functions one within another, it may prove helpful to move backward chronologically and examine Mukarovsky's analyses of the aesthetic function and function in general. This is because Mukarovsky analyses quite transparently couple the first meta-pragmatic principle-- namely, the intersection or rather interplay of various functions-- with the second such principle-- namely, the binding of functional configuration to particular, historically- specific social collectivities. Indeed, as Mukarovsky's functionalism suggests, the two meta-pragmatic rules at issue might alternatively be characterized as, in the first place, a rule for the indefinite multiplication of the *modal* contexts of a given utterance distributed *among* an indefinite number of rules for use at any given time; and, in the second place, a rule for the indefinite multiplication of *temporal* contexts for a given utterance distributed *across* an undefined number of functional configurations-- these configurations being indexed, in turn ,to an undefined number of past, present and (possible) future social collectivities. Together, in fact, the two meta- pragmatic rules I am eliciting from Prague School functionalism capture both that difference

and that deferral which, in another context, Derrida assigns to the structure of signification in general : "[d]ifference as temporization, *difference* as spacing" (1976[1968]:9).

But I am perhaps getting ahead of myself. For the moment I shall restrict myself to assembling a number of Mukarovsky's polyfunctionalist statements. First, we have those statements or propositions which issue the imperative of interpenetrating functions. In his essay on "The Place of the Aesthetic Function among the Other Functions," for instance, Mukarovsky, proposing to "revise" the (monofunctionalist [37]) emphasis hitherto at work in "functional architecture and functional linguistics" (34-5), confirms that

We are not concerned with the aesthetic as a static property of things, but with the aesthetic as an energetic component of human activity. For this reason we are not interested in the relation of the aesthetic to other metaphysical principles, such as the true and the good, but in its relation to other motives and goals of human activity and creation. (1978[1942]: 32-33)

In consequence, as Mukarovsky observes in the same essay, "there is not an insurmountable difference between practically and aesthetically oriented activities" (34); in consequence, too,

not even the most ordinary colloquial speech is, in principle, devoid of the aesthetic function. And so it is with all other human activities.... In brief, we shall find no sphere in which the aesthetic function is essentially absent; potentially it is always present; it can arise at any time . It has no limitation, therefore, and we cannot say that some domains of human activity are in principle devoid of it, while it belongs to other in principle. (35)

Indeed, claims Mukarovsky, "there are cultural forms [like "folklore culture"]... in which functions-- among them, of course, the aesthetic-- are almost indistinguishable from one another, in which they appear with every act as a compact bundle... (36). And if "[a]ny function, not just the one which the acting subject ascribes to his [or her] act or creation, can always be evoked " (36-7), then Mukarovsky is quite justified in drawing a broader "conclusion pertaining to functions in general" : the conclusion, namely, that "can be formulated as the basic polyfunctionality of human activity and the basic omnipresence of functions" (37).

Propositions of this class-- propositions about the polyfunctionality not just of linguistic utterances but of all human activity, and about the impossibility, therefore, of indexing a single function to a given activity or utterance-- may be found throughout

Mukarovsky's corpus. Thus, in the essay "On the Problem of Functions in Architecture," Mukarovsky asserts that [e] very act in which an object is used can simultaneously pursue more than one purpose " (1978[1937-8]: 237), and that " there are potentially present in every act and its result functions other than those which the act obviously fulfils" (239). More poetically, if I can risk that term here, Mukarovsky in describing the aesthetic function in particular as "always potentially present, waiting for the least opportunity for revival" (244), goes on to suggest that the aesthetic function clings closely to and follows the other functions just as space fills up with air everywhere that an object has withdrawn, or just as darkness penetrates a fold of space from which light has retreated " (244). Similarly, in his analysis of "Poetic Reference," Mukarovsky reiterates that "the boundary separating the aesthetic function from practical functions is not always apparent, and, in particular, it does not coincide with the dividing line between art and other human activities. Even in a fully autonomous artistic expression, practical functions are not entirely suppressed" (1976[1936]:158).

Finally, in his book -length study of *Aesthetic Function Norm and Value as Social Facts* (1970[1936]), Mukarovsky opens with an analysis of the aesthetic function that provides us with a transition from ,on the one hand, the set of propositions in which Mukarovsky points out the indefinability, in the modal sense, of the aesthetic function vis- a -vis the other possible or actual functions of acts or utterances; to, on the other hand, the set of propositions in which Mukarovsky distributes functions indefinitely across different temporal contexts. Restating that there is no definite border line between the aesthetic and the extra aesthetic (1); and that [t]he aesthetic sphere develops as a whole and is ,in addition, constantly related to those aspects of reality which ,at a given point in time, do not exhibit the aesthetic function at all" (19); Mukarovsky clarifies thus: "There are no object or actions which, by virtue of their essence or organization would, regardless of time, place or the person evaluating them, possess an aesthetic function and others which, again by their very nature, would be necessarily immune to the aesthetic function" (1-2).

We have, accordingly, those propositions of Mukarovsky's which enjoin us to relativize the fit between functions and things (artifacts, utterances, etc.). This relativization proceeds vis -a- vis the temporal or, more broadly speaking-- to use a term with modal as well as temporal dimensions-- the socio- cultural contexts in which the fit between functions and things is to be determined. As Mukarovsky puts it in (1970[1936]),

the aesthetic function manifests itself only under certain conditions, i.e. in a certain social context. A phenomenon which, in one time, period, country, etc ,was the privileged bearer of the aesthetic function may

be incapable of bearing this function in a different time, country, etc....
As soon as we change our perspective in time, space, or even from one social grouping to another (e.g from one [social] stratum to another, one generation to another, etc) we find a change in the distribution of the aesthetic function and of its boundaries. (3,5)

Hence, if "the aesthetic function is in itself, neither a real property of an object nor explicitly connected to some of its properties"; and if the "aesthetic function of an object is likewise not totally under the control of an individual ..."; then we must conclude that "stabilizing the aesthetic function is a matter for the collective and is a component in the relationship between the human collective and the world, and that" any given distribution of the aesthetic function in the material world is tied to a particular social entity" (18). Further, in his analysis of "The Problem of Functions in Architecture", Mukarovsky explicitly links the dialectical interplay of functions with the specificity of the temporal contexts in which the configuration or structural bond of functions is located. As Mukarovsky puts it, because of the dominance of the structural bond among functions over individual functions it is sometimes possible to identify one and the same function in two different historical or social contexts only with great difficulty" (1978[1937-38]:238). Inescapably, we have a given "set of functions [both] lodged in the awareness of the collective and bound by internal interrelations into a structure" (237). Hence, if within a certain structure of functions "an object can change its conventional function in the course of time, "this temporal variability of functions in turn derives, on the one hand, [from] the collective that associates certain functions with a particular object and, on the other hand, [from] the individual who uses the object for his personal aims and largely determines this usage" (237). Indeed, the dialectical antinomy, as it were, between individual and collectivity, with the individual introducing "a constantly renewed structure of accidentality into the functional process and thus [setting] a given structure of functions into motion" (237), insures that the manner in which a social collectivity embodies a functional configuration can be determined on only a momentary basis. What you call art, for instance, we do not; yet in a moment, under the right kind of (peer) pressure, we may have to grant your point, and thereby extend (once again) the protean domain of the aesthetic function.

4. Prague-matics

I should like to turn now, finally, to a more considered analysis of what I hope I have not too disingenuously termed the meta-pragmatic rules 14 under which may be subsumed the two sets of propositions I have isolated from Mukarovsky's corpus. We can look at the matter as follows. On the one hand, from those propositions with mainly a synchronic or modal bearing on pragmatic (i.e., functional) contexts

we may derive meta- pragmatic rule (i): namely, that it is impossible to rule out in principle the accessory participation of one (or more) linguistic or indeed generally behavioral function in another such function. On the other hand, from those propositions with chiefly a diachronic or temporal bearing on pragmatic (i.e. functional) contexts we may derive meta -pragmatic rule (ii): namely, that the function assigned to a given fragment of linguistic or other behavior occurring at time t_n cannot in principle be determined by the application of any one set of functional criteria embedded in a social collectivity at time t_{n+1} (the future) or time t_{n-1} (the past)-- or, indeed, factoring in the additional constraint of rule (i), at time t_n (the present) itself.

In my formulation of both rules (i) and (ii), one may notice, I have emphasized the phrase "in principle." Without some such restriction of their scope-- a restriction as I hope I have made clear, Mukarovsky does in fact recommend-- the rules would cease to be meta- pragmatic and instead become pragmatic as such. They would become, more precisely, anti -pragmatic, because they would in effect rule out the very possibility of establishing any ruled or law- governed determination whatsoever of utterances by functions, texts by contexts. Utterances or speech- acts in particular, although perhaps still characterizable as designed and interpreted in accordance with rules for syntactic well -formedness and semantic pertinence or fit, could not be linked in more than an arbitrary, unspecifiable way to the contexts in which the speech- acts arose. The instrumentality of contextual or pragmatic vis- a- vis syntactic and semantic rules would be, undecidable, either incalculably great or infinitesimally nil, since we should have no verification procedure by which establish regularities between certain contexts and certain discursive effects. We should not be able (quickly and efficiently) to distinguish, for instance, between the utterance " I shall kill you" uttered as a joke, and the same utterance spoken in earnest. The limits of the concept of killing out of self -defense would therefore have to be extended to ludicrous proportions, in order to cover the violent reaction of those persons to whom such undecidably ambiguous threats and/or jokes were addressed.

But the point is that Prague School functionalism does restrict the scope of what I have designated as their (two) meta- pragmatic rules. In practice, accordingly, it remains possible, in functionalist terms, to establish pragmatic rules for linking utterances with their functions in a given context. Pragmatic rules result in fact from the(always provisional, always temporary) application of the operator "dominance" to a given structure of configuration of functional interrelations . More precisely, dominance marks the place where an illimitable or (truly) global set of functional contexts produce in fact, and because of inescapable pragmatic constraints, local structures of meaning. Dominance, conceived as this sort of operator, thus maps the form- function dichotomy onto the more provisional distinction between determinate or local structure and indeterminate or global functional contexts. The role of

dominance in this connection, indeed may best be illuminated by Nietzsche's emphasis on necessarily perspectival judgments, on falsification and reduction as the very means of comprehension. Nietzsche's perspectivism in effect rests on the claim that, under the pressure and exigency of circumstances, the provisionality of given local structure or local determination of meaning cannot be processed as provisional--except after the fact. In the same way, Prague School functionalism's meta- pragmatic rules presuppose the *de facto* necessity of dominant functions-- functions that necessarily, due to pragmatic constraints, terminate the *de jure* interminability of the modal and temporal contexts in which any judgment or evaluation or, most broadly, linguistic behavior takes shape (cf. Plotnitsky 1987).

De facto a succinctly- phrased telegram announcing a friend's deathly illness derives, from the context in which it is received, a rule- based predominance of, to use Jakobson's scheme, the referential over the poetic function. After my friend's recovery, or in light of the possibility of a practical joke, the pragmatic or functional rules by which context (in part) determines the meaning, or rather the dominant function, of the telegram-- these pragmatic rules may then possibly be subject to revision. But --and this is precisely the restriction of scope which Prague School meta- pragmatics imposes or allows-- the potential revisability of a pragmatic rule does not mitigate the imperative in its *de facto* application.

In contrast, speech -act models of pragmatics suggest that pragmatic rules are applicable at once *de jure* and *de facto*. More specifically, the speech- act models, precisely by forestalling the question whether pragmatic rules might possibly be revisable under certain (pragmatic) constraints or conditions, surreptitiously confer *de jure* status on manifestly *de facto* rules and applications of rules. Speech- act approaches, to put it still otherwise, insufficiently modalize and relativize the rules for illocutionary and perlocutionary force-- and in Pratt's case the Gricean principle and maxims of conversational implicature-- by means of which speech- act theory stipulates a set of generally- applicable pragmatic rules for the design and interpretation of utterances within literary discourse. Pratt, for instance, makes those pragmatic rules and maxims, together with certain well -delimited violations or rather simple negations of them (152ff), applicable in principle to all possible contexts in which literary discourse is produced and received. In other words, the (small) degree of context- boundedness Pratt assigns to her own metalanguage is at odds with the (large) degree of context -Boundedness she uses that metalanguage to assign to the object- language at issue; i.e., literary discourse. Paradoxically, Pratt's model implies that by permuting a limited number of relatively context- free pragmatic rules in order to describe a limited number of ruled forms of linguistic behavior, all possible kinds or degrees of context- boundedness can be specified, no matter what the

complexity of the context or the nature or era of the social collectivity comprising that context.

Yet-- and this is the threshold at which the descriptive power of Prague School functionalism effectively exceeds that of the speech- act model-- it is in principle possible for a (sufficiently complicated or polyfunctional) utterance to confound, at any given moment, a given typology of, say, perlocutionary force (Derrida 1988). The ancient Greek's apotropaic utterances, for instance, sought to avert evil precisely by invoking it. Likewise, from the temporal standpoint, is it *de jure* possible for one and the same utterance, whatever its topic, to have more or less illocutionary force before and after the discovery of, say, a new planet in a solar system thousands of light years away-- or simply before and after the addressor or addressee gives way suddenly to a mood of boredom or impatience or depression. These sorts of examples can be extended indefinitely and across all modes of utterance; in particular, the *de jure* illimitable role of context in the production and reception of specifically literary utterance can be, on Pratt's own terms, no less instrumental than it is in connection with discourse at large. But what the examples point up in general is that Pratt's speech- act metalanguage is insufficiently context- bound or, to put it another way, too idealized; it abstracts away from certain kinds of contexts, with the result that the metalanguage fails to exemplify that degree of context- boundedness on the strength of which the speech -act model claims to surpass, to explain more than, other, over-idealized metalanguages-- such as, for instance, the Formalists' and (sic) Prague structuralists' "literariness" metalanguage.

In any case, pragmatics is, given its peculiar relation to context- boundedness, under special obligation not to extend-- although speech- act theory does extend-- the scope of its rules so far that only certain kinds of contexts, and not all possible contexts, are in principle allowable as pragmatic constraints. Speech- act analysis overextends the scope of its pragmatic rules not only by restricting the kinds of contextual factors subject to analysis, but also by failing to build into its metalanguage supplementary or meta -pragmatic rules that capture the *de jure* revisability of any given working pragmatic maxim or norm. Prague School functionalism, however, restricts the scope of pragmatic rules (applicable *de facto*) by means of meta-pragmatic rules, which are in turn restricted by a merely *de jure* applicability. Functionalist pragmatic rules, as a result, provide pragmatic inquiry neither with too much nor with too little data subject to analysis. By the same token, Prague School functionalism avoids the Scylla of reductionism and the Charybdis of complementarism.,

In general, the speech- act metalanguage, instantiated in particular in Pratt's analysis, conflates *de facto* with *de jure* applications of pragmatic rules; it confuses

what, on the one hand, can provisionally be termed the most pertinent contextual features constraining a given utterance, with what, on the other hand, might possibly be termed the most pertinent contextual features constraining an utterance. This conflation in turn generates meta- pragmatic paradoxes, since speech- act theory does not build into its metalanguage supplementary rules by which the inalienable reflexivity of all pragmatic claims can be projected onto an overarching sphere of revisability, a meta- context that remains, by its very nature, open- ended. By contrast, Prague School functionalism does develop, at least implicitly, such supplementary rules for the indefinite multipliability of contexts-- and does so some thirty to forty years before Derrida's analysis of intentionality into iterability, or Lyotard's analysis of Habermasian universal pragmatics into an illimitable heterogeneity of context-specific "differends." Thus, although Pratt for one attempts to supersede Prague School functionalism through pragmatics, Prague School functionalism supersedes any overly narrow pragmatics with an implied meta- pragmatics-- or, more simply, a Prague- matics. 15.

Notes and References

1. In her "Introduction" to Gerard Deledalle's *Charles S., Peirce*, Susan Petrilli makes the same sort of distinction but uses slightly different nomenclature. What Parret calls structural semiotics Petrilli links with Saussurean "Semiotics of the code and message"; what Parret labels analytic semiotics Petrilli associates with Peirce's "semiotics of interpretation" (1990: xi-xii). But Petrilli's formulation of this distinction, unlike Parret's, underscores the interesting overlap between Peircean semiotics and Bakhtin's dialogic theories of discourse. As Petrilli puts it, whereas "[c]ode semiotics does not provide adequate instruments for the description of heteroglossia, plurivocality, ambiguity, and semantic wealth of signs" (xii), Peircean semiotics foregrounds precisely these (Bakhtinian) features of sign, making "of semiosis an open process dependent upon the potential creativity of the interpretant. In this case, semiosis is not guaranteed by appeal to a code given that the code... [does] not subsist outside the interpretive process" (xiii).
2. Parret's study strives as a whole to "homologate" the analytic and structuralist approaches to semiotics by interposing a sufficiently broad (or perhaps electric) notion of semiosis itself between the "form function- dichotomy" (1983:40). In Parret's view,

semiosis is a [*tertium quid between*] *significance* and *communicability* rather than either the domain of the formal or of the functional separately (with their respective residues). It all comes down to a categorical refusal to found semiotics by psychology, in which formal meaning is

the central category, or by sociology, where communication is the primary *explanandum*. Resistance to foundationalism or to the reduction of semiotics as a logic saves us from an unbridgeable dichotomization between formal meaning and communicative meaning, which are two possible but partial domains of semiosis. (40; cf 89-128)

In my own analysis, however, I wish to focus not on the form- function dichotomy as such, but on a separate, more localized issue, which, however, at a certain point links back up with the form-function issue in its larger sense. In particular, I wish to isolate here certain formulations of pragmatic rules-- rules by means of which various utterances have been conceptualized as so many uses or functions rather than kinds or forms of language. In some formulations, I submit, these rules fail to build into a given pragmatic metalanguage the same context- sensitivity imputed by the metalanguage to the object- language. Hence, whereas Parret mediates between formalist and functionalist accounts of language (or meaning), my own analysis isolates, instead, the paradox of pragmatic (e.g., speech- act) metalanguages that propose a functionalist explanation of utterances, but do so by means of highly formalized, maximally context - free "rewrite" rules. Such rules on the one hand dissolve the form- function dichotomy into an overarching functionalism. Yet on the other hand the rules preserve the form- function dichotomy, by reinscribing within a second- order formalism the specific steps of operations by means of which utterances can be accounted for in functionalist terms. My argument is, as we shall see, that Prague School functionalism, with its careful assortment of *de jure* (effectively "meta pragmatic") versus *de facto* (pragmatic) rules, allows us to circumvent the form- function dichotomy altogether.

3. Peirce, of course, exhibits the same high hopes for a general semiotics in (1955[1897-1903]). See too Greenlee (1973:13-22) for an account of how "sign theory for Peirce takes the form of a general theory of meaning" (7).
4. The *locus classicus* of attempts to sort through the claims of linguistic and semiotics (or "semiology") is perhaps Derrida (1976[1967]:51-2).
5. In this respect, Austin's model prepares the way, too for the "functional grammar" Dik develops in (1978). Compare the schema Dik provides, in which the "functional paradigm" is set over against the "formal paradigm" (4-5). Whereas according to the formal paradigm, "syntax is autonomous with respect to semantics; syntax and semantics are autonomous with respect to pragmatics; [and] the priorities run from syntax via semantics to pragmatics;" according to the functional paradigm, "pragmatics is the all- encompassing framework within which semantics and syntax must be studied; semantics is subservient to pragmatics and syntax to semantics; [and] the priorities run from pragmatics via semantics to syntax." Rorty's (1970) account of ideal- language versus ordinary- language

articulates, in specifically philosophical terms, the same formal -functional dichotomy broached by Austin and elaborated in Dik.

6. In fact, with its emphasis on the expedience and provisionality of contexts-- its stress on the impossibility of making global or intemporal determinations of context-boundedness-- Prague School functionalism bears, in general, a striking resemblance to the (classical) pragmatism out of which Morris's Pragmatics stems (see Morris 1938: 29-30). Compare, for instance, James's analysis of "truth" as a mode or aspect of the ongoing process of inquiry : " [t]he truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event, a process: the process namely of verifying itself, its veri-*fication*. Its validity of the process of its valid-*ation*" (1948[1907]:161).
7. For an analysis that places the Lyotard- Habermas dispute in a slightly different context, see my "Modernism versus Postmodernism: Towards an analytic Distinction" (forthcoming in *Poetics Today* 12:1).
8. Even Peter Caws' highly sympathetic Structuralism (1988), to the extent that it attempts to recover the minimal features (as it were) of structuralism, abstract away from the national or intellectual contexts in which particular variants of structuralist inquiry have been embedded. Construing structuralism as "a method for the understanding and analysis of the objects of the human sciences"(258-9, my emphasis), in other words, Caws tends to obscure the important *differentiae specifica*e of the various structuralisms-- viz., Czech and French.. Steiner, for one, has stressed the historical implausibility of viewing the relation between Russian Formalism and Prague Structuralism as "a mere transfer of ideas" (1982: 175), and discussed in detail how an indigenous Czech tradition of aesthetic inquiry made the Prague School particularly receptive to only certain of the Formalists' concerns.
9. At other levels, however, Eichenbaum's text does not bear out Pratt's construal of the Poetic Language Fallacy, as for instance when Eichenbaum, in a formulation that sounds strikingly similar to Pratt's call for a "socially- based, use- oriented" approach to literary discourse, makes this claim.: "The facts of art demonstrate that art's uniqueness consists not in the parts which enter into it but in their original *use*" (834).
10. By no means should we concede this point to Pratt without hesitation, especially if we take Pratt to mean that interest in the "structural properties of literary utterances" excludes interests in the functional context of such utterances. As Steiner (1982) points out, already in his earliest (1921) text (on Xlebnikov), Jakobson stresses the polyfunctionality of all utterances-- whereby the "functional classification [of a given utterance] is not simply a matter of the presence or absence of a particular function, but of the hierarchy in the functions co- present"

(199). While still a formalist, therefore, Jakobson places the quality or property literariness within a polyfunctional matrix that tends, from the start, to make properties parasitic on functions, the "structure" of utterances on their use. Further more, whereas both Holenstein and Steiner construe Jakobinsky as a sort of exemplary monofunctionalist, even he demonstrates, in the passage Eichenbaum (1971[1926]:832) and then Holenstein and Steiner isolate, what might be interpreted as polyfunctionalist tendencies. Thus, in describing poetic versus practical language, Jakobinsky refused to make the distinction a difference in kind: for it is "linguistic systems... in which the practical purpose is in the background (although perhaps not entirely hidden) "that constitute poetic language (my emphasis; Steiner's translation: "linguistic systems... in which the practical aim retreats to the background... "[1982:198]; Holenstein's: *sprachliche systeme... in denen das praktische Ziel Zweitrangig wird (obschon es nicht ganz verschwindet)*" [1979:11)

11. As I shall discuss later, I wish to stress that (i) highlights the synchronic or modal dimensions of pragmatic rules, whereas (ii) highlights the diachronic or temporal dimensions of such rules. Of course, (ii) does not only bear on diachrony or the change of functions over time: after all, different social collectivities in different parts of the world at one and the same time may, and probably most often do, ascribe different functions to a given utterance. But I do ascribe different functions to a given utterance. But I do mean to suggest that, taken together, (i) and (ii) exhaust both the synchronic or modal and the diachronic or temporal-- i.e., the contextual-- constraints under which any particular working pragmatic rule is always, in principle, formulated.
12. Because they were formulated in 1929, the "Theses" thus predate the functional schema articulated by Karl Buhler in his *Sprachtheorie* (1934). It was, as Holenstein points out (1979P:14), Buhler's trichotomy of functions that Mukarovsky, around 1938, synthesized with a fourth, poetic (versus practical) function to produce the polyfunctional schema Jakobson later extended to six functions. In any event, we see how Pratt, by isolating the early "Theses" in this connection, selects what is, in the context of her own argument, one of the least interesting texts. Because the "Theses" do not represent the polyfunctional stance that Mukarovsky for instance eventually developed they do not provide the really crucial counterexamples to Pratt's argument that Prague School functionalism merely replicates, in different terms, that Formalist preoccupation with literariness.
13. See Holenstein (1979:13): "treffen sich die Prager und der Buhlerische Ansatz im Versuch, die Funktionen den konstitutiven Komponenten des Sprechereignisses zuzuordnen und in ihnen zu verankern". Holenstein also links Jakobson's functional schema with the contemporary interest in communication theory, which

made possible the redefinition of Saussure's, *parole- langue* distinction as that of *message* versus *code* (15).

14. These rules, of course, cannot be considered recursive, as are the specifically grammatical rules that Chomsky describes in (1964a). That is to say, what I have termed "meta- pragmatic rules" do not specify operations, of a merely finite number of steps, which, however, generate(for instance) the infinite set of grammatical sentences of a given language L, and also assign to each generated sentence what Chomsky calls that sentence's "structural description" within L(120). Nor are meta- pragmatic rules recursive in the sense Chomsky details in (1964b) meta- pragmatic rules do not" assign [to sentence of L not generated by the grammar of that language] structural descriptions that indicate the manner of their deviation from perfect well formedness" (9).

And yet neither should I like to call meta- pragmatic rules merely regulative, to use Searle's (and before him, Kant's) constitutive- regulative distinction (Searle 1969: 33-42) Rather, meta- pragmatic rules mark the limits of the very concept of recursivity as applied to pragmatic rules *per se* . At the same time, such rules provide the condition of possibility for constitute the local structure of meaning accounted for in part by pragmatic rules property so- called. What I mean is that for rules that specify the context- sensitivity of all language- use, decreasing the context -sensitivity of the rules themselves-- making them recursively finite or in other words applicable to a potentially infinite number of speech- acts --produces the paradox of recursively describing situation that are at least *de jure* irrepeatable. Yet if meta -pragmatic rules on the one hand stipulate the impossibility or recursively accounting for pragmatically -constrained situations or speech- acts; on the other hand ,and by the very gesture, meta -pragmatic rules issue the imperative of making *de facto* linkages between, say, contexts and sentences.

15. An earlier version of this essay, translated into Czech, is forthcoming in *Czech Literature*. My thanks to the editors of the journal for their permission to publish in English this expanded version of the essay. I should also like to acknowledge my gratitude for the helpful comments and criticisms of Bruno Bosteels, James English, Gerald Prince, and Peter Steiner, all of whom generously accorded their attention to the earlier draft of this paper.

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Roman Jakobson on Modern Czech Poetry, 1925

Translated by : I.R. TITUNIK and J. TOMAN

"There' is a kind of exercise book that consists of mathematical problems arranged in a numbered series. Some problems involve equations with one unknown, later come problems involving equations of the second degree. At the back of the book the answers are listed in a numbered column:

4835	5 rams
4836	17 faucets
4837	13 days
4838	1000 herrings

Woe to him who sets out to learn mathematics by going straight to the answers and trying to make sense of that neat column. What's important are the problems, the working out of their solutions, not the answers in and of themselves.

In this very situation of a person who, wishing to learn mathematics, studies columns of answers, are those theoreticians who, in works of art, concern themselves with ideas, with deductions, and ignore the construction of those works.

This is what goes on in their heads:

Romantics	=	religious exaltation
Dostoevsky	=	seeking after God
Rozanov	=	the question of sex
at 18	=	religious exaltation
at 19	=	seeking after God
at 20	=	the question of sex
at 21	=	resettlement to northern Siberia

Woe to the writer who attempts to promote the value of his work, not by refining its mode of operation, but via the magnitude of the "answer" to the problem he has set himself. As if problem 4833 were somehow greater and more important than problem 4837 because the number 13 stands in one answer whereas the other answer has '1000 herrings.' They are merely two problems, and both of them for high school juniors."¹

Thus for Viktor Shklovsky, my friend and comrade in a new field of scholarship. I happened to recall the above lines when I read the following endearing pronouncement in the magazine *Reflektor*² under the heading "proletarian column" : "We have basically nothing against a puzzle section and would gladly use contributions to it. Of course, one must make such puzzles beneficial for our worker readership by having the solutions present some truth useful to the proletariat".

How typical of the editor-in-chief of the magazine, the venerable Stanislav K. Neumann !³ It's just like him to contemplate imprinting a puzzle with the motto about the proletarians of all countries. Just like him to do that, he who goes to such impressive pains to stitch the editorials of *Rude Pravo*⁵ with Vrchlicky's rhymes⁵ and to break them down into rhythmicized (albeit carelessly done) lines of verse devoutly believing he is making revolutionary poetry. He puts together a proletarian cross-word puzzle, transforms Dolezal's article into a tender lyric poem, contentedly sips coffee with rum from a cup with a flower design and happily naps on a cushion embroidered by a careful hand-- not with the words "Fifteen minutes only" (that would be petty- bourgeois), but with the words "Honor work !" I do not mean to cast aspersions on his meritorious gray hairs. But we do not want to repeat, and will not repeat, the mistakes of old men brought up on the knowledge and aesthetic habits of the late nineteenth century.

To make it clear and concise :the linguistics of the second half of the last century, in its inquiry into the phenomena of language ,asked the question "How did they come about?" and largely ignored the question "What were they for?" Yet the most elementary language consciousness inevitably asks the question about problems, about goals. I am listening to someone speak and I ask "What are you telling me this for?" and the speaker can answer "If I speak, then I know what for." This "what for" of every act of speech-- that is, its task-- is clear both to the speaker and to the listener, as long as the one understands the other. Language, according to the apt definition of contemporary French linguists, is a system of conventional values just like a deck of cards and it is thus wrong to analyze of language without regard for the multitude of possible tasks outside of which no such system actually exists. A general conception of language is a fiction. Just as there are no laws of a card game in general-- equally applicable to black jack, poker and to building a house of cards-- so, by the same token, linguistic laws can be established only for a system determined by a specific task. Nineteenth century scholarship was not concerned with these problems; and the few sporadic attempts to take language function into consideration turned out to be unhelpful inasmuch as the multitude of functions was artificially restricted to a single one. But today we know communicative language with its orientation towards the object of the utterance and poetic language with its orientation towards the expression itself represent two different, in many

respects opposed, language systems (these two do not, of course, by any means exhaust the multitude of language functions). And because it is constructive things we want-- things corresponding to their purpose-- we are appalled by lampshades that imitate flowers and by false windows you cannot see through. It is for this reason that we haven't got the slightest inclination to express the truths useful for the proletariat in the form of riddles or rhymes. The communication of "useful truths" requires completely different modes of expression: clarity, brevity, precision, unambiguousness, and the like. When a worker is called to a rally, no one suggests that he walk from one suburb of Prague to another in fox trot steps. If a useful truth is to be passed on to the worker, elementary integrity prohibits the use of rhymes, poetic metaphors or any such imaginative gear.

This is not to deny the social role of poetry but merely to protest against making poetry into a contraband smuggled in under the pretext of truths useful for the proletariat. While we cannot require this sort of integrity of Mr. Neumann, who has been brought up on the aestheticism of Oscar Wilde, that celebrator of the lie and of decorative art, we must insist on it with young people.

The bold innovators in Czech poetry, the poets of Devěsíl,⁶ have set themselves the task of forging the poetic word, a forging uncontaminated by any extraneous factors. In the process they must overcome a sclerotic tradition: leaving it behind and marching their own way, if the tradition is flaccid and wrinkled, or firmly pushing away from it, if it has petrified into a canon.

Russian literature, while furnishing Czech literature with ideological impulses from time to time, has nevertheless remained deeply foreign to it in terms of form and has thus left almost no traces there. Czech literature received the Russian partly as an amazing exoticism and otherwise just went its own way. Recent Russian poetry, however, may conceivably depart from that tradition and provide some fruitful impulses to Czech art.

I am a foreigner and have no wish to meddle in Czech internal affairs, not even in poetic ones. I shall therefore limit myself to a few points which spontaneously come to mind when comparing modern Russian poetry with Czech.

Free verse has been declared virtually canonical in modern Czech poetry, but aside from some valuable, but isolated, instances, it has quickly degenerated into a convenient way of ignoring the tasks of rhythm. As a consequence, free verse in practice remains very largely like that of the nineteenth century after all, only somewhat rickety or spongy. What is lacking here is the rich cultivation of free verse so characteristic of modern Russian poetry. The new rhythmic tasks confronting Czech poets who have renounced syllabic poetry-- for example, a reevaluation of quantitative measures, new rhythmic highlighting of quantity-- are only today reaching

the poets' awareness and finding their place on the agenda of poetic tasks to be worked on.

As long as the old metrical forms continue to be utilized, it is doubtful that the tradition of the nineteenth century has anything left to offer. The rhythmic possibilities of that tradition are utterly exhausted and squeezed out. Their lawful successors are ditties and advertising jingles for the silks made by the Loeb Company. It is not possible to continue on the road of this tradition. The best one can get here is a good imitation like Durych's⁷ stylization of Erben. However, the rhythmic richness of the Czech Middle Ages, especially of the fourteenth century, could perhaps still be a fruitful impulse in many respects. I have in mind the problem of Czech verse syllabics, that is, of the removal of obligatory ictuses. Fischer's *Slaves*⁸ is a timorous, but at the same time an interesting, attempt in that direction.

Moon--- June, love- Prove, life- strife, flower- power, marx- sparks . . . Are these the rhymes that exhaust the possibilities for the poet today? Even the attempts at rhyming in the fourteenth century were often times much richer.

Allow me to point out a few characteristic types of modern Russian rhyme:

rhymes the ends of which do not coincide (nahota- nahodou, peru- perute, brazda- nazdar, sto- stoh, etc.⁹)

heterosyllabic rhyme (hodla- hodila, visla- visela¹⁰)

metathetic rhyme (kriosta- skryta, burs- brus srub¹¹)

consonance (stal- stul- styl- na postel¹²)

I do not know to what degree these particular kinds of decanonized rhymes will take root in Czech soil but attempt in that direction would, I feel, be beneficial, just as in modern Polish poetry where such attempts have been made partly under Russian influence. Once it is recognized that modern- day Czech poetry not infrequently suppresses the rhythmic importance of word accent, new possibilities will open up for rhymes with different accentual positions (*prolina -slina*), rhymes which until recently Czech critics strictly condemned.

It must be said that the sound organization within the verse is also less worked out; modern Czech poets seem less conscious of it than, for example, Mayakovsky, Khlebnikov or Pasternak. Such clusters as in Seifert's¹³ "dlouhe dalekohledy" [long binoculars] (the so- called *povtor*, that is, sound repetition, metatheses of the type abc- ab- cba, according to the terminology of the new Russian poetics is) form a sound- figure parallel, or poetic etymology, as I call it. A broad and varied play on linkages of that sort not only increased the sound density of the verse but also enriches the poetic semantics (by a play on word meanings).

For lack of space, I will not deal with important problems of Czech poetics, semantics, syntax, composition. More about such things on another occasion.

I shall conclude with a few remarks on vocabulary. When Czech language was under threat from a strong, aggressive neighbor, there was some reason for defensive means such as persistent purism and rigid linguistic conservatism. But that danger has, I believe, been overcome; the Czech language is now so strong that Germanisms are no longer a threat and, provided they help Czech to express fine semantic distinctions, might even be welcome. We know that a language becomes stylistically enriched by foreign elements. Such is the task carried out by Romance elements in English and by Old Bulgarian in Russian. The latter made possible a strictly defined "high style" in Russian. Colloquial Prague Czech, strongly permeated with Germanisms, forms the base for Czech "low style." Hasek masterfully exploits colourful features of colloquial Czech in his *Svejk*. From here it is just one step to street slang which sound so artful in Horejsi's translation of "The Prayer of a Prostitute." 14 But in Hasek's hands, the use of ordinary Czech is justified by the fact that *Svejk* is a good soldier, and in Horejsi by the fact that the heroine is a prostitute. New poetry is polychromatic, classical differentiation of styles is foreign to it. Elastic and dynamic features of common Czech and low-level slang are a treasure for a poet. It would be tempting, without any naturalistic motivation, to try for a simultaneous merging into a pure lyric of the most diverse features of common Czech, of street slang, rural and archaic speech, barbarisms and neologisms. Words become palpable when they scrap together in forced proximity. Russian Futurism resoundingly proclaimed the poets right to a limitless creation of words. Khlebnikov has a number of creations in prose and verse written virtually all in neologisms. A new coinage creates a splotch of color, whereas old words even phonetically lose their aroma, worn out by frequent usage, and their sound texture is only partially perceived. The shape of a word in practical language easily ceases to be recognized--it fades and petrifies--whereas we have no choice but to perceive the form of a poetic neologism, given as it is almost in *statu nascendi*. The meaning of neologisms is to a large degree determined by their context, it is more dynamic and forces the reader to think etymologically. An important potential of poetical neologisms is their non-representationality. The law of poetic etymology is in force, the inner and outer form of the word are experienced, but a relation to an object can be missing. Moreover productive experiments in decomposing words into their elements are possible. The word is diversified first of its inner then of its outer form. What remains is a phonetic word *Zaum* 15 (see the poetry of Khlebnikov Kruchenykh, Alyagrov, 16 Zdanevich).

Let us do away with inorganized work in poetry, with this kind of poetical huckstery. The science of poetic form must go hand in hand with poetry. Let us

do away with priestly mysteries, with Delphic oracles. The course of the poet must be conscious while at the same time, his poetic intuition can only profit if it takes hold on the iron- and- concrete foundation provided by scientific analysis. And, conversely, science is fructified by its contact with new art. It is an unnatural state of affairs, brought about in the nineteenth century, for science to pay attention to a literary movement only when it has turned into an archeological fossil. In Russia, the new literature and the young science of literature (that of the OPOJAZ- group¹⁷) more often than not advance side by side.

Transalators' Notes

* The article originally appeared in the Czech avant- garde review *Pasmo* [The Zone] in May 1925. The original title, "Konec basnickeho umprumactvi a zivnostnictvi," literally The End of Umprum- ism and Small- scale Enterprizing in Poetry," can be rendered in English only with difficulty. It alludes, among other things, to Umprum, the Prague academy of industrial design, which was selected as a representative of a conservative, non -functional approach to design.

1 This is quotation from Viktor Shklovsky's essay "One Thousand Herrings" in his *Knight's move* [Khod knonya], Berlin 1923.

2 *Reflektor*- a communist magazine established in 1925.

3 S. K. Neumann (1857-1947)- a Czech poet and essayist; in his younger days associated with a number of currents, including anarchism, became an ardent supporter of the Communist party in the 1920s.

4 *Rude pravo*- literally "Red Law/right," the daily of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (established 1921).

5 Jaroslav Vrchlicky (1853-1912)- a Czech poet, noted for his formal virtuosity; in many respects akin to French Parnassians.

6 *Devetsil* - the Key- group of Czech avant- garde writers, artists and architects in the early 1920s; among the members were famous Czech poets such as Jaroslav Seifert (see n. 13) and V. Nezval.

7. Jaroslav Durych (1886-1962) -a Czech poet and writer whose early poetry is influenced by the ballads of the late romantic poet Karel J. Erben (1811-1870).

8. Otokar Fischer (1883-1938) -a Czech writer and literary scholar, later also member of the Prague Linguistic Circle ; Jakobson refers to his play *The Slaves* [Otroci] from 1925.

9. Cf. such possible English rhymes as *paradise- paradox ,history -hysterectomy, heavy- ever, who- hoot.*

10. Cf *country- effrontery, hanging- hankering*.
11. Cf. *system- missed them, scrub- curbs- brusque*.
12. Cf *steel -stole- stale -style*.
13. Jaroslav Seifert (1901-1986)- a Czech poet, member of Devetsil (see n 6), 1984 Nobel Prize laureate. The issue of *Pasmo* in which Jakobson's article appeared also contained two poems by Seifert.
14. Jindrich Horejsi (1886-1941)- a Czech poet; Jakobson refers to Horejsi's translation of the argot- poem "La Charlotte prie Notre- Dame durant la is unit du Reveillon" by the French poet Jehan Rictus (1867-1933).
15. *Zaum'*- the so -called "trans- rational" language; a poetical experiment most often associated with the Russian poet Velimir Khlebnikov (18885-1922) and practised by the Russian futurist poets Jakobson subsequently enumerates.
16. Alyagrov- pseudonym with which Roman Jakobson signed his futurist poetry.
- 17 OPOJAZ- a group of young linguists and literary scholars (including Viktor Shklovsky) that formed in St. Petersburg around 1915; together with the Moscow Linguistic Circle the most important center of Russian formalism.

The Velvet Revolution in Literary Theory

MICHAEL HOLQUIST

Jurij Striedter, *Literary Structure, Evolution, and Value: Russian Formalism and Czech Structuralism Reconsidered*. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1989.

Due to the vagaries of cultural history (the marginalized status in the United States of translation in general, and of translations from Slavic languages in particular) as well as political history (the whole unhappy story of Communist stupidity and American incomprehension), the remarkable work of the Prague Linguistic Circle has had little resonance in anglophone literary scholarship. The Russian formalists have done slightly better, if only because they are easier to read, published their works in a world language, used familiar art works as their examples, and were taken up by such prominent figures in the West as Fredric Jameson. A small group of refugees (including such distinguished names as Rene Wellek and Ladislav Matějka, but especially the younger generation that includes Peter Steiner and Frantisek Galan) has worked hard in the face of apathy and incomprehension to translate, explicate, and exemplarize PLC theory, and all honor is due to them. After the rise of deconstructionist theory, 'structuralism' and 'semiotics' fell into the peculiar limbo of a widely assumed posteriority, from which they have yet to re-emerge. That they will indeed re-emerge is not only an event we may confidently count on (without, of course, knowing precisely when), but an event as well that will accord with the complex theory of literary dynamics first articulated in Moscow and Prague.

When that moment arrives, Jurij Striedter's book will be perceived to have played an enabling role. Striedter is not simply another author of metacritical commentary, but himself a player in the history of the events he covers. As a professor of Slavic Literatures first at the Free University of Berlin, and then at Konstanz, Striedter not only specialized in researching and translating the work of the Russian formalists and the Czech Structuralists, he participated in the attempt to incorporate that work into an ongoing dialogue with the more native German tradition of hermeneutics. Along with Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser, Striedter was active in the group called Poetic und Hermeneutik, whose publications are sometimes jointly referred to as the work of the school of Konstanz, or as the aesthetics of reception (Rezeptionsästhetik). By making the ideas of such theorists as Shklovsky, Tynyanov, Mukarovsky, and Vodička available to his German

Colleagues, Striedter performed an invaluable service, and accounted for a good deal of the 'Poetik' in the work of Poetik und Hermeneutik.

Striedter's book has, then, the unmistakable authority of an insider. He was personally acquainted with the key figures in both Moscow and Prague, and he has participated in the work of those scholars in Germany who have done more than any other group to incorporate Russian and Czech theory into their own ongoing work. The evident mastery of Striedter's account, which cannot be praised too highly, derives from this intimacy, and that is its strength. But such close involvement with the German appropriation of the Formalist/ Czech Structuralist tradition makes for certain limitations, as well. Formalism and Structuralism are treated with the kind of respect that comes from the assumption that they still have a vital role to play in current debates about literary theory. But the contemporary work Striedter has in mind is mostly German—at least half of the book is made up of essays translated from Striedter's prior German publications. It is not surprising, therefore, that he concentrates mostly on those issues and figures that have had most resonance in Germany (even though the other half of the book is a new, long essay, written in English, on current debates about aesthetic value that includes some British and American theorists such as Terry Eagleton and, most notably, Barbara Herrnstein Smith). What such an arrangement of material leaves out, as Striedter himself recognizes, is "the crucial French contribution to the development of Structuralism and /to the present scholarly debate." (p.9)

Such an omission means that the Structuralist phase of recent French theory is ignored—but then, who, after all, needs yet another potted account of early Levi-Strauss or Tzvetan Todorov? More Seriously, it also means that what Striedter calls "the crucial French contribution... to the present scholarly debate," (by which I take him to mean Deconstruction), is ignored as well. Thus the challenges posed by Derrida and Paul de Man to those who operate with the categories of traditional poetics, structure, function or aesthetic value—to say nothing of meaning, which is so important a category in Prague theory—are passed over. Striedter is surely right when he argues that for all the *arriviste* posturing of recent criticism that seeks to establish it as 'beyond formalism' or 'post-structuralist', what is usually meant is that French versions of these schools that have been left behind, while the more complex work of Tynyanov or Mukarovsky have simply been passed over. Thus, "the very rapidity of this development left the rediscovery of the two early schools—Russian Formalism and Czech Structuralism—partial and insufficient and so underestimated in their ground-breaking contributions to modern literary criticism." (P.1) But if we are to have a true rediscovery of the two schools, one that would instantiate their continuing theoretical power in the present, a confrontation will have

to be staged between their claims and those of the deconstructionists that is more direct and sustained than is provided in this book.

But for any fair minded reader, Striedter here provides in abundance the tools needed if we are to begin conceiving what such a confrontation might look like. The first two chapters of Slavic literary theory from 1916 to the 1960s as it was active in Russia and Czechoslovakia (Poland plays a somewhat offstage role here as well, through the influence exercised by Roman Ingarden). The first chapter is exclusively devoted to the Russian formalists. In English, Victor Erlich's classic study (*Russian Formalism: History and Doctrine*, 1955) is more comprehensive, and Peter Steiner's (*Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics*, 1984) more detailed and finely tuned as to shades of difference between individual critics and the various stages through which they as a school progressed, besides having the virtue of covering Formalist verification, which almost everyone else scants. And, of course, for any serious student of the subject, one must still go to Aage Hansen-Love's blockbuster *Der russische Formalismus: Methodologische Rekonstruktion seiner Entwicklung aus dem Prinzip der Verfremdung* (1978). Nevertheless, Striedter's chapter provides the best brief account (only seventy pages) available in any language of two out of the three major formalist achievements: a theory of prose narrative, and a theory of literary evolution (the third being their highly technical verse theory).

Centering his discussion around the various turns taken by Shklovsky's concept of defamiliarization (*ostranenie*), Striedter charts the several different attempts made by the formalists to isolate a topic that would be literature and literature alone, not something else. Striedter, who is also author of a definitive history of the picaresque novel in Russia, is at home in the Russian eighteenth as well as nineteenth centuries. He is thus able to establish the formalists' radical attempts to isolate the essence of the literary as an almost predictable twentieth century reaction against the tendency to mix literature up with everything else typifying earlier centuries. In their first phase, the formalists sought to strip the art work of its extra-aesthetic dimensions, especially the social ones. It is this scandalous avoidance of social and historical factors in the very earliest work of Shklovsky and Jakobson that made (and in some circles continues to make) the formalists a favorite target.

But as Striedter shows, from relatively early on in their collective career, the formalists were impelled to treat questions of literary history not only by their Marxist opponents, but by a logic immanent in their own theory. In 1916, in his very first exposition of the doctrine of defamiliarization, Shklovsky raised implicit questions about the dynamics of literary change; much of what the formalists did later can be grasped as an attempt to give explicit answers to those questions. Shklovsky's original idea was that the essence of the literary was to be found in

those devices writers employed to call attention to the stylistic innovations in their texts. In order to be perceived with the intensity required by art, a work had to shock the reader out of the habits formed through his experience of past art. "Literariness" (literaturnost') consisted, then, in devices such as "braking," or "step structure" which slowed down the reader's ability to assimilate a given text, forcing him to dwell on this text, as opposed to all others. The text was thus understood as the "sum" of such devices.

There are several problems in such a formulation: how does a work continue to generate a sense of defamiliarization, once its original devices for achieving such an effect have become traditional? How was one to account for canon formation and the existence of classics? Where was one to locate the ground for change brought about by defamiliarization—was it in a transcultural psychology? Or was it in the physiological mechanisms of perception? Was it in the individual, or was it in the community that inculcated norms of style, genre, etc.? Although they did not provide answers, by focussing on defamiliarization as the source of literariness, the formalists succeeded in bringing new urgency to some of the most basic questions legislating literary scholarship—historical, practical, or theoretical.

In his second chapter, Striedter takes up the tricky task of relating Russian Formalism to the work of the Prague Linguistic Circle. He proposes a three part progression, each step of which is organized around a different concept of the work of art :

- "1. The work of art as the sum of devices, which have a defamiliarizing function whose purpose is impeded perception.
2. The work of art as a system of devices in specific synchronic and diachronic functions.
3. The work of art as a sign in an aesthetic function." (P.88; see also P. 95)

This is a most useful scheme (but compare it with Peter Steiner's formulation of the move from formalism to Structuralism in the concluding essay to his anthology, *The Prague School: Selected Writings, 1929-1946* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982) that reflects both continuities and changes. Each of the steps can be associated with the work of a major theoretician. Shklovsky is the key figure in step 1: Tynyanov in step 2: and Mukarovsky in step 3. And this scheme covers as well the move from Russia to Czechoslovakia: "We might say that Russian formalism covers phases 1 and 2, and Czech Structuralism phases 2 and 3." (P.106) It is a tribute to Roman Jakobson that such a scheme cannot contain him, for he was an innovatory presence in all three phases.

Jurij Tynyanov plays an axial role in these developments for it was he rather more than any other who devoted himself to the questions left unanswered in

formalism's early phase. Tynyanov's almost preternatural 'feel' for history, which would in his later years make him such a masterful historical novelist, can be seen at work in his 1927 watershed essay "On Literary Evolution." Tynyanov had already concerned himself with the problem of how to incorporate Shklovsky's powerful but essentially anarchist ideas about defamiliarization into a system. Shklovsky was very much a part of the cultural revolution that coincided with the political revolution wrought by the Bolsheviks; his instincts were those of the avant-garde; he delighted in the role of *enfant terrible*, and highlighted stylistic inversion of readerly expectation because such slaps in the face of the traditional public were in accord with his desire to tear down restraints of the past. Tynyanov, as Striedter makes abundantly clear, was less a destroyer than a builder, someone eager to use terms like 'device' and 'defamiliarization' less as nihilist bombs than historical bricks, materials from which could be constructed a system of literary change that would incorporate the past as well as the future, towards which Shklovsky strove exclusively.

Tynyanov's basic move was to concentrate on an elaborate theory of overlapping relations between periods of time, different levels of social and discursive expression, and different styles, all of which were part of a unitary process that was ongoing and synchronous. Tynyanov emphasized the degree to which literary history was not a dead succession of unconnected revolutions, but a series of events whose consequences extended very much into the living present, and which, therefore, had implications for the future as well. He chose "evolution," rather than "history," to nominate his account of past-present relations, because he wished to emphasize precisely the tension and struggle of the process by which social forces work on texts to give birth to different texts.

He proposes a number of key terms he hopes will be useful in transforming literary history into literary evolution. One of the more important of these is *ustanovka*, first introduced by Jakobson as a Russian equivalent for the German *Einstellung*, a term that "can mean at once the orientation of one thing to something else, and the arrangement of all the parts within a system (corresponding to its external orientation)..." (P. 59) Tynyanov then describes how each aspect of a text performs several functions at once: each element is part of the whole of the particular text containing it; but it also is an element in another series, the whole of that part of literary discourse in which it is inscribed (more often than not, how the element is perceived against the backdrop of the genre to which it belongs). As such, it thus participates not only in a particular text, but in the evolution of other texts; it follows that each element in a given work must be read against the backdrop formed by other levels of discourse in the society—the evolution of legal, religious, business, street languages, etc.

Tynyanov provides two other terms that are crucial for grasping the dialectic between system in an individual text, and the various contextual systems that surround it: *synfunction* and *autofunction*. The first nominates a particular element's role within a single text (let us say, in a crude example, a legal document, perhaps a will, used as a clue in given detective story); the second refers to the element's role in other literary genres (such as how legal documents are used in realistic novels). Autofunction ultimately will refer as well to extraliterary functions of the same element, such as legal documents in the law. And of course all these simultaneous functions must then be mapped onto the various histories that detective stories, literary language, and extra literary discourses constitute together.

Tynyanov's emphasis on evolution and system culminated in the theses he published with Jakobson in 1929 called "Problems in the study of Literature and Language." The calculatedly undramatic title of the theses did not conceal their nature as a manifesto arguing that the ancient quarrel between poetics and history was over, for it was now understood that "the history of a system was itself a system."

Striedter treats the Jakobson/Tynyanov document as the *dernier cri* of Russian formalism; but in harmony with that text's own emphasis on simultaneity, he treats it also as an originating document for Czech Structuralism. First of all, because the 1929 Jakobson/Tynyanov theses were written in Czechoslovakia, while Tynyanov was visiting Jakobson, who had left Moscow to become professor of linguistics at the University of Brno. But Striedter interprets the theses' role more fundamentally as a theoretical influence on Jan Mukarovsky, who was rapidly emerging as the leading light among those in the Prague Linguistic Circle who devoted themselves to questions of literary methodology. Mukarovsky had independently begun working with many of the same ideas about the interconnectedness of literature with other discursive systems. But he introduced two elements that were to make for crucial differences between his own work and that of the Russian Formalists.

The first was an emphasis on aesthetics as such; the second was a new understanding of the linguistic base of literature as participating in a general semiotics. Mukarovsky never ceased to think about the specificity of art, the features of it that set it apart from all other human expression. In this he was less influenced by the formalist concern for literaturnost, than he was by the native Czech tradition of aesthetics represented by the work of such men as Josef Durdik, Otokar Hostinsky, and Otokar Zich, Mukarovsky's immediate predecessor in the chair of aesthetics at Charles University. Although he worked with music rather than literature, Zich is an important figure in this story, because he provided a powerful example of how aesthetics is related to semantics. As Striedter formulates this development, "If early

Russian formalism sought chiefly to found how a work of art is made, for Czech formal aesthetics since Zich this question was closely linked with the question of its meaning... notions that Zich's student Mukarovsky and Czech Structuralism developed further." (P. 85)

The second important feature introduced by the Czechs (and their Russian compatriots working in Prague and Brno) was a conception of language as sign. From very early on, Mukarovsky sought to theorize the specific implications for art of Saussure's general theory that the elements of a linguistic utterance do not have meaning in themselves. The particular way in which this manifested itself was in Mukarovsky's attempt to isolate what was uniquely aesthetic in a work of art, the "aesthetic object" in a poem, as opposed to the work-thing of the paper and ink comprising the material text. But since the medium of literature is language, a means of communication across the whole spectrum of human activities, one had to oppose the aesthetic function of words to their possible meanings in other discourses.

Formalist linguists, such as Lev Jakubinsky, had earlier wrestled with the same dilemma. Their conclusion was patently unviable: a distinction between "everyday language" and "poetic language." The formalist attempt to isolate something that could be understood as a poetical language failed, largely because, in their understanding of it, such a language would have an immanent quality that guaranteed it would not be taken as mere communication.

What the Czechs understood from the outset of the activity that characterizes them in their period of flourishing (roughly from 1929 to 1946) was that there were no single, stable, immanent feature in language that could be read off as aesthetic. The distinctiveness of the aesthetic had to be understood as a function, the instantiation of which would change from place to place and in different cultural settings. A given literary text is a sign in a specific aesthetic function. As such, each word in it must do at least two things at the same time (we see again the emphasis on simultaneity so characteristic of Slavic theory in these years, and whose most comprehensive expression is found in Bakhtin's insistence on dialogue).

Each word in a text, understood as a linguistic sign, always refers the reader to a meaning that is not literary: if, to use once again our example of a legal document, a "will" is mentioned in a story or novel, the reader must know what a "will" is in his own lived experience. He has inherited money, or at least understands how wills work in his society's legal system. But the document will also have taken on for the reader another meaning, related but different, that accrues through the uses it serves in articulating the aesthetic function of this particular story, the complex of meanings which structures the work as an aesthetic object. In Striedter's paraphrase, "whereas in the usual, purely communicative use of language the conjunction of

particular meanings and particular linguistic elements seems obvious, serving only to convey information about a given reality, in the aesthetic sign (because of the directional duality just discussed) the conjunction becomes problematic. It is exposed as a tension between verbal material, its meaning, and the concrete reference of the sign, and it is exploited aesthetically, for instance as tension between the construction of a work as a web of poetic meanings and the experiential meaning of the real world." (P.93)

In the movement from Russian Formalism to Czech Structuralism, described in this way, one cannot but be gratified by a certain whiggish sense of progress, as major problems in literary theory are addressed with greater and greater subtlety over time in a continuous dialogue between practitioners. Mukarovsky's work overcomes the limitations of Shklovsky's narrow concept of 'device,' as well as Jakubinsky's static opposition between everyday and poetic language, while still maintaining many of the gains achieved through a deeper understanding of defamiliarization and system (à la Tynyanov).

In addition, the Czech emphasis on structure as deriving from essentially semiotic relations had the virtue of giving new prominence to specific social and cultural factors in aesthetics. For if the aesthetic object was defined by its fulfillment of aesthetic function, and aesthetic function was a semantic variable that could (in fact, had to) be variously achieved under different historical and social conditions, then the relation of a text to its contexts became of central importance. I use the plural of contexts, because in Prague usage, there is always slippage between the context in which the work first sees the light of day and the context in which that work is performed by readers in each of its subsequent concretizations (another key term for the Czechs).

The subsequent fate of Czech Structuralism can be understood as taking two diverging lines, that of Mukarovsky himself in his later work; and that of his principal successor at Charles University, Felix Vodicka. Striedter covers the later Mukarovsky, but he devotes a whole chapter to Vodicka, largely because, in line with Striedter's stated emphases in his book, Vodicka was to prove an influence on the German theory of *Rezeptionsästhetik*. It is at this point that I must confess a certain bias in my evaluation of Striedter's book. While recognizing it as a landmark achievement in our understanding of two of the most important schools of literary theory in the modern period, and as an exemplum of intelligent, accurate exposition, I hope it is possible to honorably disagree with some of its nuances. No doubt Vodicka, an attractive, modest man who always claimed to do no more than further elaborate ideas originally proposed by his teacher Mukarovsky, *did* provide a new focus on the central Prague School category of concretization. In doing so he assigned a

whole new importance to the role of the reader. If, then, I scant Striedter's treatment of Vodicka in this review, it is largely because I believe that in the end this emphasis on reader reception, in Vodicka's own writings and in those of the Konstanz school he influenced (Jauss and Iser, in particular), literary theory and historiography were never joined in a synthesis more powerful or useful than that already present in Tynyanov or Mukarovsky.

The basic problem, it seems to me, with Vodicka's theory of reader reception is that it ultimately provides a wholly inadequate account of the relation between what is transhistorical and what is in the text. Vodicka took several of his key concepts from the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, particularly those of 'uncertainty points' and 'concretization.' Ingarden conceived the work of art as a structure with gaps (*Unbestimmtheitsstelle*) in it, gaps which required individual readers to fill. Vodicka went further, arguing that "not just the schematic parts but the work's entire structure is subject to concretization since (the structure of the work) is projected against the background of the given literary tradition and so acquires, in the changing temporal, spatial, social, and, to some degree individual circumstances, ever-new characteristics." But as Frantisek Galan has pointed out, "Vodicka's solution...demands too steep a price for an explanation of historical changes, in that he arrives at this explanation at the expense of the literary work's structural unity. If any and all structural components of a particular work can eventually be reshuffled according to the expectations of the readers, it may well happen that the various critical testimonies, the very stuff of reception history, will not be referring to the same work of art. For Vodicka, the aesthetic object swallows up...the work's material vehicle: incessant changing of its guises obliterates the work's underlying identity." (*Historic Structures: The Prague School Project. 1928-1946*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985, P.160.)

The final chapter in Striedter's book is really a longish monograph on current work devoted to the topic of aesthetic value as that work might be illuminated through the insights of Czech Structuralism. The intent is obvious: having surveyed the work of the Structuralists historically, Striedter in these pages seeks to demonstrate their relevance to contemporary theoretical debate. It has to be said that this section of the book is perhaps less successful than its purely expository chapters.

Bakhtin, in particular, seems to get slighted in Striedter's otherwise comprehensive coverage (he is accorded a mere eleven pages 176-187). Striedter quite properly focuses on the Russian thinker's early philosophical works as they inform his later, more conventionally 'literary' theory. It is all the more surprising, then, that he nevertheless defines Bakhtin as a "semiotic Structuralist," (P.180), a characterization difficult to square not only with Bakhtin's own stated reservations about both

semiotics and structuralism (in his "Response to Questions from Novij Mir") , but with the conception of responsibility and authorship Bakhtin formulates in precisely those early works Striedter cites.

In general, the problem with Striedter's final chapter is not so much a weakness in its argument, which is more often than not cogent and fair, but in the peculiarity of the discursive universe Striedter here enters. Formalism and Structuralism cannot be innocent terms in the United States in the 1990s. First of all, because most current theories define themselves--justifiably or not--in their posteriority to both schools, or because "semiotics" has a somewhat tarnished reputation here. But also because, for all their innovativeness, both the Russians and the Czechs were still working in a tradition that has never at any time had much resonance in the United States--the European tradition of classical aesthetics. Thus there are few points of immediate convergence between work of the Prague school and some of the more vital achievements of current theory in the United States.

Literary criticism and theory have been a central factor in East European social history and political life. Its discourse has occupied a place among the languages of that culture different from that of literary theory in the United States. Three factors suggest we might nevertheless be on the brink of a new dialogue between the two traditions. The first is the increasing importance in the United States of literary theory in disciplines previously thought to be outside the usual bounds of literature--in anthropology, psychology, and even the law. The more imbricated literary theory here becomes with other discourses, the more at home we will be with the Slavic tradition, in which this has always been the case. Secondly, philosophy has played an increasingly prominent role in literary criticism here. While the number of professional philosophers who have achieved prominence in literary circles is still rather small, eccentric, and arguably parochial--Rousseau, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida and a very few others--it may be sufficient to suggest the relevance of other schools now out of fashion, possibly even the Kantianism, Neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology that were shaping forces in Eastern Europe. If so, then some of the preoccupations of Slavic theory will seem more familiar, and possibly even more useful. Thirdly, some of the unnatural constraints on interchange between scholars and ideas in Eastern Europe and the United States seem happily to be disappearing in the era of glasnost. The conditions for dialogue have never been better, and the relevance of Striedter's book may be greater than even its author could have hoped.

Review Article

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Roman Jakobson : *Echoes of His Scholarship*. Ed. by Daniel Armstrong and C.H. Van Schooneveld. Lisse, The Peter de Ridder Press, 1977. ix, 533 pp.

The thirty- four contributions to this anthology bring together important information about Roman Jakobson's decisive role in the various branches of the humanities and his personal influence on diverse scientific and cultural milieux. Needless to say, it is not merely the number of disciplines in which Jakobson has taken interest but, above all, the depth and intensity of his participation that are so impressive-- as this anthology convincingly testifies.

In what follows we shall look only at the studies which pertain to literary theory and poetics. To begin, Umberto Eco, charting Jakobson's impact on the development of semiotics, claims that an obvious link exists between Jakobson's synthetic works of the early 1960s and the rapidly growing world-wide acclaim of semiotics as a serious scholarly discipline. As the first scholar to combine the Peircean and Saussurean traditions, Jakobson served as the chief catalyst of this historical breakthrough. Eco seeks to sum up Jakobsonian semiotics in eight basic theses (or assumptions), but he intentionally does not distinguish between the common premises of semiotics and Jakobson's own tenets. Among the unique features of Jakobson's thought, we can find a concern for the study of language in operation, for the performance of its concrete tasks. This conception is indeed much more characteristic of Jakobson than is Eco's algebra of purely abstract differential systems. Let us also add that such a methodological orientation clearly ties in with Jakobson's general theory of functions. Unfortunately, Eco overlooks the category of function (and the corresponding typology of communicative situations) in his cursory investigation of Jakobson's theory of pragmatics and of his theory of context. The theory of language functions, which Jakobson helped formulate in the late 1920s and early 30s, constitutes, as we know, the core of the Prague School's pragmatics. Although Eco's survey of individual aspects of Jakobson's semiotics seems thorough enough, it tends to place Jakobson's dynamically evolving views into static, isolated categories. This tendency is particularly apparent when Eco discusses the interdisciplinary transfer of theoretical laws and principles from one sign system to another.

Elmar Holenstein's essay, "Jakobson's Contribution to Phenomenology," like his other studies, further deepens our understanding of Jakobson's philosophical

foundations and proves how untenable is the view which considers structuralism as "scientistic" or "technocratic" methodology without relation to modern philosophy. Holenstein's article is grounded in Husserlean distinctions between static and genetic, eidetic and transcendental phenomenology. Holenstein reconstructs Jakobson's methodology primarily from phonological analyses by demonstrating the analogy between the structural and phenomenological notions of opposition: over against the logical conceptions, the structural notion embraces not only the relationship of exclusion but also that of inclusion. As a result, structural analysis is able to differentiate marked and unmarked members of an opposition and, more importantly, to account qualitatively for particular elements. Jakobson's contribution to genetic phenomenology rests in his analysis of the functional relations of interdependence, of relations which are immanent and which form the basis for the structural explanation of the universal dimension of time. In an aside on poetry, Holenstein mentions another temporal axis provided by the time of perception of the work. We might add that the element of time enters the work's structure mainly because the work contains elements of different historical provenance, and their reciprocal tensions help shift the dynamic process of development into the text. Holenstein's sections devoted to eidetic phenomenology (i.e., to the problem of universals) and to transcendental phenomenology yield a comparison between the structural and phenomenological objection that structuralism neglects the "subjective relativity of all objective cognition" does not apply to Jakobson and the Prague School at all. In contrast to traditional phenomenology, however, which holds that the structure of the mind is reflected in the structure of the world, structuralism emphasizes that, in its constitution of the world, the mind is bound by the systems of intersubjective categories, rules, and relations. To be sure, the Prague school continues to develop its conception of the intersubjective control over the subject. Holenstein would find ample testimony of this development above all in the school's aesthetics and poetics.

In his article on Jakobson's poetics, Tzvetan Todorov in turn approaches Jakobson's categories from the standpoint of French structuralism. Todorov focuses on Jakobson's thesis regarding the autotelic nature of poetry (of its orientation towards the sign itself), and traces the origins of this thesis back to Kant. Todorov correctly stresses the fact that the structuralists' recognition of the social function of poetry prevents the simplistic identification of autotelism with a drastically constricted program of art for art's sake. Todorov also shows that Jakobson proved increasingly able to integrate the referential function into his conception of poetry (although Todorov himself does not draw a distinction between the referential function of poetry and its imitation of external reality). In fact, we can get beyond autotelism and discern the purpose of artistic self-purposiveness if we realise that, given its

orientation toward the sign, a work of art attains an intensity of possible meanings capable of disclosing the total relationship between man and the universe. For Todorov, however, this line of thought would scarcely be acceptable. On the contrary, Todorov emphasizes Jakobson's dubious formalist thesis about "literariness" as the proper subject of literary study and the device as its sole hero (instead of the efforts to investigate the work in its global signification). Precisely because of this preference, in Todorov's view, Jakobsonian poetics is seen to fit the French notion that science is limited to the description of formal relationships. In our opinion, however, Jakobson's concrete analyses of poetics texts cannot be forced into such a narrow framework, even though (as Todorov points out) these analyses aim at disclosing the paradigm of possible meanings rather than the meaning of particular works. Todorov goes on to discuss the principal devices which, according to Jakobson, characterize the poetic text: the well-known projection of the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination and Jakobson's method of defining the types or genres of utterance by means of the semantic expansion of language categories such as metaphor and metonymy.

Krystyna Pomorska for her part deals in great details with particular poetic devices in regard to Jakobson's fundamental linguistic postulates, namely, the principles of opposition and of hierarchy, and the functional relation of part and whole. Pomorska collects examples of the semantization of the poetic text's phonological and grammatical properties which, subject to extreme organization, acquire independent semantic validity, enter into relation with the work's theme and composition, and so become indices of individual stylistic tendencies. In Pomorska's view, Jakobson's concentration on euphonic organization as such (that is, without a definite semantic interpretation) characterizes his early, pre-phonological phase, whereas the later phonologically mature stage is exemplified by a concern for devices such as paronomasia and poetic etymology, in which the ties between semantic equivalents are readily observable. This shift corresponds roughly to the development of Jakobson's interests, yet the earlier approach, too, is justified by the nature of poetic texts themselves. Undoubtedly, we could find texts (or at least valid concretizations of such texts) in which not every configuration of speech-sounds is directly motivated and in which the main semantic role belongs rather to the euphonic organization of the text as a whole. To be sure, this semantic effect is often indefinite, manifesting itself, for instance, in the blurring of the relations among the standard meanings of words and in the activation of their accessory meanings. Such semantic processes were analyzed by Eichenbaum, Tynjanov and Mukarovsky; indeed, Mukarovsky's and Jakobson's analyses of Macha's *May* offer instructive illustrations of the difference between these two modes of interpreting euphony. A determined search for the immediate links between grammatical and semantic constructions of

the text, however, may in some instances reach the limit of what we might call premature semantization. Thus Pomorska assumes, for instance, that Pasternak's use of the instrumental case, marked within the system of cases by marginality, carries with it the theme " of marginalia and their significance for life."

Another part of Pomorska's survey of Jakobson's poetics is devoted to a discussion of the principles of selection and combination, of metaphor and metonymy, and of parallelism. (An exhaustive study of James J. Fox in this anthology is also devoted to poetic parallelism.) It is important to note that Pomorska calls attention to several of Jakobson's studies from the 1930s which treated poetic texts as components of a hierarchically superior structure of poetic personality and thereby paved the way for a semiotic integration of textual explications with traditional literary concerns such as biography. Pomorska notes how closely Jakobson's expanded interests are related to contemporary historical events. In keeping with her previous valuable studies, Pomorska repeatedly points to *avant-garde* art and the fate of its creators as the mainspring of Jakobson's inspiration. (Thomas G. Winner's article, too, supplies important material by assembling Jakobson's youthful poetic and programmatic statements and suggesting that even such crucial theoretical categories as the laying bare of the device, the autonomy of artistic structure, and artistic deformation have one of their origins in the *avant-garde*.)

Maria Renata Mayenowa's brief piece on Jakobson's comparative Slavic poetics stems from a twofold understanding of comparativism: as the reconstruction of a system's evolutionary stages, and as the circumscription of that system's general principles. Jakobson's study, *Foundations of Czech Verse* (1926), which identified the correlation between the hierarchy of prosodic elements of particular languages and the elementary features of their respective systems of versification, is an example of the latter set of problems. As Jakobson argued, because of the decisive relations and traditions of cultural systems, such equations can never have a single solution. On the other hand, Jakobson's path-breaking studies devoted to the reconstruction of the norms of the earliest Slavic verse illustrate the former set of problems. Here Jakobson deployed the axiomatic method of constructing oppositions among elemental forms: even after a quarter-century these studies remain unsurpassed. For instance, when examining Slavic rhyme with its extraordinary sensitivity to grammar and to poetic tropes like homoeoptoton, Jakobson managed to disclose the role of the special derivational and inflectional structures of Slavic languages and of their relatively free word order. (Dean S. Worth dedicates detailed and well-documented essay to Jakobson's work on rhyme.) Another interesting problem concerns the legacy of the ancient Slavic poetic symbols and of their surprising reappearances in the poetry up to the present day. (V.V.Ivanov's and V.I.Toporov's article discusses Jakobson's contribution to the study of folklore and mythology.)

We can do no more than mention the remaining articles of this anthology devoted to literary theory. Foremost experts offer elaborate reports on Jakobson's research in Old Czech (František Švejkovsky), Old Russian (Riccardo Picchio) and Old Church Slavonic (F.V. Mares) literatures. Among the studies of Jakobson's activities in various cultural and scientific contexts, the essay of Miroslav Rensky about Jakobson's participation in the Prague School is of special interest. Rensky analyzes the contribution of the Russian members of the Prague Linguistic Circle, for example, their indebtedness to Hegelian tradition, which had been more vital in Russia than in Bohemia. Rensky underscores the methodological and theoretical pluralism of Vilém Mathesius which, in the early days of the Circle, balanced out the more uncompromising "scientism" of Jakobson and Trubetzkoy, and later found a positive response in the integrating attempts of Jakobson himself. Rensky also examines Jakobson's role in the collective pronouncements of the Circle and so dispels several old misunderstandings. Particularly noteworthy are Rensky's remarks about Jakobson's heritage in Czechoslovakia after World War II. Rensky shows considerable understanding of the complicated situation of the scholars in the humanities in this period, yet he concludes by saying that Jakobson's collaborators and disciples "will have to live with the verdict of historiography for not defending his name with more courage and dignity."

The present reviewer, however, would like to suggest a need for some discrimination at this point. Let me mention such little known facts as the endeavors to include an entry on Jakobson in the dictionary of Czech writers compiled in the early sixties: the open polemic which helped offer a more accurate appreciation of Jakobson's part in Czech cultural life and which could be undertaken in the Czech press only at one's considerable personal risk; the anthology of Jakobson's literary essays, *Slovesne umění a umělecké slovo* (Verbal Art and the Artistic Word), whose long delayed publication, prevented in 1969 at the very moment that the book was ready for distribution, is in itself a tragic-comic event typical of the times. (Let us mention in passing that Vera Linhartová, writer and historian of art, also devotes an article to Jakobson's activities in Czechoslovakia; other articles describe the impact of Jakobson and of his work in the USA, Scandinavia, the Soviet Union and the Netherlands.)

There is no room left for a report on the numerous linguistic contributions which, in accord with the main lines of Jakobson's work, comprise the core of the anthology. Yet even if we were to take all these essays into account, it would not affect the principal trait of the anthology itself, and that is its practical usefulness. Any one dealing with a given philological problem will find a well-informed assessment of Jakobson's contribution to it. None of the authors in the anthology nor the anthology as a whole sets the task of depicting the complete development

of Jakobson's creative personality--all of its contradictions as well as its unique inner coherence. Since the contributors divided their subjects according to the separate compartments of Jakobson's diverse specialities (excepting Holenstein's essay on Jakobson's philosophical foundations), Jakobson's all-pervasive principles and categories of operation can barely be perceived. If the focus of investigation shifted to the creative personality, the individual combinations and articulations of these categories would be more likely to come to the fore. (Only the introduction by C.H. Van Schooneveld, co-editor of the anthology, deals with one such personal category, yet even van Schooneveld shows more concern for the impetus of Jakobson's work for future linguistics than for Jakobson himself.) In short, the study of personality, of that supreme expression of "autotelism" in the humanities (for what other purpose could such studies possibly have?), remains in Jakobson's case, and even after this anthology, ahead of us. Only with difficulty can one imagine the magnitude of the problems with which a future "biographer" of Jakobson will have to grapple. But then many of the contributions to the present anthology will prove to be indispensable aids.

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XIIIth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF AESTHETICS

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